

Value Patterns and Value Change in Germany and Japan (2)

Pluralization of Value Patterns in Germany and Japan

Ulrich MÖHWALD*

The first part of this paper has been published in Vol. 13 of the *Journal of the College of International Studies*. It deals with changes of social mentality in Germany and Japan based on existing time series from opinion poll surveys. The finding in part 1 of this paper is that similar groups of values have been involved in the change of social mentality in both countries after World War II, but that there exist differences concerning the timing of change as well as some groups of values which have been involved in the value change in Germany, but not in Japan.

As has been stated in the introduction to part 1 of this paper,¹ a great variety of operationalizations and measurements of values is used in social sciences. The presentation in the next few pages is mainly based on the research on German values by the research group of Klages and on Japanese values by the German Institute of Japanese Studies and by the Culture Institute of the Life Insurance Companies. Although there exist major differences in the value instruments, the goals and also in data analysis, in all three cases values have been measured with rating scales² and a major step of data analysis has been the use of factor analyses for exploring the dimensional structures of the value systems. Based on this kind of analysis, in all three cases major value patterns could be ascertained. It has also already been noted that the pluralization and diversification of value patterns³ is an important element of the process of value change in Germany as well as in Japan, and this process is the main topic of the second part of this paper.

3. Value Patterns in Germany

Perhaps the best known typology of changing value patterns is Inglehart's materialist-postmaterialist scale. Since this scale has been administered in a number of West-

* 国際文化学科 (Department of Comparative Cultures)

ern societies since the early 1970s,⁴ it perhaps provides the most extensive international time series on value change. As Klages (1984: 85–86) has pointed out, what Inglehart calls 'materialist' values can roughly be used as an indicator for 'values of duty orientation and acceptance', while 'postmaterialist' values correspond to 'values of self-actualization' in Klages terms. Table 1 gives the development of the proportion of materialist and postmaterialist value patterns in Germany based on the Inglehart-scale.

Table 1: Materialist-Postmaterialist Value Types in Germany 1970–1990

	1970	1973	1974	1976	1976 ⁱ	1981	1982	1987	1988	1990
Materialists	43.0	42.0	56.0	37.0	41.0	43.8	38.3	16.3	19.4	19.0
Mixed types	47.0	50.0	39.0	43.0	38.0	48.3	47.6	57.4	52.9	57.0
Postmaterialists	10.0	8.0	6.0	8.0	11.0	7.8	14.2	26.2	27.7	21.0

Sources: Groß 1992 : 235 (1981, 1982, 1987, 1988) ; Schmitt and Hofrichter 1992 : 195 (1976, 1990) ; Inglehart 1977 : 104 (1970, 1973, 1976ⁱ) ; Klages 1985 : 86 (1974)

Although the data presented in table 1 show an overall trend of increase in post-materialistic and decrease in materialistic values in Germany between 1970 and 1990, in my opinion, it is difficult to interpret this increase in the direction of a substitution of materialists for postmaterialists, as Inglehart does. Rather the data show that a major factor of the change is the increase of 'mixed value types' which are largely ignored by Inglehart's analysis.⁵

The research of the Klages group, which has been executed in a number of surveys since the mid 1970s, gives ample evidence of the importance of the emergence of new mixtures of values in the process of value change. In their own research, the Klages group uses an instrument of twenty-three items which taps a much broader range of values.⁶ The importance of the items is measured with a rating-scale ranging from "1=unimportant" to "7=very important". Table 2 gives the items of this instrument (the means are average means from four 1987/1988 surveys)⁷. One thing is obvious if one looks at the means from the 1987/88 surveys: There are a number of items with means of 5.5 and above which are regarded as important by practically all respondents. These items form the three value complexes of harmony (family, partnership), uninjuredness (health, environment-consciousness), and communicativeness (friendship, sociability). In the analysis of the structure of the interdependence of the values, these values are compatible with all other values, in other words, in the factor analyses they load on all factors. In Herbert's words, these value complexes constitute a dimension of highly consen-

sual values which are shared by the vast majority of the population irrespective of socio-demographic properties. They therefore neither discriminate between value patterns nor between social groups and thus have been excluded from further analysis. For quite the same reason, in 1987/88 "autonomy" has also been excluded from further analysis, because this value too showed a tendency towards consensualness (cf. Herbert 1988: 147–148; 1992: 73–74).

Table 2: The Value Instrument of the Klages-Group

abreviation	exact statement	means
conformism	to do the same things as others do	2.5
conservatism	to adhere to time-honored ways	3.7
national pride	to be proud of German history	3.9
religiosity	to believe in God	4.9
acceptance	to respect law and order	5.9
orientation towards security	to strive for security	5.45
conventional achievement ethics	to be diligent and ambitious	5.2
standard of living	to have a high standard of living	4.5
power	to have power and influence	3.15
family	to lead a good family life	6.3
partnership	to have a partner in whom I can trust	6.5
health	to lead a health-conscious life	5.65
environment consciousness	to behave by all means in an environment-conscious way	5.7
friendship	to have good friends who recognize and accept me	6.1
sociability	to have many contacts with other people	5.5
emotionality	to be also guided by my feelings when making descisions	4.9
autonomy	to be independent from other people	5.6
hedonism	to enjoy thoroughly the good things in life	4.7
individualism	to better assert myself and my own needs against others	4.4
self-actualization	to develop my own imagination and creativity	5.3
social helpfulness	to help the socially disadvantaged and fringe groups	4.85
tolerance	to tolerate even those opinons with which I really cannot agree	4.8
political engagement	to engage in politics	3.5

Source: Herbert 1992: 72–73


Let us first turn to the 1970s. As has been stated in part 1 of this paper, the major direction of the value change which occurred in Germany between the early 1960s and the mid-1970s consisted of a decline of values of acceptance and duty orientation which was accompanied by an increase of values of self-actualization and social engagement. Factor analyses of the value instrument confirmed the separation of the values according to these two dimensions, and this dimensional structure of the values remained stable until the mid-1980s. The first dimension of values of acceptance and duty orientation consisted of values of duty, discipline, order, diligence, self-control, security, and materialism, while the second dimension of values of self-actualization consisted of values of idealistic critique of society, socio-political engagement, hedonism, and individualism.⁸ But, as Klages has stated in 1984, since the two value-dimensions had been relatively independent of each other:

The two-dimensional view leads ... to the possible question whether the push of value change from values of acceptance and duty orientation to values of self-actualization discussed here is the only possible way to characterize the dynamics between these two groups of values, or whether it would not be possible to conceptualize completely different forms of "value change". The results of our own surveys indicate that besides the substitution of values (or exchange of values) there also exist the possibilities of value-loss (both groups of values decrease), or of value-gain (both groups of values increase). (Klages 1984: 23–24).

To approach this problem, the Klages group separated the respondents into groups which show a different intensity of attachment to the two value dimensions.⁹ This resulted in four types of value-bearers (or value patterns): *tidy conventionalists* (*ordnungsliebende Konventionalisten*) who score high on the dimension of values of acceptance and duty orientation and low on the dimension of values of self-actualization and represent the traditional value system, *non-conformist idealists* (*nonkonforme Idealisten*) who score high on the dimension of values of self-actualization and low on the dimension of values of acceptance and duty orientation and represent value overturn, *active realists* (*aktive Realisten*) who score high on both dimensions and represent value synthesis, *prospectless resigned* (*perspektivlose Resignierte*) who score low on both dimensions and represent value loss (see figure 1).

These four value types showed clearly different profiles concerning socio-demographic properties as well as attitudes and needs. If we summarize the results of the research of the Klages group during the 1970s, the four value types show the following profiles¹⁰ :

Figure 1: Value Types in Germany
1979



Source: Franz/Herbert 1986:130; Herbert 1992:79

—*Tidy conventionalists* are overrepresented in the older and underrepresented in the younger age-groups, 53.5% of the conventionalists are older than forty and 21.3% are younger than thirty. Among them men are somewhat over- and women somewhat under-represented. Markedly more of them than the average are married, have children and are gainfully employed. A much greater proportion of the conventionalists than the average has lower, and a smaller proportion has advanced education levels, 75.9% of the *conventionalists* compared to 63.1% of the average left school after finishing compulsory education with most of them receiving professional education to become skilled workers thereafter. Concerning living standard they range in the lower middle income-groups, are blue-collar workers or lower middle class, and possess their own housing.¹¹

Subordination to authority, adaption to the social environment, satisfaction with their life, and a high longing for security together with the rejection of social and political engagement are major elements of the mental disposition of *conventionalists*. They are relatively passive and mainly interested in their own personal well-being. They shy from responsibility, their achievement motivation is rather limited and they dislike new and unusual tasks. To a certain degree they display unsociableness. Concerning social problems, they display a highly selective perception which corresponds to a rather conservative or even rightist political outlook.

—*Non-conformist idealists* are rather young. The age groups between 14 and 30 are clearly over-represented among them and the older age groups are under-represented. 52.3% of the *idealists* are younger than thirty and 29.3% are older than forty. Among them women are

somewhat over- and men somewhat under-represented. They tend to be unmarried and do not have children. University and high school students are clearly over-represented among them while a markedly lower proportion than the average is gainfully employed. Their education level is rather high. 56.7% of the *idealists* compared to 36.9% of the average have completed at least some type of secondary school education. Regarding their age and occupational situation it is no wonder that the lowest income groups are clearly over-represented among them. Concerning their social background, from their descent as well as from their own social status, persons from the upper classes or the new middle classes are over-represented among the *idealists* while blue-collar workers are clearly under-represented. Nevertheless, since more than 50% of the *idealists* are younger than thirty, 28.5% are university or high school students, or attending professional education programs,¹² and 61.5% live in cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants, only 28.8% of the *idealists* compared to 39.2% of the average possess their own housing while 70.7% compared to 60.3% are renters.

Regarding their mental disposition, *idealists* are the opposite of *conventionalists*. They show a low degree of satisfaction with society, a rejection of authority and adaptation to the social environment which goes hand in hand with a high regard for autonomy and self-reliance. Concerning work, their achievement motivation is rather high—as long as the work is interesting and makes sense to them. They have a strong inclination to social and political engagement. Concerning social problems, they also show a highly selective perception which in contrast to the *conventionalists* corresponds to a rather progressive or leftist political outlook.

—*Active realists* concentrate in the middle-age groups between thirty and fifty five. Among them the proportion of persons who are younger than twenty-five and those who are older than sixty are under-represented.¹³ A higher proportion of the *realists* lives in small and middle towns. 66.1% of them are married and 62.7% have children. Both figures are a bit over the average but markedly lower than in the case of the *conventionalists* and clearly higher than in the case of the *idealists*. They are gainfully employed, and only 10.3% of them attend school or professional education programs. Their income tends to be higher than the average, they tend to own their housing and their social background is middle and upper class with people from the old middle classes clearly over-represented. *Realists* show a tendency toward middle education levels.

In their mental disposition, *realists* practically combine the 'positive' features of the *conventionalists* as well as of the *idealists* while lacking the 'negative' features of both types. They are as disciplined and able to adapt as *conventionalists* and at the same time as ready as *idealists* for critical socio-political engagement. *Realists* are oriented to the family and leisure to the same degree as to their occupation and they are very active in both spheres of life. Respect for law and order goes hand in hand with the willingness to defend their rights and interests against encroachment by the authorities or public agencies. They have a high achievement motivation and are willing to take responsibilities—as long as they are given

enough room for decision making. Concerning social problems, *realists* lack the selectivity of perception which is typical for *conventionalists* or *idealists*: The whole range of possible problems is observed by them and they are especially willing to adapt their private behaviour to enhance the solution of problems e.g. pollution.

