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Cultural Democratization and Youth Culture in West-Germany, 1955-1970

1. Introduction

If we look at the change of West-German society between 1955 and 1970, it is without doubt that a significant change of West-German social mentality and behavior and in the culture of its common people had occurred during this period. Perhaps the most obvious changes are a decline of authoritarianism, which had been diagnosed by the social psychology of leftist psychoanalysts – including the Frankfurt School in exile – as a central factor for the Nazis gaining power in January 1933,¹ and what I called in my own research on value change in Japan and West Germany from the 1990s, a de-hierarchization of human relations, especially in the relations among common people and the relations between people of different social status, and – to a lesser degree – also in gender relations. Human relations in West Germany during the late 1950s and early 1960s were characterized by the proper deference that had to be shown by the lower classes towards their social betters.² These changes in social mentality and human relations, with an accompanying recognition of the legitimacy of the culture of the common people, and not only the embracing of representative democracy by the majority of the West Germans at the end of the 1960s, is what is implied with the term *cultural democratization*. The question that has been much discussed in Germany, especially since 2008, is how this obvious change came to happen, and what and who was involved in bringing this change into fruition.

When I started my project of research on West Germany's youth culture with a historical and cross-cultural comparative and contrastive approach in 2009, I was heavily influenced by my cooperation with my deceased wife's own research on the topic during the late 1990s. We had been especially impressed by West-German research based on the Shell Youth Surveys and the compilation of research results on British youth culture from the Birmingham Center for Contemporary Cultural Research (see Hall and Jefferson 1975). West-German research on youth culture tended to treat it as a uniform phenomenon encompassing the whole generation of youth. Reading the volume edited by Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson was an eye opener as they defined youth culture in a plural as *youth subcultures*, and insisted on the importance of the differences between classes and genders and, to a certain degree, they also found regional variations. Only very few West-German researchers played heed to these problems.³

Due to my own experiences of growing up in a working-class community of miners in rural North Hessen, and entering the local Gymnasium at age ten, while from age fourteen to sixteen spending each summer for more than a month with my grandparents in the working-class quarters of the industrial city of Oberhausen, later becoming close friends with a number of French youth from a rural industrial region in the department Oise just at the frontier to the banlieue of Paris and visiting them on my own, and also hitchhiking through Holland and England, I came into close contact with youth life in various regions and various social classes since an early age, not only in West Germany, but also in France, and to a lesser degree

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in Holland and England. Hence, I became aware of the differences of growing up in different regional, social-class, rural/urban, and religious subcultural settings. My wife, who grew up in a small agricultural village made similar experiences as her own education after elementary school moved her from her village through schools in various regional towns and eventually to university in Marburg. Therefore, we fully agreed with the importance of acknowledging the variations and differences between youth subcultures due to their regional and class setting.

Another important point is that during the early years of my research, I still harbored a rather idealistic understanding concerning the relation between youth protest and the leftist student movement in West Germany during the second half of the 1960s, which had been in part the result of the amalgamation of the West-German peace movement, the leftist student movement, the leftist wing of the labor-union youth, and antiauthoritarian youth subcultures into the extra-parliamentary opposition against the *Notstandsgesetze* (Emergency Act) in 1966, and my own involvement with several of these groups. However, the year 2008 had been the fortieth anniversary of the international cumulation of the protest events and movements of the 1960s in 1968, and this anniversary led to a lot of publications about 1968, especially in Germany, France, and also Japan. Many of these were reminiscences about heroic revolutionary, activism or conservative and rightist denigrations of the protest movements, however, they also included quite a number of publications attempting serious historical research and critical contemplations about the movements and their effect on their societies, and the latter has been reinforced ten years later in 2018.

At the same time, since about 1990, the 1950s and 1960s have become an important field of research for social and cultural history in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. This led to a number of very interesting studies, not only about youth life and youth subcultures, and about the protest movements in these countries, but also the transformations that West German society and culture experienced during this period, which initially draw my attention due to other areas of research and teaching, but which have proved to be indispensable for a critical new understanding of the period. As a result of reading into the vast amount of these new publications, especially since I restarted my research after six years of almost abstinence from the topic in 2019, my understanding of the connection between youth subcultures, youth protest, and the student movement has become more critical and differentiated.

The West-German extra-parliamentary opposition was not a unified and monolithic organization, but an alliance of a great variety of different organization with quite a large spectrum, of political and ideological orientations. And especially the leftist student movement was divided into a number of mutually antagonistic factions that each displayed their own brand of political orthodoxy and forceful dogmatic demands on what other students should think; This was something that could become quite frightening for uninitiated newcomers to the university.⁴ At the same time, most of the middle-class protagonists of the student movement harbored quite negative attitudes towards the working-class youth subcultures, their political orientations and their cultural tastes of popular music and culture, which tended to be denigrated as American mass culture.⁵ Not only had most of the middle-class protagonists internalized the elitist bourgeois cultural tastes and values that were propagated in advanced secondary and post-secondary education, especially the antiauthoritarian faction in Frankfurt, which was strongly influenced by Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, also shared the Adornoian distaste and rejection of American popular culture and mass culture.

Hence, although for those working-class youth, who were born since 1947 and became active in the protest movement of the second half of the 1960s at an early age as secondary school students or apprentices in professional education and training, participation in the

protest movement and participation in youth culture were closely intertwined with each other, this was not necessarily the case for the middle-class protagonists of the various factions of the Marxist Left. However, as I explored deeper and deeper into the various materials and research results, not only concerning West Germany, but also concerning other Western European countries, it became obvious to me that the role of youth subcultures in inducing the cultural shift towards a common embracement of representative mass democracy that became obvious in West Germany after 1968 started already in the mid-1950s and was much more important than former leftist middle-class protagonist of the student movement admit in their interpretation of the 1960s, which tend to focus exclusively on the role of the university students.

What I am dealing with in this paper is essentially a transformation of *Civic Culture* that is based on a deep change in social mentality. My notion of social mentality is identical with Mita Munesuke's Japanese concept of 「社会意識」 (which is also sometimes translated as social consciousness).⁶ As Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba noted,⁷ this kind of transformations are long processes, which include inter-generational as well as intra-generational processes of value change, lifestyle, and political engagement among the elites as well as the common people, which in the case of West Germany lasted at least from the end of World War I to the early 1970s.

2. Some Preliminary Clarification of Terms

There are three terms, which regularly appear in the discussions about West-German youth of the 1950s and 1960s, which, however, need a bit of clarification how they are used, or why they are not used in this paper, these are 'common people', 'youth culture', 'youth subculture', and 'Americanization'.

