

ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS

—Taylor's Political Philosophy and Expressionist Ecology—

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Introduction

According to the analysis conducted by Ko Nomura, environmental politics can be divided into three distinct domains, namely environmental political theory, comparative environmental politics, and international environmental politics (Nomura 2010, 4). This research paper intends to enrich the

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discourse surrounding the first domain, namely environmental political theory, by reviewing the fundamental principles of politics and the environment with the help of Charles Taylor's works.

As John Dryzek highlights, before the 1960s, the term "environment" was not commonly used. Contemporarily, numerous nations have implemented environmental legislation¹⁾ and established governmental departments to address this issue (Dryzek 2013, 3-5). The study conducted by Doyle and his team has determined three fundamental environmental attitudes: Resistance, Reform, and Radicalism (Doyle et al., 47).

Resistance towards environmentalists arises from individuals and groups who deny the severity of environmental degradation and impede the integration of ecological issues into the political agenda²⁾. The Heartland Institute³⁾ is famous for its skepticism towards climate change. Bjørn Lønborg⁴⁾ was a prominent skeptic (Pálsson 2020, 149).

Some individuals and groups take a reformist position, seeking to make moderate and incremental changes to the system of liberal democracy while maintaining its fundamental tenets. The United Nations Environment Programme's sustainable development initiatives reflect this perspective (Doyle et al. 46-47). Neil Carter's extensive work, *The Politics of the Environment*, provides valuable insights into the reforms taking place in Europe (Carter 2018). Additionally, the research conducted by James Connelly and his team offers useful information on the European environmental movement and green politics (Connelly et al. 2012).

Proponents of radical ideologies contend that moderate approaches are inadequate for addressing systemic issues. They argue that swift and substantial political transformation, akin to environmental movements such

1) I have learned environmental law at the University of Warwick under Professor John McEldowney. He has important works including *Environmental Law*, Longman, 2010. He is a mentor to the Pope in the Vatican concerning the environment.

2) Resistance Presidents in the US include Ronald Reagan and Donald J. Trump.

3) The Heartland Institute in the US is the epicenter of climate change denial and funds scientists who depart from the scientific consensus (Dryzek 2022, 67, 69).

4) Bjørn Lønborg in Denmark became known as a scholarly denialist (Pálsson 2020, 149). His book is *The Skeptical Environmentalist*, Cambridge University Press, 2001.

as Earth First!,⁵⁾ is essential (Doyle et al., 46-47). David Rothenberg⁶⁾ cites Arne Naess, an ecological philosopher, as stating that deep ecology comprises three important components: the intrinsic value of nature for humanity, ecological laws governing human morality, and the right of endangered species and unique landscapes to remain unaltered (Naess 1989, 16).

Charles Taylor occupies a distinctive position that unites the reformers and radical ecologists. He is not an activist but a philosopher. He is widely acknowledged as a significant figure in parliamentary democracy. He has participated in four elections for the Canadian Parliament as a candidate⁷⁾. In his opinion, contemporary democracy confronts numerous obstacles⁸⁾. Furthermore, he is acutely aware of the widespread feelings of economic disillusionment that many individuals experience within contemporary democratic societies (Taylor, 1968, 1970, 1974, 1976).

Taylor, a political philosopher, has dedicated himself to examining and expounding upon political thought. His extensive research has focused on the conventional political system in Europe, and the various political ideologies that have emerged from it (Taylor 1991b, 2004). By offering a fresh perspective on political philosophy, he has contributed to political theory. He argues that one of the aspects of contemporary political philosophy, utilitarianism, is accountable for the economic disparities and the erosion of individuals' dignity that are widespread in various nations (Ibid.).

In his work, Taylor sought to integrate Enlightenment ideas with ecology, drawing on the perspectives of Romanticist thinker Herder to develop an ecological viewpoint. Taylor's efforts successfully merged liberalism and romanticism, and his findings were influenced by Herder's belief that human beings are connected to nature, with human voices being

5) Earth First! is a US direct action group (Doyle et al. 131-133). Charles Taylor is not a member of this group.

6) Rothenberg's introduction (Naess, 1989).

7) He was a New Democratic Party candidate in 1962, 1963, 1965, and 1968.

8) Taylor wrote many essays on these points. The book, *The Pattern of Politics* is important (Taylor 1970).

seen as expressions of the natural world (Taylor, 1975, 1979). According to Isaiah Berlin, Herder's romanticism could be classified as expressionism (Berlin, 1965).

Taylor challenged one aspect of the Enlightenment philosophy's concept of a person, particularly Cartesian dualism's notion of man of soul and body. This separation of a person into soul and body results in the division of a man into two distinct beings: the self and the physical body. The body is inherently natural and connected to the external environment, while the mind is separated from nature. Consequently, humans possess the ability to manipulate both their bodies and the natural world.