—*Prospectless resigned* are rather old. Among them people over fifty are over-represented and the age group between fifty and sixty is especially strong.¹⁴ Divorced and widowed persons are over-represented among them. Persons who are full-time gainfully employed are somewhat under-represented among them. They tend to belong to the lower income groups and to lower social status groups and among them possession of housing is clearly lower than the average.

Prospectless resigned are characterized by passivity and poorly developed self-confidence. They are unsociable and suspicious towards their social environment with a strong tendency to isolate themselves. They are in a diffuse way unsatisfied with the world, but they also reject social and political engagement. Their achievement motivation is very low and responsibility is not their cup of tea. They are ill-informed and absolutely disinterested concerning any kind of social problems, and this corresponds with a very low use of the media. (Cf. Franz/Herbert 1986: 141–151; Klages 1988: 122–130).

Two elements of these value patterns are of special interest. One is the fact that value synthesis has emerged as a major factor of value change since the 1960s. The proportion of persons adhering to this kind of value pattern has continuously increased since the early surveys and at the end of the 1980s *realists* made up about one third of the population. The other element is the high importance of value loss in the 1970s. Since then the proportion of *resigned* has decreased considerably and at the end of the 1980s they amounted to only about one tenth of the population. On the one hand, since value synthesis seems to be very well suited to overcome social cleavages and *realists* seem to be especially fit to adapt to social, political, and economic changes, the phenomenon of value synthesis has attracted considerable attention among German social scientists. On the other hand, since value loss is connected with maladjustment between the individual and the social environment and the inability to adapt to social change, its prevalence gives cause for concern.


What we have to consider before trying to interpret the phenomenon of value synthesis is the fact that conventionalism since the end of the 1970s no longer has been as conservative and traditionalistic as it had been before the start of the value change in the early 1960s and that today many elements of the 'modernized' value system are taken for granted by the vast majority of the German population. This points to the fact the value change is connected with learning effects which affect almost the whole

population, but which vary among different social groups. Put in this way, value synthesis largely consists of learning processes on the level of individual value systems. These learning processes lead to the adoption of new values and their integration in the existing value system while old values are not repudiated. These processes may be related to life cycle effects, but this need not necessarily be the case. According to Klages (1988: 133–138), these kinds of processes are especially stimulated by well integrated social environments with a high degree of participation in various social groups, associations, and clubs, i.e. a social situation which has been typical for German small and middle-sized towns.¹⁵

In value loss, period effects seem to have played an important part. This phenomenon has been typical for persons who can be regarded as the losers in the modernization processes which have taken place in Germany since the end of the 1960s. Massive structural and technical changes in German industry since the late 1960s, the appearance of declining industries, expanded automation and micro-electronization of production processes, and the shift to service industries resulted in mass long-term unemployment which especially affected poorly educated youth and older workers who lost their jobs in their late forties and fifties. The reduced ability of these groups to adapt to social and economic change resulted in personal disorientation, disenchantment with society, anxiety, and isolation, hence in social anomy, and value loss is especially over-represented among these groups.¹⁶ But while value loss had been an important phenomenon in the 1970s, despite continuing high unemployment rates and social and economic change during the 1980s, Germans seem to have learned to cope with the new social risks and today the importance of value loss has considerably decreased.¹⁷

But the decline of value loss and the increase of value synthesis are only two elements of the change of social mentality which has regained strength in Germany since the mid-1980s. The results of several nation-wide surveys which the Klages group conducted in 1987/88 show a further differentiation of the dimensional structure of the value universe and the emergence of new value patterns. First, the factor analysis of the value-instrument given in table 2 did not result in two, but in three factors. This is a new phenomenon which cannot be found in the data from surveys of the 1970s up to 1984 but seems to have developed since 1985 (cf. Herbert 1988: 151–152). What has happened is that materialistic values have detached themselves from the dimension of *values of acceptance and duty orientation (conventionalism)* and hedonistic values have detached themselves from the dimension of *values of self-actualization (self-actualization and engagement)* and now these two groups of values together form a new dimension which

the Klages group calls *hedonistic materialism*.¹⁸ Second, this also brought changes in the value patterns. The cluster analyses allowed for the identification of the following five¹⁹ new value patterns: *conventionalists* who score high on the dimension of *conventionalism* and low on both other dimensions, *idealists* who score high on the dimension of *self-actualization and engagement* and low on the other two, *hedonistic materialists (HedoMat.)* who score high on *hedonistic materialism* and low on the other two dimensions, *realists* who score high on all three dimensions and *resigned* who score low on all three dimensions (cf. fig. 2).²⁰



Source: Herbert 1992:79

To sum up the changes in the value patterns, we have to state three effects: (1) The emergence of the new value pattern of *hedonistic materialists*, (2) a very strong decrease of the proportion of *resigned*, i.e. of value loss, and (3) a further increase of the representatives of the 'old' value change, i.e. of *idealists* and *realists*, which goes hand in hand with a further decline of the 'traditional' value pattern of *conventionalists*. A comparison of the 1979 survey with the age groups 14–54 years from the 1987/88 surveys²¹ especially reveals these facts (cf. table 3). Besides the new value pattern, *resigned* decreased twenty-eight, and *conventionalists* almost five percentiles, while the proportion of the representatives of the 'old' value change increased from 49% to 57%. Seen in this way, the 'old' value change from values of acceptance and duty orientation to values of self actualization is still continuing, but supplemented by a new wave of pluralization and differentiation of value patterns which started around 1985.²²

Table 3: Distribution of Value Germany 1979 and 1987/88 (14-54 Years)

	conventionalists	idealists	HedoMat	realists	resigned
1979	19.6%	21.5%	—	27.4%	31.5%
1987/88	14.8%	22.3%	15.1%	34.5%	13.3%

Source: Herbert 1992: 79.

Despite the changes in the basis of the construction of the value types, the Klages group decided to keep the old names for the old types because they essentially retained identical social and mental dispositions. Nevertheless, the emergence of a new value type did not only affect the size of the other groups, it also had certain effects on their profiles. Therefore it seems useful to summarize the new profiles and the changes which have occurred since 1979.

—Due to the detachment of materialistic values from the dimension *conventionalism*, *conventionalists* are nowadays more strongly separated from the other groups than had been the case in 1979. The proportion of the older age groups above sixty among them has increased markedly, and (widowed) old women are overrepresented. The educational, social, and occupational levels have become even lower. It is expected that the proportion of *conventionalists* will continue to shrink in the future merely because of effects of ageing and death. Compared to 1979, no differences concerning the mental dispositions of the *conventionalists* have evolved.

—While in the case of the *conventionalists* the development of a new value dimension has resulted in a reinforcement of their typical traits, in the case of *idealists*, the detachment of hedonistic values from the dimension of *self-actualization and engagement* has rather led to a tendency of integration. *Idealists* as the 'children' and carriers of the value change of the 1960s and 1970s are still younger than the population average, and still have the highest formal education levels. Students, highly qualified managerial employees, and the upper echelons of the public service are markedly over-represented among them. But, all in all, they have grown older, and the proportion of married and gainfully employed persons has risen considerably, facts which can be interpreted as an increase of social, familial, and occupational integration. This tendency towards integration can also be observed regarding their mental disposition. *Idealists* still are rather contradictory personalities with a strong narcissistic strain, they still are critical of society, harbor a progressive or leftist political orientation, and are ready to participate in non-conventional political activities and movements, but their attitudinal and behavioural repertoire has enlarged and their willingness to engage in conventional forms of political and social action like that of the churches, welfare organizations, labor unions, and political parties has increased considerably.

—The proportion of *realists* increased considerably, but besides this, they show no changes,

neither concerning their socio-demographical features, nor concerning their mental dispositions.

—Besides the marked decrease of their proportion, the *resigned* have not changed very much. They still are based in the lower social classes and the importance of negative life experiences which might lead to resignation seems to have increased somewhat, as might be inferred from the high proportion of divorced people among them. In their mental disposition no changes have occurred.

—*Hedonistic materialists* have the youngest average age, they are even younger than *idealists* (cf. table 4). Consequently among *hedonistic materialists* unmarried persons, *Auszubildende*²³ and high school—but not university—students are over-represented. Besides their age, they show no marked social characteristics, but contrastive analysis with the young *idealists* points in the direction that *hedonistic materialists* rather are representatives of the young middle classes of urban skilled workers, while young *idealists* rather are the representatives of the highly educated youth of the upper middle classes. Their mental disposition gives the picture of only partially self-confident egoists who neither possess clear life goals nor strong self-assertion and show signs of ego-weakness. *Hedonistic materialists* display a light dissatisfaction with society which is compensated by positive future-expectations. Concerning political orientations, *hedonistic materialists* show some conservative traits similar to *conventionalists*. They have no willingness to engage in political protest and a low social problem consciousness with the exception of real or supposed threats to their (material) security: The problems of foreigners in Germany and of economic growth. But compared to *conventionalists*, they show no sign of political alienation, nevertheless they have the highest proportion of vote abstention. In other words, while the *conventionalist* fear politics, *hedonistic materialists* are disinterested in politics and consequently they have a markedly lower proportion of members of political parties than *idealists* or *realists*. The turning away from institutions which can be observed in the area of politics extends to other life areas too: *Hedonistic materialists* show a very low acceptance of formalized bonds in the areas of religion and the family. In work life they see work only as a means to earn money, are characterized by a strong need of 'much leisure time', the lowest achievement motivation of all value types, indifference to career, rejection of responsibility, and they strongly detest hierarchical-authoritarian structures. Consequently they do not respond to any of the usual incentives for enhancing work motivation. (Cf. Herbert 1992: 79–82; 94–97).

Table 4: Proportion of the Value Types in the Younger Age Groups in Germany 1987/88

age group	convent.	idealists	hedo-mats.	realists	resigned
14-17	8.0%	20.3%	32.6%	28.9%	12.7%
14-23	6.2%	26.5%	22.3%	32.4%	12.7%
all respondents	21.0%	19.1%	13.0%	33.0%	14.0%

Source: Herbert 1992: 81.

The results of the 1987/88 surveys of the Klages group are in accordance with the results of other German value research, and especially the opinion and market research institute GFM-GETAS has reported a new wave of differentiation of value patterns among the younger Germans since 1985, and the emergence of a new value pattern which they called *lighthearted materialists* (*sorglose Materialisten*) and whose socio-demographic traits and mental dispositions correspond very well to the *hedonistic materialists* of the Klages group (cf. Grimm 1990; 1992), while continuing pluralization of value patterns has been reported by Maag (1991) and Schmidtchen (1993).

4. Value Patterns in Japan

As has been shown in part 1 of this paper, the general directions of value change in Germany and Japan did very much resemble each other. It has also been stated that in Japan too this change went hand in hand with a differentiation of the dimensional structure of the value universe and a pluralization of value patterns. Unfortunately, the construction of questionnaires and the methods of data analysis of most Japanese research on social mentality differs very much from the German research on values and value change so that a direct comparison of the dimensional structure of values and of the value patterns is impossible. Therefore, in order to approach the problem of the dimensional structure of values and of value patterns in Japan, I will first give an overview of the results of the 1991 survey on Japanese values by the German Institute of Japanese Studies and then approach the problem of the differentiation of the dimensional structure of Japanese values by an inspection of the results of the three surveys on Japanese life values by the Culture Institute of the Life Insurance Companies.