The term 'common people' was introduced by Kaspar Maase⁸ as a translation of the German vernacular expression *einfache Leute*, which during the 1950s and the 1960s was a popular expression among people from the lower classes depending on wage- and salary-earning⁹ in blue-collar or sub-altern white collar occupations, when referring to themselves, especially in order to distinguish themselves from the petit-bourgeois and bourgeois middle classes and upper white-collar new middle classes, while also using the vernacular expression '*wir da unten, und und die da oben*' (we below, and they above) as a rallying point of collective identity within the social hierarchy. This is not an established term of German academic social analysis, and it does not address a socially and culturally uniform collective, although in the life-world of the lower classes, the vernacular expressions constituted a common collective identity and social character. 'Common people' in this sense comprised roughly the proletarian working classes, small farmers, who often combined part-time farming with non-agricultural employment, simple (unskilled) white collar employees and public servants, and low-level personal services. These different groups also entertained common circles of socialization and inter-marriage. As a rule of the thumb, during the 1950s and 1960s these 'common people' comprised of roughly two-thirds of the West-German population, and the social background of between 70% (1960s) and 80% (1950s) of West-German youth.

Friedrich Tenbruck, who in 1962 presented the first sociological analysis of the position of youth within West-German society after Helmut Schelsky's monumental analysis of West-German youth of the first half of the 1950s, detected that something had happened since Schelsky published his book. He diagnosed that "contemporary youth has not only its distinct forms of association, sports, leisure, it also has its own fashion, morals, literature, music, and language," and concludes that the life of contemporary West-German youth was forming a

configuration that was characterized by self-consciousness as a distinct group in society and autarchy and self-control of the group concerning the ways and norms of its life, a configuration that he defined as a *Teilkultur* (subculture).¹⁰ Tenbrucks book marks the beginning of the academic understanding of West German youth life as youth culture, although the term itself was already known from its use by British media and research since the early 1950s. Nevertheless, Clarke, Hall, Jefferson and Roberts (1975: 15-17) have argued convincingly that the term *Youth Culture* in the singular has been mainly a marketing category that should be replaced by the concept of subculture, and that *youth subcultures* in the plural which can coexist at the same time but within different social strata are a more appropriate category for social analysis. However, in his analysis of the influence of the British youth subculture of the *Teddy Boys* on British youth in general, Horn (2009: 115-142) makes a distinction between the working-class youth subculture and British mainstream teenage culture, which appropriated and transformed important elements of *Teddy-Boys'* style and cultural tastes into their own way of life. I regard Horn's distinction as significant, and it is also close to Maase (1992) observations concerning the appropriation of American popular culture by West-German youth during the second half of the 1950s. From a generational point of view (see Möhwald 2023: 19-17), we can understand a mainstream youth culture as a configuration that is shared more or less by the majority of a generation of youth, while subcultures formed by specific groups of youth may also form avant-garde generational units that have a strong influence on styles, tastes, and ways of life of mainstream youth culture. What Tenbruck analyzes in his book, is more or less the West German mainstream teenage culture that emerged between the second half of the 1950s and the mid-1960s.

During the 1950s and the 1960s, the term 'Americanization' was used by conservative middle-class critics and educators to denounce the trends in West-German youth culture, and until today, the German discussion on American influences on West-German youth culture of the 1950s and 1960s is dominated by the terms *Americanization*, *Americanism*, and *Anti-Americanism*. However, these terms were not simply used to describe the influence of the American popular culture on West German youth, they were rather imbued with value-loaded cultural criticism of American influences on West Germany's common people and youth, therefore I rather avoid using these terms in my own analysis and use 'American cultural influences' instead. I refrain at this point to go into more detail concerning the historical development of these terms,¹¹ I only want to note that conservative German cultural critique of American influences on the mass of common people and on German youth was centered since the mid-19th century around a horror of conservative economic, political, and cultural elites concerning American cultural influences' furthering of vulgar *Materialismus* (materialism) among the lower classes and of social *Gleichmacherei* (levelling) of the elites with the common people, and thus destroying their own hegemonic and privileged position in German society.

American popular culture's influence in Germany and the accompanying cultural democratization in the sense as it is used by Maase (2001) and Hobsbawm (2010c), i.e. the change of popular culture that included mass production and mass consumption of cultural products and its increasing acceptance or at least its tacit toleration by the elites accelerated in the second half of the 19th century, and it was closely related to the industrial modernization led by the rapid growth of heavy industry, the evolvement of giant joint-stock companies, the rapid growth of the salary-earning new white-collar middle class directing and managing the administration of these companies and basing its products and production on scientific and technological invention. It was the evolvement of a technical and scientific civilization which understood itself to stand at the apex of technological and scientific progress and of

the evolution of human society, hence it also was the basis for Europe's rule over the world. This process was accompanied by a rapid urbanization and growth of the big industrial and administrative cities. In Germany this process proceeded explosively after the end of the Franco-Prussian War and the founding of the second *Reich* (German Empire) in 1871. For instance, within a two decades the new capital Berlin became Germany's political, administrative, financial and industrial center, and between 1871 and 1910, its population increased from 825 thousand to 2.07 million people. However, other economic and administrative centers showed similar rates of growth: Munich's population grew in the same period from 170 thousand to 596 thousand inhabitants, that of Hamburg from 240 thousand to 931 thousand inhabitants, Cologne from 129 thousand to 517 thousand inhabitants. The growth of these four cities, which nowadays have a population of more than a million inhabitants, was the most striking, however, the new industrial centers of the Ruhr region and elsewhere showed similar rates of population increases during the same period.

Of course, this development had massive social consequences. The expanding cities produced what sociologists of the early twentieth century called *mass societies* in the sense that the crowds of common people who had to be transported to and from work, had to find places for living, shopping, leisure, and entertainment were massive, and so were the logistics of supplying the industry of these cities with raw materials and its growing population with food and other goods. It was only natural that the needs of leisure and entertainment of these crowds could only be satisfied by mass production of popular culture, and in this industry the United States were leading in creativity, quality, productivity, and the invention of new products and new technologies. Around the big cities of the advanced industrial countries of Europe grew amusement parks and other venues for mass entertainment in amusement parlors, dance halls, and fairs, and also in sports events for crowds of spectators. Right since the late 19th century, working-class youth as well as the privileged upper-middle- and upper-class male youth were the most avid consumers of the new mass-produced popular culture and its American products, especially the popular music and 'hot' dances of *ragtime* and *jazz*, and dime novels, film, and later radio.

And this was also the period of an explosive growth of the first political mass movement, the labor movement with its combination of collective bargaining and other economic activism in labor unions and collective political activism in socialist parties. Together with the influence of American ideas about social equality and democracy, the labor movement evoked among the middle-class elites deep seated fears about the vulgar, unruly and impertinent crowds of the common people and their demand of political and cultural emancipation. And these fears grew especially strong and pronounced after World War I and during the period of conservative reconstruction of West-German society during the 1950s.