This paper comprises two primary sections. The first part includes Taylor's critique of Cartesian tendencies, which encompasses four key aspects: human dualism, separation from nature, atomistic detachment from nature and society, and instrumentalism. The second part consists of Taylor's theoretical proposal, encompassing five components: the unity of human and environmental entities, the expression of human and natural elements, the reflection of human and natural aspects, ecological perspectives, and languages and ecology.

(1) Taylor's Critique of Cartesian Tendencies

a) The Critique of Dual Persons

According to Ko Nomura, the separation between humans and nature has drawn considerable interest, particularly during the Anthropocene epoch, especially on whether individuals are fundamentally distinct from or connected to the natural world (Nomura 2022, 57).

As Ko Nomura, Roger Scruton et al., and Charles Taylor mention, contemporary individuals experience estrangement from the environment, largely due to the isolating tendencies of modern epistemology. The primary cause of this isolation is the duality of a person, which comprises two distinct parts: the mind and the body. In the following sections, this paper will critically examine this notion of human duality (Nomura 2022, 59; Scruton 2002, 3-80; Baker and Morris 1996, 11-22; Charles Taylor 1965, 326-327).

According to Gilbert Ryle⁹⁾, the myth about bodies and minds propagated

by Descartes is so pervasive among theorists and even laymen that it may be deemed the official theory. Many philosophers, psychologists, and religious teachers, with minor reservations, endorse its key tenets. The official doctrine posits that every human being, with some supposed exception, possesses both a body and a mind. Furthermore, it asserts that every individual consists of both a body and a mind and that these aspects are typically coordinated. After the end of the history of the body, the mind may persist and continue to function. Human bodies exist in space and are subject to the mechanical laws as physical entities in space (Ryle 2023, 13).

One can observe the external physical processes. Therefore, a person's bodily life is as public as that of animals, reptiles, trees, crystals, and planets. However, nobody can see other's minds and their privacy. Only the individual has direct access to his mental states and processes. As a result, a person lives through two separate histories: one that involves the events and processes occurring in and to their body, which is public, and the other that involves the events and processes happening in and to their mind, which is private (Ibid.).

The distinction between the mind and matter is a basic one. Physical objects inhabit a shared area, often referred to as space. Mind is a mental phenomenon and occurs in separate spheres. There is no direct causal relationship between events in one mind and those in another (Ibid., 15).

Based on the official theory, the mind is believed to reside within a person's private inner world, which is distinct from the external environment. Each individual is thought to possess an inner life separated from others. While people can observe, touch, and communicate with one another's physical bodies, they remain incapable of perceiving or comprehending the internal mental processes of others (Ibid.).

He is unable to question his inner thoughts. Nevertheless, he must remain skeptical about everything external to him. This is why Descartes confronts the enigma of cognizing the external world. To address this challenge, he necessitates epistemology¹⁰⁾ (Ibid.).

9) Gilbert Ryle was a Professor of Philosophy at Oxford when Taylor was a student. Ryle had a great influence on Taylor's theory.

The contemporary rationalist theory propagated by philosophers like Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke, encompasses various epistemological perspectives that contend that human knowledge is rooted in the perceptions that the intellect acquires from the external environment (Scruton 2002, 29-39; Taylor 1966, 233-234).

Recognition, widely regarded as the cornerstone of all knowledge, refers to the mental processing of information gathered through the human body's five senses. According to this theory, recognition entails the accurate representation of an objective reality that exists beyond the confines of the mind, as well as the internal portrayal of a reality (Taylor 1987, 3).

Recognition is characterized as the cognitive process reliant on the physical form, while action is portrayed as the bodily movement guided by the intellect. As recognition and action are recurrent, they are perceived as an enduring interdependence between the mind and the body (Descartes 1982, 32-34; Baker and Morris 1996; 50-51; Russell 2009, 455-458).

The intricate relationship between the mind and body also encompasses the relationship between individuals and their environment. According to David Hume, perception is the foundation for the mind to form impressions and terminology (Hume 2003, 61-76). Following Locke's philosophy, the mind combines impressions and ideas to facilitate recognition and accumulating experiences. Experiences have their place within an independent mind separated from the surrounding circumstances and events. This notion provides insight into the nature of the world (Locke, 1894, Vol I, 118-165; Russell, 2009, 490-495).

The strict partitioning of experience and the external environment results in a division between the individual and their surroundings. The roots of Cartesianism, a mode of thought that distinguishes between people and the world, can be traced back to the philosophical successors of Locke, Hobbes, and Descartes.