4.1 Value Patterns in the 1991 Survey of the German Institute of Japanese Studies

Since 1990, the German Institute of Japanese Studies in Tōkyō has been engaged in a research project on value change in Japanese society since 1945. Besides content analysis of middle school social studies textbooks and legal documents and the reanalysis of time series from Japanese opinion surveys and social statistics, a nationwide survey on Japanese values which was executed in May 1991 forms an integral part of this research project. My discussion of the research project will be limited to this latter survey.²⁴ But it should be stated from the start that in contrast to the German research on values and value change by the Klages group and others, or the Japanese research on

values by the Culture Institute of the Life Insurance Companies, the research project of the German Institute of Japanese Studies did not aim at a complete examination of the value universe, but was centered on two dimensions of value change, namely individualism—collectivism and equality—inequality in the life areas of the family and the workplace. While the choice of the two life areas mainly resulted from the necessity of limiting the scope of the project and selecting areas for which material to document change over time sufficiently exists, the selection of the two dimensions was, at least partly, motivated by the fact that popular representations of Japanese society in Western as well as in Japanese social sciences see the characteristics of Japanese society in contrast to Western ones in the priority of groupism and hierarchically structured human relations while the notions of individualism and equality are insufficiently developed, and that we wanted to examine to what degree these claims can be corroborated empirically and what changes have occurred in this respect. Although the project was not designed as comparative research, it is clear that German research on value change formed one of our reference points, and especially the data analysis was oriented to the techniques used by the Klages group.

To begin with, when we started the research project in 1990, we proceeded from the assumption that values of individualism-collectivism were structured in a one-dimensional way with individualism and collectivism forming the opposite poles of a unified dimension, and basically the same was assumed for the dimension of equality-inequality. But when we received the results of the survey, we were forced to revise our assumptions already upon the examination of the simple tabulations: The percentages of answers belonging to individualism and those belonging to collectivism or of those belonging to equality and those belonging to inequality showed that in a number of cases quite a high proportion of respondents must have chosen answers which were theoretically contradictory. Further inquiry into the problem of consistency of the answers by cross-tabulation of the items showed that especially when crossing life areas the proportion of respondents who consistently chose individualistic or collectivistic, egalitarian or inegalitarian answers was rather low. This pointed to the fact that the dimensional structure of the values involved in the survey was far more complex than originally assumed and that an analysis proceeding from a bi-polar frame of reference made little sense.

Therefore, we proceeded with a more thorough analysis of the interrelation of the items, which started with an examination of their correlations.²⁵ As a result it became clear that there exist multiple interdependencies between the items, but at the same time

we found groups of strongly interrelated variables in each of the two dimensions. These groups suggest that there are attitude or value complexes which correspond to specific life situations or life areas, and these are largely consistent with the theoretical constructs that entered into the selection of the items. In order to examine the dimensional structure of the attitudes and values, the second step of the analysis consisted of explorative factor analyses, which were executed separately for each of the life-area or life-situation specific constructs.

As might have already become clear, the problem of individualism vs. collectivism was very much the center of the survey of German Institute of Japanese Studies. Concerning this problem the questionnaire included a battery of six items tapping individualistic and collectivistic values on a general level, i.e. independent of specific life situations or life areas. This battery (question 10) became the basis for all further analysis of the value structure. The battery had the following wording:

Q 10. In your opinion, how important are the following capacities and abilities for man's life? Please indicate the number which corresponds to your view.²⁶

How important do you think it is

10.1 to fulfill required tasks without grumbling?

10.2 to be able to make one's own decisions (to decide by oneself) in any situation?

10.3 to be able to make compromises in discussions although they may differ from one's own opinion?

10.4 to make efforts to shape one's life according to one's own conceptions?

10.5 to let other people live according to their own conceptions?

10.6 to endeavor to follow the rules of the group to which one belongs (eg. school, local society, firm)?

This battery was designed to inquire into the importance of individualistic and collectivistic values. As already said, we originally proceeded from a one-dimensional model with individualism and collectivism as opposite poles. Consequently we assumed, that respondents who chose the individualistic or the collectivistic pole on one item would do the same on the other items. We therefore assumed a close interconnectedness of all items with a clear separation of the poles. Therefore, concerning the evaluation of the construct validity of this battery it is decisive to what degree the groups of individualistic and collectivistic items are separated.²⁷

Explorative factor analysis²⁸ resulted in two factors with the individualistic items 10.2, 10.4 and 10.5 constituting one, and the collectivistic items 10.1 and 10.3 constituting the other. The two factors explain 51.6% of the variance. The item 10.6

which theoretically should also belong to collectivism loads on both factors and with 89.2% of the respondents regarding it as important or rather important constitutes a highly consensual item which consequently was excluded from the construction of the dimensional variables (cf. table 5). What conclusions can be drawn from these results? First, concerning the construct validity of this battery, we can state a clear separation of the individualistic and collectivistic items, as had been assumed. Second, concerning the dimensional structure of individualistic and collectivistic items, it became clear that individualism and collectivism do not constitute the opposite poles of one unified dimension, but form two separate dimensions. And third, rather than by collectivism or groupism, this second dimension is formed by values of conformity and subordination, whereas values of group integration are highly consensual and neither discriminate between the factors, nor conflict with individualism.


Table 5: Factors and Factor Loadings of the Items from Battery 10 of the German Institute for Japanese Studies 1991 Survey

item	factor 1	factor 2
10.2	0.60	0.10
10.4	0.77	0.06
10.5	0.76	0.12
10.1	-0.15	0.88
10.3	0.26	0.51
10.6	0.43	0.49

Based on the factors, we computed the new dimensional sum-variables called *individualism* (items 10.2, 10.4, and 10.5) and *conformism* (items 10.1 and 10.3), and explored their relation with the socio-demographic traits of the respondents using cross-tabulations, comparison of group means, and analysis of variance (ANOVA). With a sample mean of 1.9, *individualism* is regarded of high importance by the vast majority of the respondents, only 4.3% of the respondents lie on a mean above 3, i.e. regard individualism as unimportant. *Conformism* has a much higher sample mean of 2.51, and consequently is regarded as important (mean under 3) by only 58.4% and as unimportant (mean above 3) by 28.1% of the respondents. In both cases age is a major factor determining the importance which is accorded to *individualism* or *conformism*, but while in the case of *conformism*, the importance increases almost proportionally with rising age, in the case of *individualism* a curvilinear effect can be observed: While the age group 27–

34 years shows an average score on *individualism*, the age groups 20–26, 41–47 and above 71 score higher on, i.e. accord lower importance to *individualism* than the average, and the age groups 35–40 and 48–71 years score lower on, i.e. accord higher importance to *individualism* than the average. The highest mean, i.e. the lowest importance of *individualism* is displayed by the age group 41–47 years.²⁹ *Individualism*, but not *conformism*, further shows marked influences of education and gender: The importance of *individualism* rises with rising education levels and men have a markedly lower score on, i.e. accord higher importance to individualism than women. In both cases urbanization influences the dimensional variables. *Conformism* is strongest in rural areas while *individualism* is strongest in metropolitan areas.

The next step of our analysis consisted in the construction of value typologies. We first submitted the dimensional variables of *individualism* and *conformism* to a z-standardization and then performed a cluster analysis setting combinations of low and high scores on the dimensional variables. This resulted in four value patterns: *individualists* which place high importance on *individualism*, and low importance on *conformism*, *conformists* which place high importance on *conformism*, and low importance on *individualism*, *integrated* which place high importance on both dimensions and represent value synthesis, and *non-committed* which place low importance on both dimensions (cf. fig. 3).



In the same way as the German value types, the Japanese value types too show characteristic socio-demographic and attitude profiles:

—*Individualists* represent 22.3% of the respondents. Among *individualists* men and the younger age groups are over-represented. 61.8% of the *individualists* compared to 53.9% of the average belong to the age groups under forty-eight. Their proportion increases considerably with rising education level. 32.6% of the *individualists* compared to 23.2% of the average have a college education. They largely live in highly urbanized environments and the Kantô region is somewhat over-represented. They esteem values of self-actualization and reject traditional values. They have no negative attitude towards the integration of groups, but they strongly reject hierarchical social relations and structures which might become an obstacle to self-actualization. In the workplace they show solidarity with their colleagues, regard equal treatment of women as a matter of course, and they have a strong achievement motivation. They attach high importance to the family, and —if necessary —they put aside own wishes for the family's sake.

—*Conformists* represent 22.3% of the respondents. Among them women are strongly over- and men strongly under-represented. The older age groups above forty-seven account for 59.9% of the *conformists* compared to 46% of the average and 35.1% of the *individualists*. Their proportion shrinks considerably with rising levels of education. 30.8% of the *conformists* compared to 24.5% of the average finished school after compulsory education and only 18.5% compared to the 32.6% of the *individualists* and 23.2% of the average have a college education. Farmers and housewives are slightly over-represented among *conformists*. *Conformists* support traditional values and reject values of self-actualization. Among all four value types, *conformists* show the strongest support for patriarchalistic attitudes and a hierarchical social order. In the workplace they exhibit only limited achievement motivation and solidarity with colleagues. They rather are those workers who are well adapted to company interests and workshop order. Their attitude towards life in groups ranges on the average, and they have a strong sense of duty towards the family.

—The *integrated* represent 36.5% of the respondents. Among them men are slightly over- and women under-represented, but not as strongly as in the case of *individualists*. Higher age groups are over- and lower age groups under-represented, but this effect is less marked than in the case of the *conformists*, and there exists a certain tendency of the *integrated* to concentrate in the middle-age groups between forty and sixty. There exists no marked relation with education. As a tendency, college education is slightly lower than the average. Compared to *individualists* with their strong tendency to higher education levels and *conformists* with their equally strong tendency to lower education levels, *integrated* show a tendency to middle education levels. People who work in small firms, are self-employed or work in managerial positions are over-represented among the *integrated*. The *integrated* are characterized by marked loyalty to the company, strong bonding with groups, solidarity with colleagues, and a sense of duty towards the family. They affirm patriarchalistic attitudes, but in family life they rather support husband-wife-relations built on partnership. Despite their loyalty to the company, they protect their own interests, and in private life they are clearly oriented to self-actualization.

—The *non-committed* represent 19.4% of the respondents. As in the case of the *individualists*, the younger age groups are over-represented among the *non-committed*, nevertheless, compared to *individualists*, the age groups above sixty shrink less strongly and there is a certain tendency of an over-representation of the youngest age groups below twenty-five. Women are over- and men under-represented, but not as strongly as in the case of *conformists*. Among the *non-committed* lower and middle education levels are over- and college education is under-represented, but the tendency to lower education levels is less marked than in the case of *conformists*. Concerning occupation, a certain tendency to production workers in the secondary sector can be observed. Among the *non-committed* people living in three-generation-families or other extended families are overrepresented. The *non-committed* display only little loyalty to the company, bonding with groups, solidarity with colleagues, and sense of duty towards the family. They strongly reject hierarchical social relations and structures, but values of self-actualization are not supported by them neither. They attach importance to material interests and leisure.