3. West German Youth of the 1950s and 1960s and American Cultural Influences

Before I discuss American cultural influences on West-German youth during the 1950s and 1960s, a short summary of the evolvement of West-German youth life and youth subcultural forms during the 1950s and 1960s is necessary. In 1957, Helmut Schelsky published his monumental sociological analysis of West-German youth of the first half of the 1950s, entitled *Die skeptische Generation*. Empirically, his study was based on several regionally and socio-demographically limited youth surveys among rural youth, working-class youth, and youth of refugees and expellees from the late 1940s and the early 1950s, as well as the first two

representative youth surveys from 1953 and 1955 (with some notes concerning the third survey from 1956) that had been conducted by the opinion research institute EMNID for the *Jugendwerk der deutschen Shell*. Schelsky's diagnosis was that West-German youth of the period was concerned with a strong orientation towards social upward-mobility and with pragmatic problems of securing a better general and professional education, while securing their own and their families' life in the precarious situation of economic scarcity in the postwar era. At the same time, they harbored a strong skepticism concerning adult attempts to interfere in their life and to organize them in various mass movements. After a short inspection of the results of the 1956 survey, Schelsky pronounced that there existed no subcultural activities among West German youth, what was more or less correct for the majority of West-German youth before 1955.

However, the year 1955 was a caesura in the evolvement of two important factors, one economic, and the other cultural. In the realm of West German economy, the year 1955 marked the start of rapid economic growth, and growth of average wages exceeding the necessities of life, and the advent of a society of relative mass affluence, mass production of consumer goods, and mass consumption, which was dubbed in vernacular German as *Wirtschaftswunder* (economic miracle). On the cultural side, *rock 'n' roll* music arrived in West Germany, and with it came a mass import of the products of the American popular-culture industry (popular music, film, television series, pulp fiction, household goods etc., accompanied by the models of everyday life styles, and youth styles displayed in these media).

A relative affluence enabled West-German youth to look for entertainment, and this led to the appearance of West Germany's first youth subcultural phenomena, the working-class *Halbstarke* subculture with a strong affinity to *rock 'n' roll* music and American styles of popular culture and lifestyle, and the middle class *Exis*, which blossomed among students in higher secondary and higher education and was oriented towards bohemian styles, French existentialism and American fiction of the *beat* generation, French *chanson à texte* and American jazz.¹² And at this point, I really was very astonished about the similarities between the findings in Maase's (1992) and in Horn's (2009) explorations into West German and British youth culture of the 1950s. In both countries evolved first working-class subcultures (*Teddy Boys* in Britain, *Halbstarke* in West Germany) which had a major impact on the evolvement of a mainstream *Teenager* youth culture at the end of the decade, and as a distinction from working-class styles, an *exi*-style among educated middle-class youth, that led to a middle-class derivate of the mainstream youth culture.

However, if we look closer at West Germany, what is important is the break of the emerging youth culture with the authoritarian traditions that the nationalistic ultra-conservatives in the Adenauer regime desperately tried to restore. Here Maase's (1992) observations concerning the styles adopted by youth culture become important, especially because of the influence of these styles on the everyday culture of the common people. Besides oral-history interviews with people who experienced their youth during the 1950s, Maase especially analyzed pictures and texts in the youth Magazine *Bravo*, as well as photos from the period. What he noted immediately was the difference of the style and demeanor in which young people of the 1950s presented themselves in contact with other people compared to previous eras. These styles were actually borrowed from the demeanor of American occupation soldiers and the role models presented in American films and television series. Maase describes a decidedly casual and offhanded posture, not only in their contact with peers, but also vis-à-vis superiors, teachers, parents, and adults in general, which differed clearly from the habitual *Habachstellung* (military standing at attention) of German youth of the previous period, and he concludes that a change

from a military to a civil posture took place. This new style of casualness included the use of language, clothing – especially at school and workplaces – and it quickly drifted from the *Halbstarke* subculture into the emerging mainstream teenage culture and also into the everyday culture and behavior of the common people in general. The result was a clear de-hierarchization of West-German human relations. Of course, this was not an instantaneous process, but one that continued throughout the 1960s until it became a general habit of the West Germans in the early 1970s.

Rock 'n' roll fever abated at the end of the 1950s and the start of the 1960s, it did not disappear completely, however. While the attention of the media and the music industry switched to other styles of popular music, *rock 'n' roll* music still continued to dominate live music and dance events of West-German youth, and this trend was reinforced by American and increasingly British bands that were hired to play the circuits of the clubs on Allied military bases, and also played gigs for West-German youth at German clubs and youth dance events. This practice led to the replacement of American popular music by *British beat* music in the early 1960s (the *Beatles* and other British bands that performed in Germany played an important part in this process). The change of the music tastes of the West-German youth culture to British *beat* music during the first half of the 1960s also led to the adoption of the British youth subcultural *mod* style and its fascination with *black* music from Jamaica and the United States, while at the same time, the British popular music invasion rolled over Western Europe,¹³ the United States, and Japan. What continued and continuously gained strength during 1960s was the anti-authoritarian trend of a de-hierarchization of human relations and of a casual lifestyle within the West German youth culture, which was, however, complimented with an increasing interest in politics and the Peace Movement and willingness to engage in political protest.

It is without doubt that American cultural influences had an enormous impact during the 1950s not only on West Germany's youth and its broad adoption of American popular culture, but also on its political and economic elites in the form of political philosophy of representative democracy and of economic philosophy of mass production, mass consumption, and mass affluence.¹⁴ After Konrad Adenauer's election as the first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany on 15 September 1949, the internal and external policies of the Adenauer regime were marked by conflicting and mutually contradictory goals of the conservative reconstruction of West-German society based on the morals and values of 19th century political Catholicism aiming at reinstituting the political, social, and cultural hegemony of the bourgeois middle-class elites on one side, and on the other side, of the integration of West Germany into the Western protective umbrella of the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the emerging European Communities, and being accepted by the United States, the United Kingdom and the French Republic as a worthy ally. Hence, the conservative cultural critiques of the influence of American popular culture on the common people and the youth of West Germany were not merely *cultural* in nature, they also had an enormous hidden political aspect, because its agenda included as its main targets the refutation of an egalitarianism that could lead to mass affluence and mass democracy. These goals split the conservative elites into infighting between mutually antagonistic factions of 'traditionalists' and 'modernizers', the latter of which dominated West-German external, and increasingly also internal policies since the mid-1950s.

If we talk about 'cultural influences', we have to be aware that cross-cultural influences are never one-way streets, but are marked by mutual exchange, nor are they necessarily limited to cultural exchange between two countries, but often include cross-fertilization between multiple cultures. We also have to be aware that cultural influences are necessarily selective in nature,

not only by what is offered and what is chosen by the recipient, but also by how it is adopted by the recipient. And this is also true concerning the appropriation and adaptation of American popular culture by West-German and the Western European (and also Japanese) youth during the 1950s.

As Horn (2000: 1-21) and Maase (1992: 32-40) have made convincingly clear, British and West-German youth of the 1950s were not passive recipients of overwhelming American cultural propaganda and commercialization. They not only were very selective in their choices and very creative in adapting these choices into their own live and identity on an individual as well as on a collective level, and in these processes the American influences were thoroughly 'British-ized' and 'German-ized' (and as far as my own comparative listening to popular music from those countries suggests, also 'French-ized', 'Ital-ized', and 'Japan-ized').