This way of thinking is characterized by the dualism of mind and body, where the body is separated from the mind. In Cartesianism, the external world, comprising the surrounding environment and the body, is considered

10) Ko Nomura mentions that we should learn epistemology to get methods and methodology in social research (Nomura 2017, Chapter 1).

the independent variable. The mind is separated from the external world. The mind gets external and internal experiences, such as reflection, which is its independent world.

Taylor posited that the notion that recognition involves the connection between external stimuli and the corresponding internal state is not only applicable to the works of Locke but has held relevance up until the present day. This viewpoint is consistent with contemporary natural science and is also advantageous for modern computer-based cognitive activities (Taylor 1965, 326-327).

Despite the efforts of epistemology, a convincing theoretical approach for achieving this alignment has yet to be devised. Even though numerous experiments have been conducted and substantial evidence has been gathered, the outcome is simply another representation. The harmony of multiple representations continues to be a mystery.

The question of which experimental method would ultimately lead to a conclusion remains unanswered. Despite attempts to grapple with the problem of the existence of the external world, the issue remains unresolved. Ontological considerations give way to methodological concerns, resulting in a dimly lit room filled with doubt and conjecture about the environment and the precarious state of the planet.

b) The Critique of a Person Disengaged from the Environment

I previously stated that individuals were within a dimly lit space characterized by uncertainty and speculation regarding the environment. Due to the separation between the mind and the physical body, the world around them became an object to be observed. In Cartesian epistemology, this observation was conducted by the senses associated with the body (Descartes 1982, 32-34; Baker and Morris 1996, 84-85).

The external stimuli through the body are transmitted to the mind and the mind moves the body as if it were a machine designed to do so. Moreover, this activity of recognition and action takes place in only one person's body. In Cartesianism, a person is a disengaged subject who does not engage in the environment around him. According to Taylor, however, people engage in nature and society in a multilayered manner in many ways including shared language. They engage in society internally and

externally. They cannot leave society. There can be no doubt without language, and no reflection without language. The self-contradiction of Cartesianism lies in the fact that the person who routinely engages in the world makes the self, the disengaged one. The hitherto "dominant" rationalist perspective has thus given us the disengaged subject as our model (Taylor 1991a, 63, 67; Taylor 1992, 102).

Modern and contemporary rationalism has led people to disengagement from participation in nature and society. The people are oblivious to the surrounding culture and history and lose sight of the bonds of nature and solidarity. Taylor has a strong sense of urgency about this self-centered, narcissistic, anthropocentric contemporary culture. The human image of the disengaged individual creates high barriers and divisions between human beings and society, and between human beings and nature (Taylor 1991b, 40; Taylor 1989, 383).

The prevailing view of the rational thinking subject in rationalism is rooted in the ontologization of rational procedures and methods. The human subject thereby liberates the individual from the constraints of external existence or non-existence (Taylor 1991a, 61).

Thus, the inner concept leaves the ontological conclusion on the external world. This concept becomes neutral depending on the procedures. The input of information becomes a mere registration of facts. Even if this way of thinking has its source in the common sense of civilization dating back to pre-modern times, it has been reinforced in the post-modern era. In Cartesianism, reason was transformed not as a capacity to relate to the order of the universe, which could be called rational, but as a methodological capacity by which we think appropriately. Rationality is said to have caused an important shift in earlier modes of thinking, as it became a careful examination of the thought process (Taylor 1991a, 64).

c) The Critique of Atomistic Person

Individuals who do not engage are forced to isolate themselves from nature and society, which has been compatible with post-modern culture. In modern culture, self-responsibility has become an important part of the culture. In particular, scientists who pursued solitary research also played a model role. For example, Copernicus, Galileo, Darwin, and Freud had

particularly heroic research styles. They idealized self-autonomy and demonstrated firsthand that to be free in modern times is to assume self-responsibility and to trust one's judgment (Taylor 1987, 7).

This epistemological tradition, modeled on these scientists, is deeply wedded to the virtues of freedom and dignity. In doing so, Taylor said, there were three key points in the epistemology. The first is the "subject" as an ideally liberated self. The subject must be free, rationalistic, and completely distinct from the natural and social world. The second is the punctual view of the self. The term punctual usually explained as the meticulousness of being on time, has a unique meaning for Taylor, who defines it as having a liberal and rationalistic mind in dealing with society and being the subject of transforming and restructuring society to promote its welfare for himself and others. This has extremely elitist and bureaucratic implications.

The third, which is also a logical consequence of the above two, is the emergence of atomism, in which the individual is understood to be very independent. Atomism, coupled with the elite's efforts to manage society, emphasizes the ideals of governance and the reform of the self. This is still a powerful model for social engineering today (Taylor 1987, 7-8).

d) The Critique of Instrumental Attitudes towards Environment

According to Taylor, the elitist, social-engineering individual that atomism represents does not see society as a place of our development, but as a set of necessary instruments. An instrumental understanding of society will hardly give people a sense of fulfillment. Ultimately, as people seek self-sufficiency, the inevitable tendency to retreat into private space whenever possible emerges. It is said that modern society self-enhances such privatization. Of course, the intensification of privatization widens the cracks between the individual and society (Taylor 1985b, 304).