The distribution of the value types astonishingly resembles the German pattern found by the Klages group. But the similarities do not merely stop on the level of the quantitative distribution of the value types. At least *individualists* as the representatives of modernized values, *conformists* as the representatives of traditional values, and the *integrated* as the representatives of value synthesis very much resemble their German counterparts, namely *idealists*, *conventionalists*, and *realists*, concerning their socio-demographic and attitude profiles. A special case are the Japanese *non-committed*, who show similarities to the German *resigned* as well as the *hedonistic materialists*. In the interpretation of the results, they posed big problems to us, because they display disengagement from almost all items in our questionnaire, and allow for no positive characterization. At first glance, therefore, we suspected value loss. But at closer inspection it is difficult to uphold this interpretation, because it doesn't fit with the socio-demographic characteristics of the *non-committed*. The problem is, that our questionnaire was strongly limited to values of individualism-collectivism and equality-inequality and contained only few items from other areas. What is obvious is that the *non-committed* display self-centeredness and disengagement and withdrawal from social life. But this pattern is not only typical for value loss, but also for the new pattern of *hedonistic-materialism* which has emerged among the youth in most advanced industrialized countries since the mid-1980s, and also in Japan, as the results of the 1985 and 1991 Japanese Life Values Surveys—which are discussed below—show. We therefore regard it as highly probable that the group of the *non-committed* in our survey consists of a certain proportion of *resigned* characterized by value loss who concentrate in the older age groups, and of this new type of *hedonistic-materialists* who concentrate in the younger age groups.

Off course, a one-time survey like this one can tell us a lot about what kind of value patterns actually exist in Japanese society, but it can tell us very little about what changes have occurred in the past. Nevertheless, if one adopts the standpoint that values are basically acquired during youth and remain relatively stable thereafter through the life of the individual, based on the analysis of variance of the age-distribution of the scores on the dimensional variables of *individualism* and *conformism*, some informed guesses are possible. While the importance of *conformism* increases almost lineally with age, the relation of *individualism* to age is more complex. As a general trend we can observe an increased importance of individualism at lower ages, but the age groups 21–26 and 41–47 show a lower importance of *individualism* than the neighboring age groups. This indicates that since the end of World War II there was not a continuous increase of the importance of 'modern' values, but that modernized values rather gained importance in intermittent waves, an interpretation which fits well with the picture presented by the Surveys on the Japanese National Character (cf. fig. 3 in part 1 of this paper). It further indicates that somewhere around the mid-1970s disengagement from 'modern' as well as from 'traditional' values began to appear as an important phenomenon. To approach the question of changes in value patterns, the following section will give a summary of the results of the Surveys on Japanese Life Values by the Culture Institute of the Life Insurance Companies.

4.2 Pluralization of Japanese Value Patterns

The Surveys on Japanese Life Values (*Nihonjin no seikatsu kachikan*) have been executed by the Culture Institute of the Life Insurance Companies (*Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentô*) in cooperation with the Nomura Research Institute (*Nomura Sôgô Kenkyûjo*) in 1976/77, 1985, and 1991. Compared to either the German value surveys of the Klages group or the survey on Japanese values by the German Institute of Japanese Studies, the Surveys on Japanese Life Values differ considerably concerning goals, approach, and data analysis. Nevertheless, since the major goal was to ascertain the basic value patterns of the Japanese, they provide answers to some questions which were raised by the results of the survey of the German Institute of Japanese Studies. But let us first summarize the differences.³⁰

The first difference is the goal of the research. The Surveys on Japanese Life values aim at the question "what are the basic values of the Japanese?" i.e. they try to ascertain value patterns which are common to all Japanese or which form the basic

structure of Japanese social mentality (and hence allow discrimination between Japanese social mentality and that of other societies). Although the notion is not stated, it is clear that this goal is very close to the inquiry into the Japanese national character. Naturally, in such a case the differences between social groups, which have been the focus of the German value research, are secondary and consensual values which have been removed from further analysis in German research play a central role in unifying otherwise strongly distinct value patterns.

The second difference is the sheer size of the value instruments. While the instrument of the Klages group consisted of twenty-three to thirty items, and between ten and thirty items are the rule today in Germany, and the instrument of individualistic-collectivistic items of the German Institute of Japanese Studies even consisted of only six items, the value instrument of the Surveys on Japanese Life values consisted of 101 items in 1976/77, 107 items in 1985, and 87 items in 1991.

The third difference is the overall approach. The aim was to ascertain the basic values of the Japanese at a given point in time, i.e. 1976/77, 1985 and 1991 with the problems of change and comparison entering into the picture only since the second survey. Especially in 1976/77 it was unclear what aspects of life would be important for inquiry into the Japanese value structure. Therefore the first step had been a delphy-enquête among specialists on Japanese social mentality which resulted in 32 life aspects which should be tapped by the value instrument. But before operationalizing these life aspects, a second delphy-enquête was launched, this time among Japanese intellectuals, who were asked their opinion about the importance of these life aspects. This was followed by group discussions with laymen concerning the importance of these life aspects for their everyday-life, and this resulted in the collection of 250 opinions which formed the basis for the operationalization of the 32 life aspects into 180 questionnaire items. These were tested in pre-tests and pre-surveys and reduced to 101 items based on the results of factor analyses before being used in the final surveys. In 1985 quite a similar approach was adopted. Because major changes in the Japanese mentality structure and language due to the rapid social change during the almost ten years since the first survey were expected, group discussions were conducted with young laymen concerning the questions of wording and importance of the life aspects and items of the 1976/77 survey and of what new aspects should be treated. This resulted in a new instrument which was tested in pretests and a pilot survey, while at the same time a panel survey was conducted to test the continuing validity of the life aspects of the first survey, before the final instrument for the 1985 survey was constructed. Anyway, this resulted in

Table 6: Change of Value Patterns in the Surveys on Japanese Life Values

	1st step		2nd step		3rd step
1976/77	101 items, 6 factors	family orientation (<i>kazoku-shikō</i>)	3 value patterns	traditionalism (<i>dentō-shugi</i>)	1 basic pattern common to all Japanese:
		authority orientation (<i>ken'i-shikō</i>)		privatism (<i>jihei-shugi</i>)	'adulthood' (<i>otona-shugi</i>)
		orientation towards life planning (<i>keikaku-shikō</i>)		orientation towards independence (<i>shutaisei-shikō</i>)	
		introverted-individualistic orientation (<i>naikōteki-kojin-shikō</i>)			
		solidarity orientation (<i>rentai-shikō</i>)			
		orientation towards social pluralism (<i>tayōsei-shikō</i>)			
1985	107 items, 22 factors		5 value patterns	orientation towards humanism (<i>ninjōmi-shikō</i>)	2 competing basic patterns:
				orientation towards family future (<i>kazokuteki-shōrai-shikō</i>)	'adulthood' (<i>otona-shugi</i>)
				orientation towards comfort (<i>anraku-shikō</i>)	'selfness' (<i>jibun-shugi</i>)
				orientation towards self-performance (<i>jiko-kenjishikō</i>)	
				orientation towards self-reliance (<i>jiritsu-shikō</i>)	
1991	87 items, 22 factors		5 value patterns	orientation towards humanism (<i>ninjō-shikō</i>)	2 competing basic patterns:
				orientation towards self-reliance (<i>jiritsu-shikō</i>)	'adulthood' (<i>otona-shugi</i>)
				family orientation (<i>kazoku-shikō</i>)	'self-centeredness' (<i>jibunchūshin-shugi</i>)
				orientation towards comfort (<i>anraku-shikō</i>)	
				orientation towards self-performance (<i>jiko-kenjishikō</i>)	

Source: Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentā/Nomura Sōgō Kenkyūjo 1980: 39–42; Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentā 1988: 60–63; 1993: 35–58

major changes of the value instrument between the first and second survey.³¹ The preparation of the third survey was by and large the same as that for the second one.³² Another important point is that the quantitative surveys have been supplemented by qualitative interviews which allow deeper inquiry into the meaning of the value patterns which resulted from the statistical analysis of the quantitative data.

The fourth difference is the technique of data analysis applied. While our analysis was based on explorative factor analyses (principal component analysis) followed by cluster analysis, the group of the Culture Institute of the Life Insurance Companies used a complex type of multi-step factor analyses in the course of which the initially very high number of factors was reduced to one or two in the final level of analysis. In all three surveys, then, respondents had been broken down into groups of high (above average), middle (average), and low (below average) scores on the factor variables, and all statements concerning the profiles of the factor variables were based on these groups. Therefore, especially the middle level factors, which are called 'value orientations' by the research group of the Culture Institute of the Life Insurance Companies, show many similarities with the dimensional variables and the value patterns of our analysis or of the Klages group.³³ Table 6 gives the an overview of the changes in the value patterns which occurred from the first to the third Survey on Japanese Life Values.

In 1976/77 Japanese value patterns were still relatively uniform and undifferentiated, and the second level of the factor analyses allowed the identification of three value patterns. These could be reduced to one basic pattern called *adulthood* on the third level of the factor analyses. *Adulthood* was thought to be common to all Japanese, nevertheless, already in 1976/77 there existed clear signs of cracks in the uniform basic pattern of Japanese social mentality: While among the adherents of the second level value patterns *traditionalists* still had many points on which they agreed with the adherents of the value pattern of responsible individualism called *independence orientation*, the third value pattern called *privatism* loaded negatively on the factor which constituted *adulthood* and its adherents showed a strong tendency to distance themselves from the mainstream of Japanese social mentality.

—The first of the three patterns of the second level of the factor analyses combined values of family orientation with the emphasis on the old *ie*-system, values of authority orientation, law-abidance, duty, diligence, and esteem for kinship and local bonds. In short, this pattern combined the traditional Japanese values and hence was called *traditionalism*. 29% of the respondents displayed strong adherence to this pattern, with a clear dependence upon age and occupation: The older age groups, blue collar workers, and farmers were especially over-

represented.

—The second pattern combined individualistic values, values of independence, social pluralism, solidarity, and rejection of taboos. 31% of the respondents displayed strong adherence to this pattern, and it was especially strongly advocated by men and by highly educated people. It combined modern and individualistic values and was called *independence orientation*.