One of the American popular culture's influences that is often forgotten (also by Kaase 1992) is the influence of American television drama. The dissemination of television sets among West-German common people increased considerably between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s, and so did the time of broadcasting TV. For filling the programming, it was necessary to buy TV-series and films from American companies. The impact of the picture of the white middle-class American family and the depiction of the relations between the family members, especially between the parents and their teenage children in the *Andy-Hardy* films and in American TV series like *Father Knows Best* and the *Donna Reed Show* that were shown in early evening prime time on West-German television cannot be underestimated. It showed family relations that were completely different from the authoritarian patriarchal family relations that re-dominated West German families in the second half of the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, and re-built the images of partnership between husband and wife and companionship between parents and children that had already been the rule among the common people in the immediate post-war period and had been suppressed by conservative family policies since 1949.¹⁵

We also have to be aware that Western European youth of the 1950s and 1960s were thoroughly comparative in their choices of foreign cultural influences. West-German youth of the 1950s and 1960s was not only attentive to American popular culture, but also to British, French, Dutch, Italian and others' popular cultures. These multiple influences were adapted and mediated into peculiar national and regional variations of the contents of 'mainstream' youth cultures in Western Europe. Concerning the youth cultures of continental Western Europe, American influences waned and were substituted by British popular *beat* culture around 1962-63. However, the influence of American popular culture came back in the mid-1960s, although this time not in the form of White *hillbilly* adaptations of Black *race music*, but in the form of Black *rhythm and blues* music that was called *soul* and very popular among British *Moderators*, another new influence about this time was American and British protest songs (Joan Baez, Bob Dylan, Donovan), which also supported the American Civil Rights Movement and the European Peace Movements. And then came the *Hippies* and their concepts of counter culture and American West-Coast Music (Jefferson Airplanes, Grateful Dead, The Doors etc.)

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And here we come to the linkage between youth culture and protest movements in West Germany. Actually, the leftist student movement was an absolute late-comer within the evolving West-German protest movement. The first wave of youth protest in West Germany was directed against the country's rearmament and culminated in 1952 in a National Youth Rally of labor-union youth, which was brutally suppressed by illegally deployed police forces shooting at the protesters (see Möhwald 2023b: 85). Labor-union youth and also youth from

several religious youth organizations and the proletarian *Naturfreunde-Jugend* were active in the Peace Movement since the early 1950s, and they also restarted their activism for peace with the international growth of the *Ban-the-Bomb* and *Easter-March* Movement in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and they were joined there by a peculiar international youth subculture of withdrawal from society labeled *Gammler* in German (see Möhwald 2023b: 134-135). In this process, solidarity with, and even participating in the Peace Movement became a general element of West-German youth culture, while the leftist student organizations during the first half of the 1960s still learned how to protest from Third-World visiting students (see Slobodian 2012).

Another important change occurred in the 1960s: the barrier between the social classes concerning popular-culture tastes eroded. During the second half of the 1950s, clear demarcation lines concerning hairstyles, clothing styles and popular-music styles were reported by Horn (2009) for Britain and Maase (1992) for West Germany. The situation in other countries is less clear, because – like in France – there either did not exist youth subcultures during the 1950s, or only on a very limited scale, or – like in the Netherlands or Japan – they have not become the object of social and historical research (see Möhwald 2023b: 14-17). What is clear, is however, that in the mid-1960s these demarcation lines were no longer important – at least in mainstream youth cultures – and that in West-Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Britain social and political protest had merged with British *beat*, American *folk* and *rhythm and blues* music and various national fusion styles into a trans-national Western European common idiom of youth culture's popular music tastes that crossed the borders between social classes and manifested itself in popular slogans of peace, love, democracy, freedom, and equality. This does not mean, that the differences between social classes concerning youth culture did disappear, they actually persisted, however to a certain degree hidden, within an increasing pluralization of styles, sub-cultural idioms, and socio-political agenda that progressed on an even larger scale during the 1970s.

In the second half of the 1960s, the evolvement of national and transnational idioms of youth culture progressed and not only youth subcultures, but also mainstream youth cultures became firmly allied with the agenda of international peace and protest movements, that culminated in the international youth protest against the Vietnam War. Backed by its predominant position in the mass production and quality of its products of popular culture, as well as by the attraction its social movements and youth subcultures exerted internationally, by the late 1960s, the influence of American popular culture on youth was back on an international and world-wide scale, however that influence was confronted by an increasing pluralization of youth styles, tastes, and subcultural ways of life, and also increasingly by competing regional and local popular-culture idioms that gained prominence on the world market.

However, it should also be noted that while we can observe a clear trend of an internationalization of youth culture during the 1960s that resulted in a common self-identification as youth (see Möhwald 2023b: 140-151), there existed clear differences in the different countries in the development of their respective youth cultures that become immediately clear if we look more closely at those countries for which social and historical research on the development of youth culture and youth subcultures is abundantly available,¹⁶ and those countries are the United States, Britain, West Germany, and to a lesser degree, France. Each of these countries had its very own social, cultural, economic, and political conditions, which strongly influenced the development of youth culture and youth subcultures within their borders, and these differences have persisted beyond all signs of internationalization.

4. The Change of West German Social Mentality

In 1982, Heiner Meulemann (1983, 1996) attempted to take stock of the empirical evidence of value change in West Germany by examining available data from long-term opinion-poll time series, and he found five time series, which prove that a change of West German social mentality was really taking place. This is apparent, if we visualize these time series in graphs. Since putting all five time-series into a single picture makes seeing and interpreting the change difficult, I have put them into two graphs, with one series appearing twice.




Figure 1




Figure 2

The first graph includes the series of one of three answers concerning the traits they wish their children to have when they were grown up, Meulemann chose “freedom and independence” (“autonomy”) for his analysis. The second series are the “yes” answers to a question whether the respondent was interested in politics, and the third series are the “no”

answers to a question whether the respondent attended church regularly. The second graph adds two new series, one, which indicates that the respondent had internalized an intrinsic work motivation, and the other gives the “yes” answers to the question whether the legal requirement for divorce should be made easier or not. However, before interpreting the data presented by Meulemann, I want to add another graph, which shows the development of all three answer choices concerning child-education goals.




Figure 3

Between 1951 and 1996 the West-German opinion research institute EMNID included this question on three education goals recurrently in its regular general omnibus opinion poll. Because multiple answers were possible, the sums of the percentages may exceed 100. The three answer choices were “freedom and independence” (autonomy), “punctuality, orderliness and diligence” (orderliness), and “obedience and subordination” (obedience), the first choice clearly represents anti-authoritarianism, the second I will discuss below, and the third one clearly targets authoritarianism.