In particular, the growth of science, technology, and modern industrialism has given humans new powers to change conditions in nature and society as they wish. Furthermore, Western industrial society has increasingly expanded the privatization of life, destroying the old local communities that were previously important in people's lives. As a result, the idea of happiness and good life as the property of a single individual or a nuclear

family has gradually become accepted. Hence happiness became the dominance of nature, for industrial developments (Taylor 1985b, 304).

Nature, Taylor understands, is sometimes human itself. However, rationalism since the Enlightenment treats nature as an object waiting to be modified or manipulated to produce certain results. The purpose for the modification is determined, ordered, and imposed on the object by humans (Taylor 1968, 149).

This modern Western instrumental reason sees solutions to environmental problems as technical. This is the social and political mainstream view in modern times, where human dignity is defined in terms of human's ability to dominate the objectified world through instrumental reason (Taylor 1989, 384).

The consequence is a materialistic view of life, including the natural environment, in which to take one outstanding example, we can think of this universe as nothing more than a source of raw materials to be offered for our purposes (Taylor 1991b, 89). In doing so, problems of environmental pollution or ecological limits may arise. However, they think those problems can be solved by technical means, that is, by better and more extensive use of instrumental reason (Taylor 1989, 384).

According to James McEvoy, this approach to nature, which has its roots in the writings of Enlightenment thinkers like Descartes and Locke, will have its heyday in our age of environmental destruction. This instrumentalist understanding shapes the practices and institutions of our time. In capitalist societies, nature for production is considered material for humans themselves (McEvoy 2001, 197; Taylor 1966, 232).

In this instrumentalist approach to nature, nature is seen as a neutral territory understood to be for domination, and people are considered free to break away from their backgrounds and circumstances when they shape themselves in the face of a reality that includes nature (McEvoy 2001, 197).

According to Glen Lehman and Joy A. Palmer, freedom in the instrumentalist approach is associated with an economic worldview linked to individualism and passive freedom. Passive freedom is more specifically the freedom of individuals to pursue whatever goals they deem appropriate. Freedom inherently involves more than radical self-autonomy and what individualism would have us believe (Lehman 2015, 164; Palmer 1998, ix).

According to John S. Dryzek, the instrumental attitude toward nature is the Promethean attitude. He employs the mythology of Prometheus, a figure who famously took fire from Zeus and enhanced humanity's capacity to shape the world. Prometheus possesses an unwavering belief in human ingenuity and technological prowess, which they hold as a means to conquer any obstacle, including environmental challenges (Dryzek 2022, 53).

As Drizek mentions, the dominant industrial order has been taken for granted for several centuries in the West. The Industrial Revolution brought about technological advancements that transformed materials into valuable resources. Concurrently, European colonial expansion provided access to new continents for exploitation. Capitalist economic growth came to be viewed as a standard aspect of a thriving society. Even those who envisioned a future beyond capitalism, such as Karl Marx, celebrated technological progress, economic growth, and the subjugation of nature (Ibid.).

Today, virtually all governments prioritize promoting economic growth as their primary objective. TV news is centered on the notion that economic growth is inherently positive, encompassing increases in wealth, income, profits, and employment (Ibid., 54). However, this emphasis on growth often leads to detrimental consequences, in terms of the environment, such as increased pollution, traffic congestion, and accelerated resource depletion. Notably, these environmental implications are rarely, if ever, reported alongside the economic metrics. Despite this, the political-economic discourse within liberal capitalist systems typically remains disconnected from any awareness of environmental limitations (Ibid.).

(2) Taylor's Theoretical Proposal

a) The Unity of a Person and the Environment

As discussed so far, the modern epistemologically isolated individual perceives the outside world through an independent body and mind. Such Cartesianism detached humans from a meaningful relationship to nature. Ultimately, the Enlightenment separates man from nature, destroys his identity, dulls his creativity, and kills his initiative (Taylor 1968, 150).

Taylor worked with Merleau-Ponty and learned the work of Wittgenstein, to break through the empiricist tendencies. The themes of Merleau-Ponty

and Taylor converged in the same place. They determined that empiricism and Cartesianism regard the individual as a disengaged subject. They strongly criticized such a subject theory. Merleau-Ponty and Taylor used the body theory, while Wittgenstein employed the linguistic theory to critique Cartesianism (Taylor 1998, 105).