—The third pattern combined self-centeredness (egotism) and strong rejection of diligent work, social relations in the local society, taboos, and restrictive norms, and strong distrust and suspicion of other people and the social environment. It implied social disengagement and withdrawal. In short, it rather was a pattern of value loss. Because of the strong tendency to seclusion from the social environment, it was called *privatism*. 19% of the respondents displayed strong adherence to this pattern. Lower education levels and blue-collar workers were over-represented, and it showed a polarized age structure: Especially strongly over-represented were people of the older age groups above 60 who had difficulties adapting to the rapid social change caused by high economic growth, accelerated urbanization and changing lifestyles, and people of the younger age groups under 25 who reacted with a kind of "inner emigration" to the increase of pressure to adapt and control of the pupils' way of living which has occurred in the Japanese schools since the early 1970s.³⁴

Before moving on to the changes of the value patterns in the second and third survey, let us first have a closer look at the attitude profile of the second level value patterns of 1976/77. In the first survey it had been a major goal to investigate how value patterns are related to attitudes concerning specific life areas or life situations. Therefore the questionnaire included a number of additional batteries which were identical to those used in the NHK Survey on Japanese Social Mentality (*Nihonjin no ishiki chōsa*).³⁵ Table 7 summarizes the findings concerning life goals, ideal type of man, ideal type of family, ideal type of workplace, ideal type of community, and attitudes toward human relations.³⁶ Following Mita, life goals are operationalized as (1) *hedonistic*: capacity for immediate satisfaction of desires of *ego* ('to live for each day in a free and pleasant way'), (2) *egoistic*: capacity for long-term satisfaction of desires of *ego* ('to plan one's life carefully and become affluent'), (3) *altruistic*: capacity for immediate satisfaction of desires of *alter* (or society) ('to lead a peaceful life in close association with friends'), (4) *righteous*: capacity for long-term satisfaction of desires of *alter* (or society) ('to contribute to society through cooperation with others') (Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentā / Nomura Sôgô Kenkyûjo 1980: 58–59); the ideal type of man is operationalized as (1) *disciplinarian*: a man of discipline who defends order, (2) *rights-type*: a man who honors

Bunka Sentâ / Nomura Sôgô Kenkyûjo 1980: 63); the ideal type of family is operationalized as (1) *authoritarian type*: the father has the authority as the family head and the mother follows his lead, (2) *independence type*: father and mother both have their own work and hobbies and are fully engaged in these, (3) *role division type*: the father puts all his strength into work, and the mother builds the home and defends the family, (4) *my-home type*: the father also engages strongly in the family and the mother puts all her energy in building a bright family life (Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentâ / Nomura Sôgô Kenkyûjo 1980: 65); the ideal type of workplace is operationalized as (1) *exhibition of ability type*: everybody's ability is displayed, (2) *human relations type*: superiors and inferiors have good relations, (3) *work environment type*: labor conditions, social welfare, and retirement benefits are good, (4) *evaluation type*: evaluation and chances for promotion are equal (Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentâ / Nomura Sôgô Kenkyûjo 1980: 66). Following Okuta, the ideal type of community is operationalized as (1) *Gemeinschaft-orientation*: I want to follow the traditions of this locality and be devoted to harmony with the people living here, (2) *anomy orientation*: I am living in this area, but have no interest in it beyond that; those who are enthusiastic about it should strive for the betterment of the area, (3) *self-interest orientation*: having the rights of a person living in this locality I demand from local politics that it reflects my opinions and needs, (4) *community orientation*: because local society is the basis of one's own life, the inhabitants should mutually cooperate for better living conditions (Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentâ / Nomura Sôgô Kenkyûjo 1980: 38–69). Relations with relatives and relations with neighbors are divided into three categories: (1) *necessary*: a kind of contact which is limited to formal matters/... which is limited to greeting if one meets another, (2) *socializing*: a kind of contact which includes talking and socializing without great obligations, (3) *advice*: a kind of contact which includes advice and help concerning all kinds of problems. To summarize the results presented in table 7, the mental dispositions of the value patterns which surfaced from the composition of the factors that constitute the value patterns become even clearer and more pronounced.

—*Traditionalism* not only went hand in hand with an affirmation of the authoritarian and hierarchical structures of 'traditional' Japanese social life, it also showed an inclination to passivity, and a sense of self interest. The achievement motivation of *traditionalists* was not very high and they rather shied away from new, unusual tasks and responsibility which imply personal initiative. If they had to make judgements, they based them on the opinions which were prevalent in their social environment. In short, *traditionalism* in the Japanese survey of 1976/77 resembles very much the German *tidy conventionalists* of the 1970s.

which were prevalent in their social environment. In short, *traditionalism* in the Japanese survey of 1976/77 resembles very much the German *tidy conventionalists* of the 1970s.

—*Independence orientation* clearly showed the mental disposition of responsible individualism. It displayed some inclination to hedonism but also a strong sense of obligation towards society. It favored self-reliance and independence and partnership between husband and wife. The traditional hierarchical-authoritarian structures were strongly rejected. The work motivation of people adhering to *independence orientation* was high, and they were ready to take responsibility and unusual tasks. Group integration was not rejected, but they were not interested in socializing with relatives. Concerning the community they strongly rejected the sticky and hierarchical relations of traditional Japanese *Gemeinschaft* and instead favored the active participation in an community of the American type.³⁷ They based their judgements only on their own opinions. In short the value pattern independence orientation in the Japanese survey of 1976/77 shows some traits of the German *non-conformist idealists* of the 1970s, but even more similarities to the German *active realists*.

Table 7: Value Patterns and Attitudes to Specific Life Areas in Japan 1976/77³⁸

value pattern	life goals				ideal type of man			
	hedonistic	egoistic	altruistic	righteous	disciplin.	rights	utalitarian	cultured
traditionalism	○	—	○	+++	+	---	+++	○
privatism	+++	---	○	○	○	○	+++	--
independence	+	○	---	+++	-	○	○	+
	ideal type of family				ideal type of workplace			
	authority	independ.	role div.	my home	ability	hum. rel.	work env.	evaluat.
traditionalism	+++	+++	○	--	---	○	+++	+
privatism	++	○	○	○	---	○	++	○
independence	○	++	○	○	+++	---	○	○
	ideal type of community				relations with relatives			
	<i>Gemeensch.</i>	anomy	self-interest	community	necessary	socializing	advice	
traditionalism	+++	—	○	---	---	○	+++	
privatism	+	+++	○	---	+++	○	---	
independence	---	○	+	++	○	--	+	
	relations with neighbours							
	necessary	socializing	advice					
traditionalism	○	○	+++					
privatism	+++	---	—					
independence	○	○	○					

Source: Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentā/Nomura Sōgō Kenkyūjo 1980: 61, 64, 66, 68, 70, 76.

—*Privatism* in some ways was a contradictory value pattern. On one hand it displayed a certain inclination towards hierarchical-authoritarian structures, but, in contrast to *traditionalism*, this inclination was combined with strong hedonism, the rejection of human relations which imply strong obligations, and anomy with one's community. The adherents of *privatism* showed passivity and a certain tendency of retreat from social life which went hand in hand with favoring casual social contacts. They had a low achievement motivation and shied away from responsibility. In making judgments, they started from their own opinion but they lacked self-confidence and sought the approval of friends or acquaintances. They show many similarities to the *prospectless resigned* of the German surveys of the 1970s. The contradictions inherent in this pattern may be explained by the fact that this pattern was comprised of two quite different groups. Analysis of the age structure of this value pattern shows that it was composed of very young respondents of the age groups sixteen to twenty-four and from old respondents above sixty. The case studies further show that these two age groups had quite different reasons for adherence to this value pattern, as already noted above. The inclination to authority was based rather among the elder adherents of this pattern while the inclination to hedonism and casual social contacts was concentrated among the younger respondents. What held these two groups together is anomy with society, retreat from social life, passivity, and low achievement motivation. Seen in this way, the germs for a future split of this value pattern which materialized in the 1985 survey existed already in the 1970s.

The results of the 1985 survey showed a considerable differentiation and pluralization of the value patterns. The 107 items of the value instrument of this survey resulted in twenty-two factors on the first level of the factor analyses. These could be reduced to five value patterns on the second level which were called *orientation towards humanism*, *orientation towards family future*, *orientation towards comfort*, *orientation towards self-performance*, and *orientation towards self-reliance*. In 1985 it was no longer possible to reduce the patterns on the third level to one uniform group of values to which all respondents related themselves, but the final factor analysis resulted in two competing basic patterns called *adulthood* (with 36.8% of the respondents scoring high on this pattern) and *selfness* (with 27.4% of the respondents scoring high on this pattern) which are composed of clearly different values. At the same time, compared to 1976/77, the composition of adulthood also changed to a certain degree, nevertheless the old name was retained.

—*Orientation towards humanism* consisted of values of duty, of concern for fellow-men, the environment, and society, and of respect for other people's individuality. Although this pattern displays a tendency to conservatism and contains appraisal of *giri* and *ongaeshi*, it is not identical with the old values of duty and order which included a strong appraisal of the traditional formalized human relations and the obligations resulting therefrom. 23.8% of the

respondents showed strong attachment to this pattern. It almost lineally gained importance with rising age: 12.8% of the age group 16–19 and 43.3% of the age group 65–69 scored high on this pattern, hence the older age groups were strongly over-represented in this pattern. Quite a similar relationship existed with education: this pattern lost importance with rising education levels (30.6% of the respondents with a low education level and 18.8% of the respondents with a high education level scored high on this pattern), and respondents who quit school after compulsory education were strongly over-represented. Concerning occupation, the primary sector (agriculture, forestry, and fishing) was over-represented. The attitude profile³⁹ of this pattern revealed an optimistic outlook on life and a strong orientation to the future and to planning one's life. It showed overall satisfaction with life. Anxiety was few and concentrated on own illness as a burden for the family (66.7%) and becoming weak in old age (66.7%), but concern for the generation gap and misunderstanding among the generations (42.6%) and being not up-to-date (28.7%) was also over-represented. The attitudes towards human relations were rather conservative or traditional: to conform with one's social environment, to respect social customs, and to follow the descion of the leader concerning group activities were strongly over-represented in this pattern.

—*Orientation towards family future* combined values of future planning and values of family orientation, but the old hierarchical-authoritarian family values which had been related to the *ie*-system were lacking in this pattern. Adherents of this pattern showed the strongest orientation to family obligations. This pattern was strongly advocated by 34.8% of the respondents, and it was strongly related to age (14.5% of the age group 16–19 and 50% of the age group 65–69 scored high on this pattern) and the age group 65–69 was even more strongly over-represented than in *orientations towards humanism*. A certain tendency to high education levels could be observed. Adherents of this pattern showed a strong orientation to the future and to life-planning, but this was combined with a rather strong pessimism. Accordingly, they harbored the most worries of all respondents: More than 70% of the adherents of this pattern harbored anxiety concerning family members' and their own health and weakness in old-age, 67% feared the death of family members, more than 50% worried about the impact of their own death on their family, their economic situation in old age, and becoming victims of traffic accidents, more than 40% worried about their future economic situation, their own or family members' unemployment, and idling one's time away. Concerning human relations, people who favored self-assertion as well as people who favored conformity with the social environment were both slightly over-represented, and respect for social customs was strongly over-represented.

Orientations towards humanism and *orientations towards family future* showed a high positive correlation of $r=0.85$. Together these two patterns correspond well to the pattern *traditionalism* of the 1976/77 survey, but with the strong appraisal of authority and hierarchy lacking in the new patterns. Hence the same trend towards declining importance of authority and hierarchy in the traditional values which has already been stated in part 1 of this paper (cf. Möhwald 1994: 126–128) can also be observed in the changes of the value patterns.

—*Orientation towards comfort* combined values of avoidance of responsibility and strenuous work with hedonistic values of pleasure and amusement. It also contained the avoidance of human relations which imply strong obligations and of social engagement. 31.7% of the respondents scored high on this pattern. The adherents were women rather than men, with an over-representation of unemployed housewives. Concerning age, they concentrated in the age groups 30–34, 45–54, and above 65, and low education levels were over-represented. Concerning their attitudes, the adherents of this pattern showed few peculiarities, they mostly ranged on the average with the exception that deciding group activities by discussion was strongly rejected, and that in their outlook on life optimism was strongly under- and pessimism strongly over-represented. Nevertheless, despite this tendency to pessimism, this is the pattern which showed the least dissatisfaction with social life and the least anxiety: about 50% worry about their economic situation in old age and about 45% worry about idling their time away, while any other pattern showed a least four areas of anxiety.

—*Orientation towards self-performance* combined values of showmanship, self-centeredness, hedonistic values of pleasure, amusement, and consumptionism, and values of avoidance of strenuous work. 39.8% of the respondents showed a strong adherence to this pattern with a clear dependency upon age, gender, and education level: The younger the respondents were, the more important was this pattern (74.4% of the age group 16–19 and 16.7% of the age group 65–69 scored high on this pattern), 47.1% of the men compared to 33.8% of the women, and 40.6% of the respondents with a high education level compared to 36.1% of the respondents with a low education level advocated this pattern. Students and unmarried people were over-represented. The life orientations of this pattern ranged on the average, they showed a strong tendency of dissatisfaction with their life and with society, but anxiety was rather low and centered on personal work or study (47.7%), their own unforeseen death (39.8%), privacy (34.7%), and personal goals (29%). In human relations, they displayed individualism with a strong rejection of conformity and respect of customs and a strong over-representation of self-assertion and not sticking to customs. Their attitudes towards consumption differed from the average in that they favored their own tastes and brand-name goods, and they were the only group which rejected relying on available money and favored loans in order to fulfill material wishes.