Now we go a bit into an interpretation of the items selected by Meulemann and the three EMNID items. As I have already said, the items “autonomy” and “obedience” represent anti-authoritarianism and authoritarianism. As figure 3 shows, there is a clear shift from authoritarianism to anti-authoritarianism that already started in the early 1950s and accelerated after 1964. Meulemann chose the item “autonomy” as an indicator for just this trend, the decline of family authoritarianism that had been believed by many social scientists since about 1930 to be an intrinsic psychological trait of the Germans, and the major factor for the election successes of the Nazis since the late 1920s and their obedience to and willful collaboration with criminal Nazi policies after 1933 and during World War II. “Interest in politics” was chosen by Meulemann, because according to Almond and Verba (1963), the general lack of interest in politics as one indicator for unstable democracies, hence the increase of general interest in politics can be seen as an indicator for the maturing of West-German democracy. Regular church attendance was very high in West Germany during the 1950s, and because of the close relations and collaboration of the Catholic and Evangelical Churches with the conservative political elites and the state, it was seen as an element of conformity with the traditional hierarchic structures that ruled the country. Then, in the mid-1960s a de-confessionalization set in, that first hit the Evangelical Church, hence, this item can be interpreted as an indicator for a de-hierarchization of West-German socio-political culture and structures. In sum, all three

items are indicators for the progressing West-German modernization.

This understanding was also the reason for Meulemann's choice of the item "ease divorce", which he interpreted as a decline of traditional views of marriage as a life-long commitment. However, in this case, his interpretation was wrong, or better, it was confounded with legal reforms in the early 1970s. Under the West German family law until its reform in the mid-1970s, the legal procedures for divorce were extremely complicated and included a number of impediments to divorce, took a very long time until the divorce was finalized, and were accompanied by very high costs for lawyers and court procedures. When parliamentary discussions about a thorough revision and reform of West-German family law started in the second half of the 1960s, the demand to ease divorces quickly gained public support, which culminated in the period between Willy Brand's social-liberal coalition assuming Federal power in October 1969 and the promulgation of the revisions of legal procedures of divorces in 1976/77. Once divorces became easier and the accumulation of people postponing their divorce until the reforms came into effect had abated, the demand to ease divorce quickly lost support. Actually, this item did not indicate a decline of support for the traditional norm of lifelong marriage, because this norm was no longer supported by the majority of the German population since before World War II, the demand to ease divorce, however, was regarded as a futile endeavor by the same majority as long as the Christian Democratic/Social Union's majority in the Federal Parliament guaranteed that the Catholic Church's opposition against any reform of family law easing divorce would be upheld.

Support for the last two items, the education goal "punctuality, orderliness and diligence" and "intrinsic work motivation", which are often subsumed with authoritarianism, show a considerable stability from the early 1950s to the early 1980s, gaining roughly the support of 40-50% of the population, hence they are consensual values that are relatively resistant to value change. In my opinion, both of these items represent an intrinsic life and work ethic that was instilled among the peasants, industrial working classes, and the wage-earning common people in general during the process of industrialization in the 19th century, first in order to guaranty gainful employment, and since the advent of relative affluence of the common people in the mid-1950s, as a means to fulfill the dream of a good life, not only in Germany, but also in other European countries.¹⁷ This life and work ethic is for sure the result of the industrial disciplination, first of the habits of manual labor, later of the habits of labor in general, however, I have some doubts that it can be regarded as an indicator for an authoritarian personality, at least not in a one-dimensional way.

To summarize the results of my interpretation of the time-series data shown in figure 1 to 3, we can conclude that between the early 1950s and the mid-1979s West Germany experienced a continuous change of its social mentality trending towards social and cultural de-hierarchization, anti-authoritarianism, and growing engagement for democracy, which became more pronounced and stronger in the 1960s, when it was reinforced by several important events, like the rise of fear of a nuclear war that was nourished by the explosive increase of the number of nuclear weapons' tests around 1960 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, which led to a sudden Western-Europe-wide revival and rapid growth of the Peace Movement, the Spiegel Affair in 1962, in which the Adenauer regime tried to limit the freedom of press and to destroy the critical news-magazine *Der Spiegel*, which led to a nation-wide wave of citizen's protests against the Federal Government, and Adolf Eichmann's abduction from Argentina in 1960 and his trial in Jerusalem in 1961/62 which forced the West Germans to re-contemplate their stance towards and moral responsibility for Nazi crimes and the Holocaust.

The question now is, how is this change of social mentality connected with the evolvement

of West-German youth culture? The answer is that this change of social mentality was first heralded by West-German youth since the late 1940s, and youth subcultural groups and the mainstream youth culture of the second half of the 1950s and the 1960s stood at the forefront of this change. And the keyword of this change is anti-authoritarianism. Authoritarianism as a psychological character trait had been regarded in emigrant and American social psychology and sociology influenced by psychoanalysis as a major element for understanding why the Germans succumbed to the Nazi's, ever since Wilhelm Reich analyzed the mass-psychology of fascism in 1933, and Erich Fromm outlined the theoretical concept of authoritarianism in his social-psychological contribution to *Studien über Autorität und Familie* in 1936 and his *Escape from Freedom* in 1941.¹⁸ It remained, however, unclear, how this character trait should be measured in quantitative social surveys, and various instruments were developed by various groups researching the problem, with neither uniform approaches to measurement instruments for empirical research, nor uniform results of the conducted surveys, until the Berkely-Group presented their advanced instruments for measuring the authoritarian personality in 1950.

In occupied West Germany, at least four different surveys trying to assess the persistence of authoritarian attitudes among the West-German population and among West-German youth, were conducted in 1945, 1946, and 1950, and they presented quite different and contradictory results.¹⁹ After 1950 only one more survey was conducted in 1961 by Michaela von Freyhold in a study on authoritarianism and political apathy that was explicitly based on the instruments of *The Authoritarian Personality*. Freyhold's study is discussed by Stone (1992: Loc. 3528-3562), however, Stone gives no information about the size of the group with authoritarian attitudes.

However, here I have to make a stop with discussing the psychological syndrome of the authoritarian character, because it goes way beyond the goal of this paper, and also is a different work in progress of mine. Instead, I have to make clear how I would apply a limited understanding of authoritarianism as a configuration of attitudes on a surface level of social mentality and not a deep-psychological character type, without diminishing its critical political implications. The answer is not one of deductive theoretical reasoning, which is immune to empirical evidence, but one of inductive interpretation of observed empirical evidence. And, of course, empirical evidence is not limited to quantitative data, but includes qualitative observation. Social reality is in constant change,²⁰ and looking at how authoritarianism as a configuration of attitudes has changed over time gives us an indicator of a very important part of this change.

And here we come back to the initial question. In 1978/79, Gerda Lederer took the final steps to answer a question that haunted her since her first visit to a German school in 1973 after she and her parents had fled Austria from the Nazis in 1938: How had the Germans become so anti-authoritarian? She had developed an authoritarianism scale from the original F-Scale in *The Authoritarian Personality*, that allowed a comparison between McGranahan's comparison of German and American high-school students from 1945 and American and West-German high-school students of the end of the 1970s. Of course, quantitative studies alone are incapable to assess the persistence of the psychological *authoritarian personality type*, they are, however, valid to assess the quantitative distribution of authoritarianism as a configuration of attitudes.²¹ Lederer (1983: 120-124) reports an astonishing mentality change of West-German youth concerning an incredibly strong decrease of support for authoritarian attitudes in McGranahan's survey from 1945 and Lederer's survey form 1979 from a rough average of about 50% to about 15%. Another surprising result was that in 1978/79 support for authoritarian attitudes was significantly stronger among American high-school students than among West-German secondary-school students of the same age.