This section will begin with Taylor's understanding of Heidegger. Heidegger believes that individuals are beings in the world and agents. The difference between Heidegger's agents and the singular subject of Cartesianism is that Heidegger's agents are plural. In Heidegger's ontology, the existence of life is collective. Society is the predominant factor in determining an individual's identity. Heidegger's argument against the previously mentioned Cartesianist feature of atomism is a paradigm-shifting critique. Heidegger believes that we must have a grasp of the world, and observe and control its various conditions. In short, as an essential foundation of the theory, we must participate as agents coping with things (Taylor 1987, 11-13).

An individual is indeed an engaged agent. The agent engages in the culture, the way of life, the world, and nature. At the same time, it also has an aspect embedded in the world in which it engages. So the agent may be described to be the agent as embodied. Embodiment means that the human agent is always concretely present in the world, living in a profound relationship with the particular circumstances of the moment (Taylor 1991a, 61-62).

Merleau-Ponty developed the concept of a body that straddles both the mind and nature. The body is a kind of unity. The body is conscious of its environment and can adapt its behavior to its environment appropriately. Merleau-Ponty's subject is not detached from the body and confronts the objects in the world. The subject maintains its unity by engaging in the world and nature around it and treating the world in the way it is. To be conscious of the self as a subject is to understand the self as a body that acts. Consciousness refers to the consciousness of our relationship to the world. Consciousness can exist only by engaging in the world. In this sense, the human subject is *être-au-monde* (being in the world) through the body (Merleau-Ponty 2014, lxxvii; Taylor 1967a, 113-115).

As mentioned previously, Heidegger's idea of the existence of various

individuals was being in the world. Merleau-Ponty's idea was *être-au-monde*. Both terms appear to position the world and nature as superior to the individual. According to Art Laitinen, the idea of "being in the world" is also "being oriented to the world" (Laitinen 2008, 72). Thus the individual and nature are deeply connected. In modern epistemology, however, subjectivity is disconnected from the external world. Taylor is trying to state that it is through "my engagement in the object" that the object is grasped and understood (Taylor 1987, 12).

Wittgenstein put the example of the game of chess. The question of how we play the game of chess can only be raised in the context of a game. An act of chess game should be in the game rules. The act contains the rule itself. Our acts should be in the rule of the world and nature (Wittgenstein 2009, § 108, § 197).

What, then, are the contents of the societies and nature that make up the world? For Merleau-Ponty, for example, the subject was inseparable from the body. He tried to show our perception of the world as closely related to our knowledge of how to engage in the world. Our perception of the world is our consciousness of our environment (Merleau-Ponty 2014, lxxxi-lxxxii).

Perception is the act of making the existence known to us. Moreover, perception is said to be implicit in us from the beginning. This consciousness is an implicit consciousness to engage in the world. The consciousness of engagement in the world is the foundation of all other forms of consciousness. However, we often prioritize our own, more developed and obvious forms of consciousness, eventually forgetting our fundamental consciousness of engagement in the world (Ibid.).

We usually forget our perceptions described here. However, our perceptions are the foundation of our knowledge and the background. The endless repetition of engagement with a particular embodied form makes its embodiment an implicit rule, an implicit perception, and a background for the next engagement with an embodied form. Embodiment, a specific act, appears as possible only against the background of the accumulated embodiments. This background is the foundation of the world. The world is shaped by forms of life, by history, and by bodily existence.

Therefore, the background is in a paradoxical logical position. The background is unfamiliar to us. To clarify the background, another

background is needed. We live as engaged subjects in the background. An engaged subject has a background but a disengaged subject has no background. By clarifying that knowledge has a background attached to it, the Cartesian image of the disengaged subject collapses (Wittgenstein 2009, § 108, § 197; Taylor 1991a, 70).

Taylor also discusses the relationship between background and context. Context is subsidiary to the central object. The background is not easily perceptible to us, any more than is the case with what takes place on the dark side of the moon. Backgrounds help us understand what we perceive directly; they summarize the implicit, unspoken context. The background appears with the engaged subject and is the context for the subject's apparent experience. Thus, to clarify something is to assume one's background (Taylor 1991a, 69).

Taylor states the following. "I can only define my identity against a background of important matters." Therefore, he says, if, like the Cartesian epistemological individual, we remove history, nature, society, and the demands of solidarity from our consideration, and see nothing but what we find in ourselves, we lose the candidates for what is important.

For example, only when a person lives in a world where history, nature, and human needs, are clear, he defines his identity with his power. We single out our relationship to nature, to define our identity. We get our identification, to respect nature (Taylor 1991b, 40). Glen Lehman argues as follows. Only when we think of ourselves as embodied, engaged, coping subjects can we understand how we are in contact with the cosmos. That is, we can learn nature and be in contact with it, only when we consider the importance of nature as an integral background to our way of being and becoming an engaged subject. The call to harmony with nature within and outside ourselves remains alive (Lehman 2015, 165).