Orientation towards comfort and *orientation towards self-performance* contain both a number of values which had formerly belonged to the old pattern *privatism*. To a certain degree the original pattern dissolved in two separate groups according to age, gender and education levels. *Orientation towards comfort* represented the passive aspects of the original pattern, appealed to the higher age groups, to women, and to the lower education levels. *Orientation towards self-performance* represented the active aspects of the original pattern which appealed especially to the young, men and those with higher education levels. The manner of the dissolution of *privatism* can be interpreted as the result of the differences between the two groups which constituted the original pattern, especially their different motives for withdrawal from society: While the old age groups had attached themselves to *privatism* be-

cause the changes in the life style made them feel insecure, but had basically continued to have rather traditionalistic orientations, the young age groups had reacted with 'inner emigration' to the pressure to conform and the regimentation of their lifestyle by the school authorities, but had basically held egocentric and individualistic orientations. Consequently *orientation towards self-performance* had separated itself completely from the basic value pattern *adulthood*, with which it showed a negative relation, and became one of the constituents of the competing new basic pattern *selfness*. *Orientation towards comfort* was completely unrelated to the new basic pattern or to *orientation towards self-performance*, but it still retained the negative relation with *adulthood* which had been typical for privatism.

—*Orientation towards self-reliance* consisted of values of individualism, independence, and pleasure and amusement, but also included values of recognition of authority. 22.6% of the respondents scored high on this value pattern. As in the case of *orientation towards self-performance*, the young age groups and students were over-represented in this pattern. 31.6% of the age group 16–29 compared to 13.3% of the age group 65–69 scored high on this pattern and it was over-represented among respondents with middle education levels. There existed almost no difference according to gender. This pattern showed only limited correspondence with the old pattern *independence orientation* which had been strongly connected with values of social engagement, responsibility and solidarity. The difference also appears in the connection to the basic patterns: *Independence orientation* had been strongly connected to the old basic pattern *adulthood*, but *orientation towards self-reliance* was only loosely connected to the new basic pattern *adulthood* and instead was closely connected with the new pattern *orientation towards self-performance* and together with this pattern formed the new basic pattern *selfness*. The new basic pattern *adulthood*, on the other hand, is closely connected with the patterns of rather traditional values. The outlook on life of adherents of *orientation to self-reliance* showed a strong orientation towards the present, and a strong over-representation of optimism and of not planning life. Compared to *orientation towards self-performance*, they showed no special dissatisfaction with life or society, nevertheless, the representatives of this pattern harbored considerable anxiety: 62.7% worried about the death of family members, 46.2% about idling their time away, 45.3% about their work or study, 39.1% about their own unforeseen death, and 29.1% about their personal goals. Concerning human relation they displayed strong individualism with strong over-representations of self-assertion, and not sticking to customs and a corresponding strong under-representation of conformity with the social environment and of respect for social customs. They also favored discussion of all members as the basis for decisions on group activities. Their consumption style was close to the representatives of *orientation towards self-performance* in that they strongly relied on their own tastes and preferred brand-name goods, but in difference to the latter they did not display the strong tendency to take loans in order to fulfill their wishes.⁴⁰

The results of the 1991 survey showed the same structure of five value patterns on the second level of the factor analyses and of two basic patterns on the third level. Never-

theless the value patterns displayed new mixtures and combinations of values and new connections among each other, and this indicates a continuing progress of the differentiation and pluralization of the value patterns which is also reflected in minor changes of the names for the patterns. Compared to 1985, the following changes could be observed in the 1991 value patterns:⁴¹

In 1991 the distribution of respondents scoring high on the seven value patterns was as follows: *Orientation towards humanism* 21.5%, *family orientation* 28.3%, *orientation towards self-reliance* 20.9%, *orientation towards self-performance* 25.5%, *orientation towards comfort* 31.8%, *adulthood* 30.2%, and *self-centeredness* 28.6%.

—Compared to 1985, *orientation to humanism* displayed several changes in 1991. Like in 1985, this value pattern shows a strong tendency among the old age groups, but now women are much stronger represented in this pattern than men. In principle the conservative-traditional orientation of this pattern still exists, but the aspects of duty and obligation to the family which rather reflect hierarchical human relations have been replaced by the appreciation of good and mutually equal relations in the family and the neighborhood. Thus the tendency towards declining importance of hierarchy and authority continues, at least in this pattern. The adherents of this pattern prefer more free time to high income, place family interest above that of the firm, regard having children as important, would like to have foreigners as friends, and have a high degree of satisfaction with life.⁴²

—*Family orientation* shows the same relation with the socio-demographic properties of the respondents as *orientation towards family future* did in 1985. The main difference from 1985 is that the elements of *ie*-consciousness, family status and authority which had been lacking in the 1985 pattern of *orientation to family future*, and which partly had been included in *orientation towards humanism* in 1985, now have been taken up by this pattern. Due to this development, this pattern now shows a much stronger resemblance to the old *traditionalism* of 1976/77. This pattern is still closely, although a bit more weakly, connected with *orientation to humanism*. The representatives of this pattern accord precedence over work to the family, think that it is necessary to marry and to have children, over-emphasize saving, have a high satisfaction with life, depend on state authority, have an optimistic outlook on the actual state and future of Japanese society, and would be against their younger siblings or their children marrying a foreigner. This pattern shows many similarities to the *conformists* of the German Institute of Japanese Studies' survey.

—In *orientation towards self-reliance* elements of independence, responsibility, and individualism have increased while the orientation to authority has disappeared. Besides the young age groups under thirty, now the middle-age groups 40–54 are also over-represented in this pattern. The major difference lies in its connection with the basic value patterns. It is now closely connected to the basic pattern of *adulthood* and no longer forms an element of the competing pattern of *self-centeredness*, although it retains a weak connec-

tion with the latter. In a certain sense, *orientation towards self-reliance* has developed into a 'mature, responsible individualism' with a certain tendency to value synthesis. The representatives accord precedence to work over the family, display responsibility towards the family, but do not regard it as absolutely necessary to marry and to have children, are aware of brand-name goods and of fashion, are active users of media and new communication means, have a pessimistic outlook on the actual state and the future of Japanese society, and would like to have foreign friends. The pattern shows many similarities with the *individualists* of the survey of the German Institute of Japanese Studies.

—*Orientation towards self-performance* and *orientation towards comfort* at the first glance show few changes concerning the content of these two value patterns. In both cases hedonistic values of consumption and values of avoidance of strenuous work have become more important. In *orientation towards self-performance*, the avoidance of close human bonds and the selectivity in the establishment of human relations became clearer. On the level of attitude profiles, this pattern shows rejection of changing firms, a dependency on brand-name goods and fashion, an active use of media and new communication means, a favor for foreign friends, and a disregard concerning the necessity of marrying and having children. The age structure of the pattern has remained the same as in 1985.

—Compared to *orientation towards self-performance*, the age structure of *orientation towards comfort* has changed considerably. Now the younger age groups up to thirty-four and the older age groups above sixty are over-represented in this pattern. In this respect it shows certain similarities to the pattern *privatism* from the 1976/77 survey. The attitude profile shows that representatives of this pattern regard work primarily as a means to earn money, give precedence to the family over work and the firm, consider the price of goods instead of quality, are passive users of media and communication, and are not interested in foreign friends. The major difference from 1985 is that *orientation towards comfort* has disconnected itself completely from the basic pattern *adulthood*, and now together with *orientation towards self-performance* forms the new competing basic pattern *self-centeredness*.

This latter pattern shows clear differences compared to *selfness* of 1985. Besides individualistic values, the characteristics of self-centeredness are determined especially by hedonistic values of a comfortable life and of leisure, materialistic values of consumption, and values of the avoidance of responsibility and strenuous work. This new basic pattern is strongly advocated by 28.6% of the respondents and it becomes lineally more important the younger the respondents are (16.2% of the age group 65–69 compared to 50% of the age group 16–18 score high on this pattern). The similarities of self-centeredness to the German pattern of *hedonistic materialists* are obvious and in my opinion, this pattern could explain the pattern of the *non-committed* in the German Institute of Japanese Studies' survey.

5. Conclusion

The presentation in the first and second part of this paper shows that value change and the development of value patterns in Germany and Japan resemble one another in many respects. In both countries the same groups of values are involved in the value change, and differentiation and pluralization of the value patterns has been an important element of the change since the 1970s. In both countries the major trend of value change goes in the direction of a decreasing importance of traditional values of acceptance and duty orientation, an increasing importance of modernized values of self-actualization, and a decline of the importance of orientation to authority and hierarchy within the group of traditional values. On the level of the value patterns, during the 1970s in both countries a clear division of patterns of traditional and of modern values can be observed, which goes hand in hand with value synthesis as an important element of the value patterns and the existence of strong value patterns of disenchantment with both, traditional and modern values. In both countries value patterns have considerably differentiated and pluralized since the 1970s with a new value pattern of a combination of hedonistic and materialistic values emerging especially among the young respondents since the mid-1980s and a further differentiation or even fragmentation of the value patterns intensifying in the 1990s. Changes in the lifestyle and in socialization conditions, which are similar in both countries in many ways, seem to have been a major factor in the value change in both countries since the 1970s.

Nevertheless differences between the two countries must also be stated. The first difference concerns the timing of value change. On the one hand, in Germany, the immediate postwar period was characterized by disorientation which soon was followed by a resurgence of traditional values of acceptance and duty orientation going hand in hand with an inclination to privatism. A strong wave of value change from values of acceptance and duty orientation to values of self-actualization started in the early 1960s and ended in the mid-1970s. This was followed by a rather stable period of 'silent' differentiation of the structure of the value system which lasted until about the mid 1980s. Since then a new wave of value change has occurred which seems still to keep on gaining in intensity. On the other hand, in Japan, a first wave of change from traditional to modern values started right after the war accompanied and reinforced by the democratic reforms of the occupation period. This wave lasted until the end of the 1950s when it was followed by a period of conservative consolidation and, perhaps, even a resurgence of certain elements of the traditional value system. Nevertheless, the orientation to hierar-

chy and authority has declined continuously during the whole period since 1945. A second wave of accelerated change to modern values occurred during the late 1960s/early 1970s, but this wave came rather quickly to a standstill and was followed by an upsurge of disenchantment with society and with both, modern and traditional values. Like in Germany a new wave of value change has occurred since the mid-1980s, but this no longer follows the logic of the increase of values of self-actualization accompanied by a decrease of values of acceptance and duty orientation. Instead, new groups of values, and new mixtures and combinations of values have entered into the picture with hedonistic and materialistic values gaining strength especially among the youth.