For Lederer's problem and goal of research, McGranahan's research from 1945 is a good starting point, however, for our own problem it is not sufficient, because it does not tell us what existed before May 1945. For various reasons, the famous first quantitative empirical survey of the *Institut für Sozialforschung* from 1929/30 is of no use for such a purpose.²² Stone/Lederer/Christie (1993: Loc 314-325) cite a British psychoanalytical survey executed by the English psychiatrist H.V. Dicks during the war among 1000 German male prisoners, mostly shot-down airmen, which he reported in 1950. Dicks independently constructed personality types of "hard-core Nazi", which accounted for 11% of the sample and of "near Nazis" who did not fully agree with Nazi ideology, and which accounted for 25% of the sample, the types showed astonishing similarities of the authoritarian types in *The Authoritarian Personality*, however, they give only a very limited impression, because Dicks was not reporting the distribution of authoritarianism as a configuration of attitudes, but the distribution of authoritarian personality (character) types with a strong support of Nazi ideology, so we can only speculate how strong the pre-May-1945 Germans supported authoritarian attitudes was. However, I suspect that it was multi-dimensionally structured with considerable regional and socio-demographic variations in this support.

Looking at the various data reported by Pipping at al. 1954, I am convinced that despite their inconclusive nature, which according to Pipping was mainly due to regional and socio-demographic variations in the samples, the observed facts and data seem to show that during the second half of the 1940s, hard-core authoritarianism was already in decline and devolving into milder forms like conventionalism among the West German population at large, and especially among youth, and the opinion poll data cited above and in Lederer 1993, show that this trend continued in the 1950s,²³ and was strongly accelerated during the 1960s and 1970s in a twist towards antiauthoritarian attitudes. And this process was accompanied by and increasing interest in politics and support for democracy by the West-Germans. As Helmut Klages' research group on value change observed, the structure of West-German value types and value patterns that evolved from the 1960s to the 1980s in the direction of an increased importance of individualism and self-actualization combined with a clear affirmation of democracy and human rights, and a strong interest in politics and political activism on the grassroots level, was a process that was especially pronounced in younger generations of an age between fifteen and thirty-four years. At the same time, hard-core authoritarianism lost support among the older generations and was replaced by a milder form of conservative conventionalism, and even with a type of a combination of values of self-actualization with values of a conservative way of life (see Klages and Herbert 1983 and Klages 1984).

5. Cultural Democratization as a 'Long' Cultural Revolution²⁴

Already in 1984, Siepmann presented a documentation of the intimate relation between the evolvments of youth subcultures and youth protest in West Germany during the 1960s, and Rotman and Rotman (2008) have presented a superb documentation of how the social changes and modernization that evolved in France since 1960 in tandem with French youth subcultures were an essential element for understanding the youth protest movements that culminated in May 1968. Quite a similar, but even more ambitious and voluminous documentation of the international evolution of the youth protest movements and youth subcultures was presented by Kraushaar (2018b). While these works concentrated their analysis on the 1960s, Maase (1992, 2001) has contended that the protest events of 1968/69 were not the start of a cultural shift, but the completion of the process of cultural democratization that started already in the

mid-1950s.

My own research on value change in Japan and West Germany and on the evolvement of West-German youth subcultures and youth cultures in other European countries confirm Maase's theses of the vanguard role of West German youth in the mentality change and the de-hierarchization of human and social relations in West Germany since the mid-1950s. It also confirms that the trends of the second half of the 1950s extended into the 1960s with a continuously increasing intensity that culminated in the protest movements of the second half of the 1960s and ended in a liberation of the popular culture of the common people in a hegemonial compromise that accepted the validity of the common peoples cultural tastes and way of life (see Möhwald 2023b).

Maase's thesis was relatively simple: What occurred in West Germany between the mid-1950s and the start of the 1970s was a breakdown of the cultural hegemony of the bourgeois middle classes' concept of elite culture and an emancipation of the cultural tastes of the common people (*einfache Leute*) and the acceptance of popular culture as a legitimate element of cultural expression. This thesis was not especially new, it had already been proposed by Eric Hobsbawm in 1987 and 1994 in a more general and comparative context.²⁵ However, in Maase's thesis, youth subcultures and their vigorous promotion of *rock and roll* and new forms of civic behavior played a vanguard role in the emancipation of popular culture in West Germany since the mid-1950s.

In his monumental history of the social changes in Europe during the 19th and 20th Century, Eric Hobsbawm analyzed the rise and fall of the bourgeois society and the destruction of the bourgeois cultural hegemony in the course of the continuing modernization and mass-democratization of Western Europe after World War I, which was accompanied by the incredibly fast commodification and commercialization of cultural products and evolvement of mass culture – or better mass-produced or mass-consumed products of popular culture – since the start of the 20th Century, in which the cultural tastes of the common man gained recognition and replaced the singular legitimacy of the cultural tastes of the bourgeoisie.²⁶

I essentially agree with Hobsbawm's analysis. The development of the social and cultural hegemony of the bourgeoisie, and its counterpart, the proletarian subculture, came into their maturity during the age of European imperialism, and this development reached its peak in the early twentieth century, just as the technical reproduction and commercialization of popular culture became an obvious element of urban mass society, and I also agree with his analysis that World War I constituted a crucial caesura in European modernity. In the summer of 1914, the bourgeois elites of the various highly advanced European societies ran like lemmings into the abyss of the Great War, which victimized about half of two generations of the youth of these cultural elites, and left the survivors either in deep psychic traumatization or equally deep hatred against their parent subculture.

It is clear that Hobsbawm's argumentation in the last two volumes of this series have a profound impact on how we understand the evolvement of capitalist society since the second half of the 19th century that go far beyond the scope of these reflections on West-German youth culture.²⁷ While the products of American popular culture, especially movies, popular music, pulp fiction, and comics attracted and fascinated European youth since before World War I, the common catchword that riled European middle-classes' cultural elites in their fight against popular culture and mass culture since the early 20th century became 'Americanization'.²⁸

However, while Hobsbawm described a process that was more or less typical for European bourgeois societies' understanding of culture and its differentiation between 'high' and popular culture, Maase (2001: 430-434) stresses the especially strong rejection of popular culture and

American mass culture by the German conservative bourgeois middle-class elites since the early 20th century that led them to an intensive struggle for protecting their cultural hegemony after World War I and for regaining it during the 1950s and 1960s. And, as a counter to these middle-class efforts for regaining cultural hegemony during the 1950s, Maase elevates the rebellious behavior of working-class youth subcultures of the second half of the 1950s and their embracing of American popular culture and *rock-and-roll* music to a revolutionary avant-garde fighting for the emancipation of popular and mass culture from bourgeois control. In my opinion, with this thesis Maase is going a bit overboard; as a complete reading of the articles collected in Schissler 2001a show, the political, economic, social, and cultural processes that resulted in a deep cultural shift of West-German society, which was completed at the end of the 1960s was much more complex and multi-dimensional than being determined by just one agent, like the rather short-lived youth subculture of *Halbstarke*.²⁹ Rather more interesting than his article from 2001 is the well-researched and convincingly interpreted role of working-class youth in the change of West-German youth's attitudes from a militaristic to a civilian habitus during the 1950s and their role in influencing the style of the emerging West-German teenage mainstream youth culture in his 1992 book *Bravo America*.