As discussed so far, Taylor is highly critical of Cartesian epistemology, stating that epistemological thinking disconnects a person from the world and nature, to think of the surrounding environment as a tool for one's use. However, we should keep the relationship between people and their environment as a relationship of engagement and embodiment. This section discusses how the relationships between people and the environment, such as society and nature, are affected when the relationship between people and

their surroundings is reviewed in this way.

b) The Expression of a Person and Nature

The people understand how they are by relating themselves, through language, to backgrounds with important value meanings. At this point, one makes a worthy judgment of things by finding them desirable or detestable. This will eventually make judgments that things ought to be treated in this or that way, which indicates the emergence of normative consciousness.

The norms would include both norms about the environment and nature. This role of language is that in which worthy meaning appears. The function of language to enable worthy judgments, or to produce worthy meaning, is considered by Taylor as a constitutive function of language. Taylor's term of constitution creates all the important ways of being - feelings, activities, and relationships - of a person. This includes, for example, a person checking with himself or stating to others what his feelings are about, which Taylor sometimes characterizes as expression. Thus, the constitution is also an expression (Taylor 1992, 106).

Taylor emphasizes Herder's important achievements in linguistic theory, noting Herder's development of the concept of "expression." Language is said to create new feelings, goals, relationships, and strong values, among others, through "expression." Language can thereby transform our world, but the world referred to here is the world of our involvement.

Language introduces new meaning into our world through expressive activities. Language can create new relationships, and it can also renew relationships with others. These relationships with strong values can be made new. So the constitutive function of language produces creative "expression." It is argued that the very telling does not merely indicate what is already obvious, but opens up possibilities that are not yet present (Taylor 1992, 107).

This emphasis on expression has been the intellectual tendency of Romanticism. Isaiah Berlin called the tendency expressionism. The Romantics included everyone from Herder to Heidegger and Hegel and even influenced the utilitarian tradition through John Stuart Mill. This Romanticism is said to have worked critically against Enlightenment

rationalism, which regarded humans as individual subjects with a strong desire to manipulate the world around them. The Romantics saw human life as the external expression of human potential (Berlin 1965, 54).

The expressionist view developed the ideal of communion between men and nature. This ideal is said to have become one of the great themes of the Romantic period. Expression became an expression of the mind, an expression of the power to live, and through expression, human life would be harmonized. Humans were thought to restore their relationship with nature as an expression (Ibid.).

c) The Reflection of a Person and Nature

When harmony with nature is restored through expression, the term reflective is sometimes used as a concept that includes this. According to Taylor, Herder discovered the reflective function of language. The function of language is not merely to describe an object. For example, when we create new relationships with people or reaffirm intimate ones, language's broader functions beyond description are at work (Taylor 1992, 103).

When we speak words that imply jealousy, or when we speak words of subjection to pressure, by this we confirm, rather than deny, our feelings. Language emanates from you and returns to you. It is truly reflective. Taylor also gives an example. A person mumbles "How" when he feels pressure. Taylor argues that this is a way of consoling oneself, which in Japanese is believed to be the utterance close to the sound of a sigh. It is precisely the language to speak that comes back to them and changes them, fulfilling a reflective function. Language "articulates" and at the same time "shapes" a person's feelings (Taylor 1992, 104).

Reflection can also be observed concerning nature and society. In the case of Enlightenment rationalism, nature was regarded as an instrument of humans. However, using the concept of reflection, humans also have reflective relationships with society and nature. Individuals who engage as members of society may change society or be repelled by it, depending on how they engage in it. In any case, language and action emanating from the human side reflects on humans through the medium of society. The same could be said about nature. The work concerning nature, through science and society, is reflected towards human beings by nature itself.

When one tries to understand reflection to others or about nature, this understanding may include a value or normative content. Its content may not be able to appear without the backgrounds of embedded culture and history mentioned earlier. Among the backgrounds, the semantic dimension becomes a valuable reflection. Reflection works in the semantic dimension. For example, the meaning of life is a pattern of duties and rights of life. Freedom and the basic orientation of life that indicates historical backgrounds shape our ways of being (Taylor 1958, 11; Taylor 1992, 103).

We live our lives surrounded by meaning. Meaning is in the words we exchange and in every sign we give. Most of us live in an artificial environment. This is especially true of the inner language we speak to ourselves, or those who are not present (Taylor 1985a, 248).

The relationship between human beings and nature shall be mentioned here. According to Fergus Kerr and Heidegger, humans must understand what nature demands. Being human as the ultimate gift by the nonhuman provides a foundation for thinking about ecological politics. Things are demanding that we allow them to disclose themselves.