But the differences are not confined to timing. While in Germany the idealistic orientation to critique of the society and socio-political engagement plays an important role among the modern values of self-actualization, this is not the case in Japan. Although this type of values had not been absolutely absent among the modern values during the 1950s and the late 1960s/early 1970s, they never played as important a role as in Germany, and their importance has further decreased since the 1970s and nowadays they seem almost to be completely lacking. Furthermore, in Japan a strong and increasing trend towards withdrawal from society, privatism and egocentrism can be observed, which seems to be much less the case in Germany, even concerning the new pattern of hedonistic materialism. This points to the effects of quite different social developments in both countries and of different social experiences resulting therefrom. In the sense of Wagner (1994), German society, like most other Western industrial societies, has become much more open since the 1960s, has experienced an enormous pluralization of social practices, and has changed from a society of organized modernity to a society of liberal modernity. In Japan this kind of change has not occurred. Although certain tendencies of a pluralization of social practices and of disembedding of the individual from conventional social, cultural, and economic contexts similar to other industrialized nations can be observed, the bureaucracy has not lost its legitimacy and has maintained a strong position, and although cracks in its control can be observed since the late 1980s, Japanese society is still very much based on the model of organized modernity. In certain life areas, especially in the education system, bureaucratic control has even increased and became more impersonal and more encroaching upon the life of the pupils. This has led to a strong tendency to 'inner emigration' and silent disagreement with authorities on the part of the youth. Hence anti-authoritarianism of the youth in the new Japanese value patterns is strongly connected with elements of withdrawal, distrust, passivity, and avoidance of social engagement.

But since the late 1980s Japanese society has been submitted to a new wave of social change due to the increasing internationalization and the structural change of its economy. The globalization of the world economy and the international treaties which resulted therefrom force the Japanese bureaucracy to conduct a thorough deregulation of social and economic practices, not only in order to conform to foreign pressure, but also in order to retain the ability to compete in the international market place. This development will inevitably lead to a loosening of the strength of the bureaucracy's control and to an acceleration of the pluralization of social practices and of the disembedding of the individual from conventional social contexts. At the same time new demands are made upon Japanese education. Docility and the ability to conform to any company wishes has become obsolete as the primary quality of the workforce. The internationalization of the Japanese economy and society, the shift to service industries, and the implementation of new production and communication technologies which goes hand in hand with an increasing speed of innovation demands a workforce which is able to flexibly respond to new demands, to make judgements, and to engage in recurrent learning. Thus the development of the individuality and creativity of the pupils has become the catchword of new approaches to reform the Japanese education system.

On the other hand, since the early 1970s German youth like that of most other Western industrial societies has strongly felt the impact of structural change of German industry and experienced considerable social and employment insecurity. This had been one of the reasons for their turning away from society during the 1970s. In the meanwhile, German youth seems to have learned to cope with these insecurities and regained a rather active and positive outlook on their private life. Concerning employment, Japanese youth has enjoyed extreme security until quite recently. Rising numbers of young Japanese graduates who cannot secure employment is a new phenomenon which as an effect of the worldwide economic recession has surfaced since 1993. But this phenomenon is expected to continue despite the return of economic growth because of structural changes and new waves of rationalization in Japanese industry, while the number of new graduates is still increasing due to the second baby boom. Japanese youth seems just now to begin to recognize the impact that these changes will have upon their lives, and it is impossible yet to guess their reaction. In my opinion these changes of the social environment will become major variables determining the future dynamics of value change in Japan.

Notes

¹ Cf. Ulrich Möwald: Value Patterns and Value Change in Germany and Japan (1). In *Kokusai kankei gakubu kiyô Journal of the College of International Studies*, (Chûbu University), Vol. 13, Oct. 1994, p. 111–139; here: p. 111.

² In the case of measuring values with rating scales the relative importance of each value is measured independently on a scale of five or more points ranging from "unimportant" to "very important". This approach differs considerably from the other major approach for measuring values which asks the respondents to rank a number of values according to their importance. Ranking has been used e.g. by Inglehart (cf. 1979 for his approach and instrument) and by Rokeach (cf. 1973). Basically, rating scales allow a better approach to the problem of mixed value patterns than ranking scales. But since rating scales can be treated as interval scales whereas ranking only produces nominal data, the statistical models available for data analysis in both cases also differ considerably, cf. Deth 1983 concerning this question.

³ What I call value patterns are combinations of values which are typical for population sub-groups. These sub-groups not only share the same values but also show distinct profiles concerning socio-demographic features and attitudes. Thus value patterns also allow the construction of typologies of value bearers.

⁴ The Inglehart-instrument has been included since 1970 in the Eurobarometer surveys which are executed by the European Community in its member states and since 1974 in the Political Action Surveys in the USA. It is also included in the German ALLBUS surveys since 1982 and has also been used in various Japanese surveys. Basically two versions of the instrument exist, one of four and one of eight items respectively. Most surveys use the four-items-version. Concerning Inglehart's instrument cf. Inglehart 1979: 284–286; Maag 1991: 51–56. Of course I am aware that there exist considerable doubts concerning Inglehart's instrument and his interpretation of the results of empirical research. Cf. Klages 1992: 12–28; and Schmitt/Hofrichter 1992 concerning this problem.

⁵ Klages (1992: 21–23) criticizes that Inglehart's instrument is especially unsuited to explore the mixture of values and the pluralization of value patterns which constitute a major element of the ongoing value change.

⁶ The size of the instrument varied somewhat over time. In the mid-1970s the Klages group seems to have used an instrument with about thirty items (cf. Klages 1984: 18) and in the early 1980s they used an instrument of twenty-five items (cf. Franz/Herbert 1986: 129). An abbreviated version of the instrument consisting of six items and tapping only the major value dimensions has also been used by the Klages group in some of their surveys and is said to have a high validity.

⁷ The lead question has the following wording: "If you judge based on your own goals in life, then, how important are the statements on the following cards for you personally?" The means had been almost identical in all four surveys and are given here as the average of these four surveys, cf. Herbert 1992: 97, note 3.

⁸ For a detailed picture of the two dimensions cf. table 2 in part 1 of this paper.

⁹ Nowadays the Klages group uses the following method to achieve this goal. In the first step the items which together constitute one factor in the factor analysis of the value instrument are recombined to new dimensional sum-variables. In the second step these sum-variables are z-

standardized and then submitted to a cluster analysis which sets very high and very low dimensional scores as initial cluster centers. In this case of two dimensional variables the Klages group had proceeded from the assumption of four cluster centers with high/low, low/high, high/high, and low/low scores on the dimensional variables. In the 1970s methods for the separation of the groups differed, cf. Klages 1984: p.85–90.

¹⁰ Socio-demographic properties are mainly condensed from Franz/Herbert 1986 and attitudes and psychological properties mainly from Klages 1988. The socio-demographic properties pose some problems, since the sample of the survey on which Franz/Herbert 1986 is based was limited to the age groups fourteen to fifty-four. Additional information concerning the socio-demographic properties of the value types was given by Klages in personal communication.

¹¹ According to Klages, *conventionalists* are most strongly over-represented among the age groups above sixty. This has also the effect that the tendency towards lower education levels and social status is further reinforced.

¹² This means in the German system of dual professional education that they are attending *Lehre* in which part of the time is spent in practical training in firms and part of the time in theoretical education in public schools. Since their pay from the firms legally is regarded as educational assistance, the monthly income of *Lehrlinge* is quite low, on the average ranging DM 450–600 during the 1970s.

¹³ This information was given by Klages.

¹⁴ Information concerning age and unemployment was given by Klages.

¹⁵ Nevertheless, the problem exists how in this case potentially conflicting values can be compatible with each other. Existing data indicate that the representatives of value synthesis have no problems or mental stress in actualizing potentially conflicting values, rather the opposite is the case: they are well integrated and even-tempered personalities. Also, the assumption of a hierarchical organization of the individual value system does not explain this phenomenon. As research by Maag (1991: 94–96) has proved, the hierarchical organization is only true for a limited number of values, and equal ranking of values is a more common element of the organization of individual value systems. Data seem to indicate that (a) the situations in which the different values are actualized seem not to be conflicting so that a direct conflict between values is avoided, (b) representatives of value synthesis seem to display a higher degree of tolerance towards conflicting values, or a lower degree of intensity in which values are enforced. In any way, existing empirical evidence is far from sufficient for explaining the processes which are involved in value synthesis.

¹⁶ The interpretation of value loss mainly as a phenomenon resulting from social anomy among the losers in the social and economic modernization was given by Gabriele Hippler during an intensive workshop on value change and data analysis in the German Institute of Japanese Studies in Tōkyō in January 1992.

¹⁷ This kind of interpretation is in accordance with the result of various youth surveys. A survey on German youth conducted by the magazine *Der Spiegel* in 1994 reveals that 46% of German youth have a bleak outlook on the future of German society compared to 28% in 1981. But while in the early 1980s this perception went hand in hand with a general attitude of despair extending to a bleak image of one's own personal future, in 1994 only half of those who saw a dark future for society also had worries concerning their own private future (cf. Schnibben

1994: 59). It should be noted, however, that the proportion of German youth who reported that they have no worries or troubles in the World Youth Surveys has shrunk from 33% in 1977 to 27.5% in 1987, and to 20.2% in 1993, and dissatisfaction with society has risen during the same time from 16.4% in 1977 to 23.4% in 1987, and to 52.8% in 1993 (Sômuchô Seishônén Taisaku Honbû 1994: 113, 121). Compared to the earlier surveys which were limited to West Germany, the 1993 World Youth Survey, however, was executed in reunited Germany and this may have affected the results because of the continuing strong differences between West and East Germanys concerning social mentality and social and economic situation.

¹⁸ See Herbert 1988: 144–151 and 1992: 73–76 for a detailed discussion of the results of the factor analysis.

¹⁹ Naturally, cluster analysis based on high and low scores on three dimensional variables theoretically allows for eight clusters. But whether all these theoretically possible clusters in practice make sense for the analysis has to be decided by the researcher based on such factors as the distribution of scores on the dimensional variables, the size of the resulting clusters, and the degree of difference of the profiles of the clusters. Actually, in an early presentation of the findings, Herbert presented the following eight clusters (Herbert 1988: 154):

no.	type	percentage	score on the dimensional variables		
			conventionalism	self-actual. & eng.	hedo-mat.
1	conservative	13%	high	low	low
2	conservative hedonist	11%	high	low	high
3	integrated citizen	10%	high	high	low
4	pluralist	20%	high	high	high
5	resigned	10.5%	low	low	low
6	hedonistic materialist	6.5%	low	low	high
7	progressive idealist	13%	low	high	low
8	New Age	11%	low	high	high

²⁰ Cf. Herbert 1992: 76–79 for detailed information on the cluster analysis. The distance-score of the *hedonistic materialists* from *conventionalism* and *self-actualization and engagement* is not very high, a fact which reflects the origin of this new dimension. The dimension *hedonistic materialism* has a correlation of .2 with each of the other two dimensions, which themselves are negatively correlated with $-.12$ with each other (cf. Herbert 1988: 151; 1992: 75).

²¹ The 1979 survey was limited to respondents aged 14–54 years, therefore comparison with the results of the 1987/88 surveys makes more sense if one compares only the results for the same age groups.

²² According to the results of a number of recent surveys, in Germany the pluralization and fragmentation of value patterns goes on with increased speed in the 1990s, personal communication by G. Hippler, Oct. 1994.

²³ This term refers to people who participate in occupational education – mainly after finishing compulsory education or the intermediate level of secondary education – in the German dual

system, cf. note 11.

²⁴ Cf. Ölschleger et al. 1994 for a comprehensive report on this research project.