However, it is true, that German middle-class historical analysis of the development and effects of the youth rebellions and protest movements of the 1950s and 1960s of both, progressive as well as anti-progressive orientation, tends to neglect and dismiss (and even denigrate, see Prowe 2001) the role of working-class youth subcultures, and their rebellious and anti-authoritarian inclinations in their relation with popular culture, as minor events or as apolitical and hence as irrelevant.³⁰ With very few exceptions like Geyer 2001, historical research has also tended to neglect the change of social mentality and values that occurred in West Germany since the mid-1950s and is documented in opinion-poll data and quantitative analysis on value change.

In my opinion based on my own research since the early 1990s, this diagnosis of the middle-class elites is wrong, and its also the result of their ambiguous and contradictory relation with the culture of the common people and hostility towards the obvious American political, economic, and cultural influences in the processes of West Germany's social and economic modernization, democratization, and popular culture. West German youth culture played a central role as a vanguard for the new cultural and social trends between the mid-1950s and the early 1970s and beyond, and it also played an important role in the support of and active participation in the protest movements of the second half of the 1960s and the popularization of important goals of these movements.

Notes

1. The history of this approach is somewhat muddled; however, it is quite well traced in the introduction chapter to Stone/Lederer/Christie 1993 and especially in Samuelson 1993. It is without doubt that the first contribution to the problem was Wilhelm Reich's voluminous *Massenpsychologie des Faschismus* from 1933. From there it became a problem that was generally discussed among leftist psychoanalysts and psychologists who had to flee Germany and Austria. It is clear, that the role of the Frankfurt school was less central than it made it appear in its postwar *Heldengeschichte* (hero-worshipping history) in West Germany. When Max Horkheimer took over the management of the *Institut für Sozialforschung* at Frankfurt University after Carl Grünberg's stroke in January 1928, research at the institute immediately changed from Grünberg's focus on the history of the labor movement to the original plan of Felix Weil, Max Horkheimer, and Friedrich Pollock to establish a foundation and an institute for critical Marxist social research on contemporary society. For a better understanding of the new direction of research

under Horkheimer, it is important to note that the *Institute für Sozialforschung* was housed in the same building – an old villa – as Frankfurt University's *Institut für Psychoanalyse*, where Erich Fromm worked, and *Institut für Soziologie*, where Karl Mannheim and Norbert Elias worked, and that the researchers of the three institutions had established a close intellectual collaboration and exchange. According to the official history of the Frankfurt School, especially Erich Fromm's social-psychological and Marxist approach to psychoanalysis became decisive for the development of the concept of authoritarianism and to make it the centerpiece of the *Institute für Sozialforschung*'s research project and a survey, which was conducted in 1929/30, on authority and the family, which were published in 1936, after the members were safely in exile, (Horkheimer 1936, Fromm 2016). However, as Samuelson 1993 made clear, Fromm's contribution to the *Institut für Sozialforschung*'s empirical survey from 1929/30 was marginal at best, because he was not in Frankfurt at the time. The construction of the questionnaire, guiding the fieldwork and preparing the data for analysis was most probably executed by Horkheimer's assistant Hilde (Hilda) Weiss, who is not mentioned in Fromm's later self-aggrandizements at all. Fromm was only marginally involved with the Frankfurt school in the United States, especially after his falling-out with Horkheimer in 1939, but his revised social-psychological analysis of the relation between authoritarianism and fascism that he published as *Escape from Freedom* in 1941 (Fromm 2013) had a strong influence on its core members. From this starting point evolved the Studies in Prejudice of the second half of the 1940s, and especially advanced instruments for measuring authoritarianism and prejudice in the *Authoritarian Personality* edited by Adorno et al. 1950, but those were basically developed by Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford before Adorno joined the *Berkley-Group*. What happened later in attributing him with the central position in the theoretical conceptualization and empirical work on *The Authoritarian Personality*, while in reality his position in this research group was rather that of a marginal latecomer, can best be labeled as a grandiose *Etikettenschwindel* (falsifying content).

2. In his comedy film *One, Two, Three* from 1961, Billy Wilder gives a good satirical depiction of West-German human relations in the late 1950s, Wolfgang Staudte's comedy film *Rosen für den Staatsanwalt* (Roses for the Prosecutor) from 1959 also gives insight to social climate in West Germany during this period.
3. Noteworthy exceptions were Allerbeck and Hoag 1985 and Krüger 1985. One of the reasons might have been the limitations in the sample sizes of most youth surveys of the period, which imposed severe limits to statistical analyses of differences by class, region, gender, and rural/urban conditions of life.
4. See for instance Schissler 2001c concerning her own experiences when starting her studies at Marburg and Frankfurt university in 1966.
5. To put it bluntly, most of the middle-class leftists adhered to idealized images of proletarian culture and a German version of *proletkult* of a bygone era, which had been completely erased by Nazism and post-war West-German modernization. They had no understanding at all of the conditions of working-class life and of how the many generations of experience of its precariousness had shaped West-German working-class attitudes towards the promise of a stable minimum of affluence – labeled in the milieus of the common people as a 'good life' – by Ludwig Erhard's policies to establish economic growth through mass consumption, see Maase 1992: 63-71 and 186-190. Concerning the attitudes of the leftist student elite towards popular music tastes of the youth subcultures, see Kraushaar (2018a: 53-58).
6. See Mita Munesuke 見田宗介 (1979): 『現代社会の社会意識』。東京：弘文堂；Mita Munesuke 見田宗介 (1988): 「社会意識」。見田宗介 (他編): 『社会学辞典』。東京：弘文堂, p.388-389; Mita Munesuke 見田宗介 (1993): 「社会意識」。森岡清美(他編): 『新社会学辞典』・東京：有斐閣、p. 392-304; Mita Munesuke (1992): *Social Psychology of Modern Japan*. Londo; New York: Kegan Paul International.
7. Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba (1963): *Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p. 5.
8. See Maase 2001:428-429.
9. The two terms *wage-earning* and *salary-earning* are referring to a structurally similar phenomenon, i.e. having to sell one's labor force in order to gain one's livelihood; there have existed, at least in Europe however, considerable differences between the conditions of *wage-earning* and *salary-earning* in job security and in payment. Wages are paid after the work is finished, at the end of the day, the week, or the month, while salaries are paid in during work, in the middle of the month, and also often include

additional benefits.