According to Jane Bennett, the notion of lifeless or thoroughly exploited matter contributes to human arrogance and our destructive fantasies of domination and overconsumption. As Ko Nomura mentions, we exist in a state of constant interaction with a broader spectrum of nonhuman forces that exist within and around our bodies (Nomura 2022, 58). These material forces, which possess beneficial or detrimental effects, enriching or impoverishing, elevating or degrading us, demand our attention and even deserve our respect (Bennett 2010, ix).

However, as Kerr mentions, an important point for Taylor is not Bennett's nonhuman forces themselves, but that if we want to maintain our identity as human beings, we need to be in contact with nonhuman creatures, and be open to them (Kerr 2004, 99-101).

d) Taylor's Expressionist Ecology

We must be open to nature and in harmony with nature. We have a certain obligation to submit to a larger order, which also means that we share with other creatures a mutually sustaining web of life (Taylor 1989, 384). According to Max Oelschlaeger, humans are part of the fabric of life,

and therefore it is too arrogant to deny moral concern for such a web of life (Oelschlaeger 2002, 117).

As James McEvoy states, modern identity and the human subject are in the crisis of environment. We should realize that we are persons in the world and nature. We must recognize that we come to know ourselves, only when we are under the situated nature of human existence, well positioned in our natural and social environment (McEvoy 2001, 197).

According to Taylor and Raymond A. Rogers, we struggle to realize higher and fuller modes against the resistance of the prosaic and shallower forms of our understanding of our authenticity. An example of the more prosaic and shallower forms is the relationship between human society and the natural world, as illustrated by the perspective of environmental policies that recommend resource constraints. This is only a pragmatic and instrumental appeal. In contrast, we need to see ourselves as part of a larger order that can make demands on us (Rogers 1994, 166; Taylor 1991b, 89). The shallower forms and higher and fuller modes of understanding the authenticity of the self here are closely related to ecology shown below.

Ko Nomura proposes to reexamine the anthropocentric view (Nomura 2022, 58) and according to Glen Lehman, Taylor offers one understanding of deep ecology. Against the contemporary anthropocentric attitude that assumes humans are the end goal of the universe, Taylor explores our ability to perceive various values in the natural environment and relates these values to ecology (Lehman 2015, 133).

When we perceive the values in the natural environment and are in awe of nature, we sometimes experience a sense of fullness that shakes our everyday senses. Taylor identifies several contemporary ecological ethics as one important way of thinking about the source of humans' power to achieve a state of fullness, which they find in "Nature" and in the depths of their inner being. The various forms of ecology attempt to reconstruct a non-exclusive humanism on a non-religious basis (Taylor 2007, 9, 19).

According to Christian Diehm, the term deep ecology was first introduced by the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess in 1972 to characterize a distinctive group emerging from the ecology movement. In contrast to so-called shallow environmentalism, which focuses on protecting human welfare in rich countries, Naess argues that a new deep ecology movement is

arising (Diehm 2020, 2).

As Glen Lehman maintains, Taylor's arguments about the environment overlap with the principles of deep ecology. Taylor understands that manipulative and dominant attitudes toward nature blind us to the values of nature. Taylor agrees with deep ecologists that we should explore the values of the world (Lehman 2015, 135, 164). However, Lehman states that while Taylor agrees with some principles of deep ecology, he tries to avoid the common tendency of deep ecologists to put the interests of the ecosystem above the interests of humanity. Taylor is a successor of the good aspect of Enlightenment and joins liberalism and ecology. Taylor, however, posits that men have too much power over the natural environment (Ibid., 143).

Taylor recognized the need for sustainable solutions. Taylor's 1976 paper "The Politics of the Steady State" implies the following. Namely, the human community must be aware of the ecological balance, which should at least prompt us to think about the problems associated with overpopulation and resource depletion, which are becoming problematic. Taylor emphasizes that we must create new ways of living in the natural environment, achieving this as long as we rely on a philosophical new approach (Ibid.).

According to Taylor, in an instrumentalist industrial society, the good life is equated with the expectation of an insatiable increase in prosperity. This comes with the expectation of further demands for goods, services, and abilities to control nature for individual purposes. This instrumentalist view of what it means to be human, so prevalent in modern civilization, is human's dominion over nature, shaping it according to the schemes we freely choose. These societies measure the success and value of their societies by production, that is, by steady increases in their dominance over nature. But Taylor's recommendation of a steady society is a society that demands us to accept a balance of improving our well-being and ecology (Taylor 1976, 53).