²⁵ The questionnaire of this survey consisted of 65 items plus the face-sheet. Of these 65 items 47 items used rating scales tapping either the degree of importance or the degree of approval, 18 items were dual or multiple choice questions. 42 of the items tapped the dimension individualism-collectivism and 23 tapped the dimension equality-inequality. Correlations (Pearson's *r*) were computed (a) for all items, (b) for all items with rating scales, (c) for all items tapping individualism-collectivism, (d) for all items tapping equality-inequality. Besides a distinct battery on individualistic-collectivistic values, the items mainly tapped attitudes. Target group of the survey were Japanese aged 20 and older.

²⁶ We used five-step rating scales from "1=important" to "5=unimportant".

²⁷ A one-dimensional solution would have led to one factor with positive and negative loadings of the items according to their respective pole.

²⁸ We used principle component analysis and varimax rotation which allows for a maximum separation of the factors.

²⁹ This group was born between 1944 and 1950, received compulsory education between 1950 and 1965 and high school education between 1960 and 1968. This is the age-group in which the expansion of high-school education to the level of normal education occurred, but not yet the expansion of higher education. Consequently the proportion of people who received college education, which was still regarded as elite education, is rather low. It thus is the generation which can be called the losers in the expansion of education which went hand hand with a devaluation first of middle school, later of high school diploma. They were either too old to receive high-school education or too old to receive college education. Accordingly, in this generation a big difference exists between respondents who graduated from college and those who did not: The former put high importance on *individualism* and strongly reject *conformism*, while the latter show the lowest importance of *individualism* of all age groups and a somewhat lower rejection of *conformism* than the neighboring age groups. It is also the generation during whose school education the march into 'controlled education' (*kanri kyōiku*) began, i.e. who became the real victims of the quarrels between the Ministry of Education and the Teacher's Union.

³⁰ The following presentation of the results of the Surveys on Japanese Life values is based on Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentā 1987; 1988; 1992; 1993; and Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentā / Nomura Sōgō Kenkyūjo 1980. Further reference is only given when necessary.

³¹ Especially between the first and the second survey the changes were very great. Of the 101 items used in the first survey, only 17 were included in the second survey, nevertheless, according to the research group, besides the aspect of death of a close relative or friend which was dropped from the 1985 survey, all life aspects of the first survey were also tapped in the second survey, albeit with 'modernized' wording, and new life aspects added. Therefore many of the new items were tapping similar values as those which had been discontinued, and the difference between the first and the second survey is not as great as not to allow a comparison on the level of the value patterns. From the second to third survey, changes of the value instrument are not so great because that time to inquire as to what kind of value changes had occurred was one of the goals of the third survey. Unfortunately the changes are not limited to the value instrument, but each of the three surveys had a different special topic which had been examined

with separate attitude batteries in addition to the value instrument, so that the comparability of the resulting profiles of the value patterns is limited.

³² Concerning the procedures used for constructing the questionnaires of the first, second, and third survey cf. Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentâ / Nomura Sôgô Kenkyûjo 1980: 173–175; Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentâ 1987: 2–4; 1992: 1.

³³ This approach with very a big value instrument and multi-level factor analyses seems to be fairly common in Japanese value research as can be seen by the research of the social psychologists Inoue, Mikawa, and Yoshida who were influenced by American research of the 1960s, especially the work of Allport, cf. Inoue/Mikawa/Yoshida 1993 and Mikawa/Inoue/Yoshida 1993.

³⁴ Concerning the socio-demographic characteristics of the value patterns cf. Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentâ / Nomura Sôgô Kenkyûjo 1980: 18-50; additional information was drawn from the case studies, *ibid.* 98–117.

³⁵ It should be noted, perhaps, that the questionnaire of the Surveys on Japanese Life Values as well as the questionnaire of the NHK Survey on Japanese Social Mentality are both based on Mita Munekakes theories of values and of social mentality and that Mita had been the adviser in both cases.

³⁶ Batteries 6, 26, 8, 9, 31 of the NHK Surveys on Japanese Social Mentality; the items concerning ideal workplace and the ideal community were especially constructed for the Survey on Japanese Life Values.

³⁷ This is the meaning of the differentiation between the two notions of '*Gemeinschaft*' and '*community*'. The former aims at the traditional bonds typical of village society or traditional Japanese urban neighborhoods, the latter refers to a democratic type of community life which is based on the active participation of the residents in local politics.

³⁸ In this table, the number of plus-signs indicates the strength of approval, and the number of minus-signs indicates the strength of rejection of the respective attitude; a circle indicates that the degree of approval ranges on the average.

³⁹ None of the attitude batteries of the first survey were used in the second or the third survey. The second survey had attitudes and behavior concerning savings, loans and consumption as its special topic, but also included batteries on outlook on life, human relations, satisfaction with various life areas, and anxiety.

⁴⁰ Cf. Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentâ 1987: 16–33, 94–97, 137–138; 1988: 127–162 concerning the peculiarities of the 1985 value patterns.

⁴¹ Cf. Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentâ 1992: 15–30, 107–115; 1993: 132–137 for the peculiarities of the 1991 value patterns.

⁴² The 1991 survey had for its attitude batteries the new topics of attitudes towards the family and marriage, work, media and communication means, and foreigners in Japan. The batteries on the degree of satisfaction with life and on consumption style from the 1985 survey were continued.

Bibliography

Deth, Jan W. Van (1983): Ranking the Ratings: The Case of Materialist and Post-Materialist

- Value Orientations. In: *Political Methodology*. (Los Altos, Cal.). 9: 407-431.
- Franz, Gerhard/Herbert, Willi (1986): *Werte, Bedürfnisse, Handeln: Ansatzpunkte politischer Verhaltenssteuerung*. Frankfurt/M; New York: Campus.
- Grimm, Eleonore (1990): Der neue deutsche Typ: Sorglos und materialistisch. In: *Psychologie Heute*. Nov. 1990: 34-41.
- Grimm, Eleonore (1992): Wertwandel in Konsum- und Marktforschung. In: Klages, Helmut; Hippler, Hans-Jürgen und Herbert, Willi (ed.): *Werte und Wandel. Ergebnisse und Methoden einer Forschungstradition*. Frankfurt und New York: Campus. p. 127-146.
- Groß, Hermann (1992): Postmaterialistische Einstellungen in Elite und Bevölkerung. In: Klages, Helmut; Hippler, Hans-Jürgen und Herbert, Willi (ed.): *Werte und Wandel. Ergebnisse und Methoden einer Forschungstradition*. Frankfurt und New York: Campus. p. 230-251.
- Herbert, Willi (1988): Wertwandel in den 80er Jahren: Entwicklung eines neuen Wertmusters? In: Luthe, Heinz Otto; Heiner Meulemann (ed.): *Wertwandel – Faktum oder Fiktion? Bestandsaufnahmen und Diagnosen aus kulturosoziologischer Sicht*. Frankfurt/M; New York: Campus.
- Herbert, Willi (1992): Wertstrukturen 1979 und 1987: Ein Vergleich ihrer politischen Implikationen. In: Klages, Helmut; Hippler, Hans-Jürgen und Herbert, Willi (ed.): *Werte und Wandel. Ergebnisse und Methoden einer Forschungstradition*. Frankfurt und New York: Campus. p. 69-99.
- Inglehart, Ronald (1979): Wertwandel in den westlichen Gesellschaften: Politische Konsequenzen von materialistischen und postmaterialistischen Prioritäten. In: Klages, Helmut und Kmiecik, Peter (Hg.): *Wertewandel und gesellschaftlicher Wandel*. Frankfurt und New York: Campus. S. 279-316.
- Inglehart, Ronald (1977): *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Inoue Tomoko; Mikawa Toshiki; Yoshida Shigeki (1993): Kachikan sokutei no kenkyū hōhō ni tsuite no bunken tenbō. A Review of Research and Methodology on Measurement of Values. In: *Ōtemon gakuin daigaku bungakubu kiyō*. No. 27. p. 1-19.
- Klages, Helmut (1984): *Wertorientierungen im Wandel. Rückblick, Gegenwartsanalysen, Prognosen*. Frankfurt/M; New York: Campus Verlag.
- Klages, Helmut (1988): *Wertedynamik. Über die Wandelbarkeit des Selbstverständlichen*. Zürich: Edition Interfrom.
- Klages, Helmut (1992): Die gegenwärtige Situation der Wert- und Wertwandelsforschung – Probleme und Perspektiven. In: Klages, Helmut; Hippler, Hans-Jürgen und Herbert, Willi (ed.): *Werte und Wandel. Ergebnisse und Methoden einer Forschungstradition*. Frankfurt und New York: Campus. p. 5-39.
- Maag, Gisela (1991): *Gesellschaftliche Werte. Strukturen, Stabilität und Funktion*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Mikawa Toshiki; Inoue Tomoko; Yoshida Shigeki (1993): Shin kachikan shakudo no kaiatsu. An Attempt to Develop the New Value Scale. In: *Ōtemon gakuin daigaku bungakubu kiyō*. No. 27. p. 35-48.
- Möhwald, Ulrich (1994): Value Patterns and Value Change in Germany and Japan (1). In: *Kokusai kankei gakubu kiyō. Journal of the College of International Studies*. (Kasugai: Chubu University). No. 13. p. 111-139.

- Ölschleger, Dieter; Ulrich Möhwald; Helmut Demes, Heinrich Menkhaus; Annelie Ortmanns; Bettina Post-Kobayashi (1994): *Individualität und Egalität im gegenwärtigen Japan. Untersuchungen zu Wertemustern in bezug auf Familie und Arbeitswelt*. München: Iudicium. [=Monographien aus dem Deutschen Institut für Japanstudien der Philipp-Franz-von-Siebold-Stiftung; 7].
- Rokeach, Milton (1973): *The Nature of Human Values*. New York: The Free Press.
- Schmidtchen, Gerhard (1993): *Ethik und Protest. Moralbilder und Wertkonflikte junger Menschen*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- Schmitt, Hermann and Hofrichter, Jürgen (1992): One or Two Ideological Dimensions? On the Relationship of New Politics and Left-Right-Orientations in Western Europe. In: Klages, Helmut; Hippler, Hans-Jürgen und Herbert, Willi (ed.): *Werte und Wandel. Ergebnisse und Methoden einer Forschungstradition*. Frankfurt und New York: Campus. p. 187–207.
- Schnibben, Cordt (1994): Ein Haufen Ameisen. In: *Spiegel special*. No. 11/1994 (Nov.). p. 56–59.
- Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentā (ed.) (1987): *Dai 2 kai – nihonjin no seikatsu kachikan chōsa*. Tōkyō: Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentā
- Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentā (ed.) (1988): *Jibunshugi no jidai. Nihonjin no atarashii seikatsu kachikan*. Tōkyō: Tōkyō Keizai Shinpōsha.
- Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentā (ed.) (1992): *Nihonjin no seikatsu kachikan chōsa – 1991*. Tōkyō: Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentā.
- Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentā (ed.) (1993): *Samazoeru nihonjin. Dēta de yomu seikatsu kachikan no henyō*. Tōkyō: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha.
- Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentā / Nomura Sōgō Kenkyūjo (ed.) (1980): *Nihonjin no seikatsu kachikan. Shōrai shakai tenbō tame ni*. Tōkyō: Tōkyō Keizai Shinpōsha.
- Sōmuchō Seishōnen Taisaku Honbu (ed.) (1994): *The Japanese Youth in Comparison with the Youth in the World: A Summary Report of the Fifth World Youth Survey, 1993*. Tōkyō: Ōkurashō Insatsu Kyoku.
- Wagner, Peter (1994): *A Sociology of Modernity: Liberty and Discipline*. London; New York: Routledge.