10. Tenbruck, 1965: 55, English translation by Möhwald. The book was first published in 1962. Schelsky – perhaps the first German sociologist analyzing contemporary youth – defined youth as a typical *Verhaltensform* (mode of behavior), which bears some resemblances to Tenbruck's notion of *Teilkultur*, but Schelsky insists that youth in modern society is not an independent phase but only a transitory role of the transition from the role of the child to the role of the adult, and he denied the possibility of forming the kind of configuration proposed by Tenbruck, see Schelsky 1957: 12-13 and 18-21.
11. Maase (1992: 21-62) thoroughly discusses the problematic aspects of these terms and the accompanying images of the United States.
12. The members of each of these cultures comprised less than ten percent of the relevant population, which means less than 7% of West-German youth for the *Halbstarke*, and less than 1% for the Exis, and they were concentrated in cities. However, their cultural influence on the styles of the relevant youth populations was enormous. And both groups shared strong anti-authoritarian attitudes towards adult authorities' attempts in schools and companies to encroach on their life and lifestyles, which also became the general mode of attitudes in the mainstream teenage culture.
13. Not in the geographical, but in the political sense as west from the *Iron Curtain*. In this sense, Japan is part of the Western World, anyway, from an American perspective, Japan is not part of the Far East, but constitutes the Far West of American influence.
14. See Berghan 2001 and Prowe 2001.
15. On gender relations and family life in West Germany during the second half of the 1940s and the 1950s see Heineman 2001, Biess 2001, Schissler 2001b.
16. However, I have noted in recent internet research, especially on *Wikipedia*, that many of the publications and other materials that my wife and I collected since the 1970s are no longer easily available, and that there exists a trend to “forget” controversial issues, which confirms Raymond Williams' caveat about the selectivity of memory.
17. As Sheila's French pop song from the 1960s *Papa t'es plus dans le bout* attests.
18. Horkheimer 1936: 77-135; Fromm 1999; 2013.
19. These were a comparative survey of German and American youth from 1945 by the psychologist D.V. McGranahan, affiliated with the Information Control Division of the American Office of the Military Government (OMGUS), which is discussed by Lederer 1993 and 1995, and surveys from 1946 by the cultural anthropologist David Rodnick, also affiliated with the Information Control Division of OMGUS, in the protestant region of Eschwege in North Hessen and the mixed Protestant-Catholic region of Weilburg in Central Hessen based on participant observation, and from the psychiatrist Bertram Schaffner's deep psychological analysis of 96 cases for the Screening Center of the Information Control Division of OMGUS, which are discussed in Pipping et al. 1954: 10-12 and Schaffner is also discussed by Lederer 1993: Loc. 3928-3956. And the last one was Pipping et al.'s survey on German youth and authority for UNESCO from 1950.
20. Or as young Marx had put it, society is produced by men, and their experience of their social conditions produce their consciousness, which leads to a further alteration of society. Social change is an inherent quality of society, and not stability, like the formidable theorist of social systems, Niklas Luhmann in his misunderstanding of cellular autopoiesis professes. Like all systems, social systems too are subjected to the *Third Law of Thermodynamics*, which is to entropy, and the agent of this entropy is the experience and free will of the individuals acting in the social system, who are purged from Luhmann's consideration.
21. And I have to make clear here that these have immense political implications, since they also put into question the political choices of the mildly authoritarian, conservative conventionalists that have ruled more or less successfully the politico-cultural hegemony of most Western industrial societies since the 1960s.
22. First of all, because contrary to all public statements concerning this survey by the so-called *Fathers of Critical Theory* since the 1950s, the survey did not target family and authority; it was a broad exploration into the ways of life and attitudes of highly skilled manual workers and white-collar employees, most of the latter public servants, and it touched only marginally on family life and authority. And second, because of the fragmentary, incomplete, and unsystematic character of the data that survived the escape

- of the institute from the Nazis, see Samuelson 1993.
23. What the sociologists of the 1980s in their search for a starting point of West-German value change and their fixation on statistically significant changes, which regarded the small increases in 'modern' attitudes during the 1950s as insignificant, failed to consider was the age factor: the target population of these opinion surveys was the population above 19 years, what means that the weight of the youth generations of the second half of the 1940s and the 1950s within the samples increased dramatically from year to year after 1960.
 24. This is an adaptation of the title of Raymond Williams book on cultural change from 1961, *The Long Revolution*. See Williams 2011: 10-13. Like the processes of cultural change that Williams analyzed in his book, German cultural democratization took a long time; it started in the mid-18th century and resulted at the end of the 1960s in what Eric Hobsbawm called a *cultural revolution*. Williams also introduced a very important caveat concerning the validity of our comparative and historical cultural studies: the selectivity of cultural traditions, which he uses in a very interesting approach to research, see Williams 2011: 61-94.
 25. See Hobsbawm 2010c, chapter 9 and 1995, chapter 11.
 26. See Eric Hobsbawm 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 1995, and also 2013, although the common tenor of the essays collected in the last book is concerned with the fact that the culmination of bourgeois understanding of art, artists, and esthetics in early twentieth century Modernism arrived just at the same time when, what Walter Benjamin (1935-1938) called the 'era of technical reproduction of art', irrevocably changed cultural production and made bourgeois modes of reception, judgment and understanding of cultural products and art irrelevant.
 27. It can be said that in these two volumes Hobsbawm clearly and openly deviates from orthodox Marxist Historical Materialism. Hobsbawm became a member of the German Communist Party's organization for secondary school students, *Sozialistischer Schülerbund*, in 1933 while he was a *Gymnasium* student in Berlin, and a member of the British Communist Party in 1936, and he publicly adhered steadfast to the party line until Gorbachev started the policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost* in 1985 and the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, despite an ambivalent and contradictory private critical stance towards the persecution of dissidents in the Soviet bloc and opposition to Stalinism and orthodox Historical Materialism, and his close association with British Marxist historians from the New Left, especially Raymond Williams, with whom he entered at the same time into Cambridge University and the Communist Party in 1936, for more details see his autobiography (Hobsbawm 2002, especially chapter six, part IV, and chapter twelve).
 28. See Dard and Lüsebrink 2009, Horn 2009, Maase 2001, concerning anti-Americanism in the discourse of the European cultural elites about the negative effect of mass culture on the common people.
 29. The West-German *Halbstarke* of the second half of the 1950s share to a certain degree a similar notoriety in West-German media of the period as the British *Teddy Boys* in their own country, in this respect they can be understood as a product of moral panic and as folk devils in Stanley Cohen's (2011) sense. Their notoriety was, however, a rather short-lived phenomenon and did not create an as conspicuous flashy uniform style as the British *Teddy Boys*, nevertheless, their outlook on life, music tastes and behavioral and clothing styles left a clear impact on the emerging West-German mainstream teenage culture, therefore we may accord them the status of avant-garde generation-units in Mannheim's sense.
 30. Much in the same way as they neglect and dismiss the importance of Third-World visiting students' protest against dictatorial and colonial regimes in their home countries and its suppression by West-German authorities for the evolvment of the West-German student movement in the early 1960s, see Slobodian 2012.

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