Taylor does not refuse economic growth. The problem is economic growth that unnecessarily consumes resources. He said resource consumption and balanced growth can also be envisioned. It is growth that focuses on qualitative change. For example, when a company improves the quality of its wallpaper, revamps its design, and produces a more beautiful design, if

the actual use of the resource remains the same, this will result in a higher quality of life while reducing the consumption of nature. Taylor recommends this type of growth. Of course, if we read the quality of wallpaper as the quality of society, we can understand the importance of Taylor's proposal (Taylor 1976, 49).

e) Language and Ecology

Taylor's ecology is based on the linguistic theories of Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty, Herder, and Heidegger. Sonia Sikka also states that Taylor built on Heidegger's constructivist and expressionist linguistic theory and believed that language is not just a tool for communicating independent representations of reality, but in a sense constitutes reality and opens access to meaning (Sikka 2018, 135).

Taylor gives an example of when things are wild. The wild demands disclosure not only as the world but also as the earth. To put it another way, humans should feel as if the wild demands the disclosure of the meaning of the wild itself. For Taylor, we should be conscious of the finiteness of nature and respect the preservation of species and the conservation of geology. This position is not inconsistent with economic improvement and scientific activity in nature. However, if men make the rainforest resource of timber, either simply out of the need for industrial development or from a purely technical standpoint, disclosure of meaning becomes impossible (Taylor 1992, 125).

From an instrumentalist standpoint, even if we protect the resources by not cutting down all the trees, one does not feel as if the wild is advocating for the meaning of the wild. Hence, the wild cannot appear in the semantic dimension. In the end, in semantics, the wild is extinct. The extinction of meaning for the wild leads to the extinction of meaning for the humans connected with the wild.

Instrumentalism assaults the very essence of man as a linguistic being. Even if we find a solution to global warming, he says, if it is technological and forgets the semantic dimension, it will eventually destroy us. For Taylor, learning to live with things in this world, including nature, will save the planet. To overcome our present crisis, we need, about this universe, all the insights we have to learn (Taylor 1992, 126).

Among the important contemporary issues, are those that must be explored in language, that evokes resonance in the heart of the individual, such as issues concerning love and the position of humans in the natural order (Taylor 1991b, 89). As Shin Chiba and Hirofumi Takada also state, through resonance with the flow of life in nature and resonance among people, we become able to perceive transcendent opportunities that go beyond what is limited to the individual or human society (Chiba, Takada 2022, 19-20).

Taylor states that if we can regain a sense that the natural environment and wild lands are calling to us, it will help to stop the serious ecological destruction (Taylor 1991b, 90). Taylor also states that we, as humans, live inescapably in a larger social, and even cosmic, context (Taylor 2016, 23). Through language, humans perceive rich meanings about nature, and such meanings, by reflecting on the self, can create new feelings.

Language would include narrative, poetics, and literature. Shin Chiba also notes that modern Romanticism's poetics, literature, art, contemporary deep ecology, and the praise of nature by poets and nature lovers, all echo humanity's awe for the dignity, mystery, and sacredness of the earth and nature. He also notes that today's Gaia (Mother Earth) hypothesis or Spaceship Earth metaphor is a new way of looking at nature that "preserves the inherent value and dignity of nature itself" separate from humanity's instrumental values (Chiba 2022, 270-271).

As Fergus Kerr notes, Taylor also states that Heidegger's understanding of being human as the ultimate gift of something nonhuman provides the basis for ecological politics. We must consider that things demand us to disclose themselves in a particular way (Kerr 2004, 100).

In his ecology, Taylor critically discusses the human manipulation and domination of nature as objectified objects, classifying it as shallow ecology. To elaborate on this issue further on the author's part, it seems that Taylor also criticizes the enhancement argument, which regards the human body as a machine and manipulates it. Taylor's view of being human as the ultimate gift by nonhuman creatures indicates the need to cultivate a deeper insight into life as a gift, both for humans and nature (Taylor 1991b, 89).

Conclusion

Charles Taylor critiques Cartesian dualism, which divides individuals into separate entities of the mind and body, arguing that this division leads to a separation between humans and the natural world, and nature is viewed as a resource and tool for human economic pursuits in the eyes of instrumentalists and anthropocentrism.

In contrast, Taylor maintains that human beings and nature should be united, and advocates for a comprehensive and non-anthropocentric perspective that yields distinct branches of political science. Political scientists who adopt an instrumental approach focus on political systems such as government, parliament, political parties, elections, and political movements, and view the political system as distinct from the ecosystem.

Ko Nomura suggests that we should hear the voice of nature (Nomura 2022, 58). Taylor asserts that our lives, emotions, and voices reflect nature and that nature communicates its intentions through human expression, so we must strive to discern nature's intentions. Taylor posits that we should function as the nexus between the political system and the ecosystem. In Taylor's images of society, citizens and politicians act as non-anthropocentric agents, working together to create an authentic democracy.

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