

Value Patterns and Value Change in Germany and Japan (1)

Ulrich MÖHWALD*

1. Introduction

Since the late 1940s, when cultural anthropologists defined values as a core element of personality relating personality to culture (cf. Linton 1945: 111-117) and Parsons defined the integration of the social, personality, and cultural systems in the individual as a primary function of values (Parsons/Shields/Olds 1962: 159-189; Friedrichs 1968: 36-68), values have been regarded in social science theory as a major category for the analysis of the mental structure of individuals as well as of social groups and whole societies. Nevertheless, despite the great importance which is accorded to the concept of values, there has existed no consensus regarding the definition, meaning, or function of values. Rather the opposite is true. When Kmiecik (in 1976) attempted a clarification and operationalization of the concept of values, he was able to identify about 180, often contradictory, meanings in which the concept was used in the social sciences ranging from values as norms to values as goals, needs, and attitudes (Kmiecik 1976: 147). The situation has not changed very much over time, as the recurrent complaints concerning the disparity of conceptualizations of values indicate (Kluckhohn 1962: 388-390; Friedrichs 1968: 2; Kmiecik 1976: 22-23; Klages and Kmiecik 1979 14-17; Herbert and Hippler 1991: xii-xiv). For the purpose of this paper, therefore, I will make no attempt at a comprehensive definition of values, but since the disparity of meaning of values is a fact, it is necessary to clarify right at the outset what I understand as values for the purpose of this paper.

In empirical sociological research, at least, some kind of unity exists in so far as most researchers claim that their definition of values is derived from Kluckhohn's 1951 definition of values as:

[...] conception(s), explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of action [...]

(Kluckhohn 1962: 395)

* 国際文化学科 (Department of Comparative Cultures)

This means that most empirical researchers adhere to a relativistic notion of values and agree that they are generalized standards of selection which are based on a conception of desirability. But beyond this minimal consensus, great variety exists concerning definition, operationalization, and measurement of values.

Furthermore, since this paper attempts to give an overview of changes in the social mentality in Germany and Japan since the end of World War II, problems concerning the definition of values arise from the material which I will use to document these changes: This material consists largely of data from various opinion polls¹ which were not explicitly designed to do research on values. In most of these polls there do exist questions which can be regarded as genuinely inquiring into values, but overwhelmingly the questions target attitudes, opinions, needs, and goals rather than values². Furthermore, my notion of social mentality largely corresponds to the Japanese notion of *shakai-ishiki* (cf. Mita 1979: 101; 1988), which not only includes values but also norms, attitudes, goals, and needs. From these reasons, for the purpose of exploration into the change of social mentality, it is appropriate to follow Klages (1984: 9-10 and 177) and use a wider definition of values as “elements of mental guidance concerning desirable human behavior”.

Clarification might also be necessary concerning the implications of value change. Following Herbert and Hippler's (1991: IX-XI) summary of the results of European research on value change, three qualifications have to be made: 1. Value change does not consist of a complete exchange of 'old' values for 'new' values and thus of a complete loss of 'old' values. What has changed is rather the relative importance of various values: On the population average, 'old' values have become less and 'new' values more important and this development is especially marked among the younger age groups and among people with a higher education level. Nevertheless, 'old' values still retain a high importance among the population. 2. There exist groups of values which remain almost unaffected by the ongoing value change. These are highly consensual values like harmony, friendship, health, love, which hardly conflict with other values and which are regarded with high importance by the overwhelming majority of the population. But since these values do not discriminate between population groups, they do not constitute the center of social science inquiry and seldom attract the attention of a public which is more interested in speculative news. 3. Value change does not constitute a lineal, one-dimensional process of continuous substitution of old values by new ones which leads from the past through the present to the future. Rather it is a multi-dimensional process in which after a period of intermittent accelerated changes that have led to the accept-

ance of plural value patterns and mental conditions, a 'silent' change proceeds in the direction of further pluralization of value patterns and the emergence of new combinations of values.

Although a consensus among social scientists concerning the importance of 'values' for sociological analysis by and large already has existed since the early 1950s, not very much empirical research on values had been executed until the 1970s. Since then 'value change' has become a major topic of empirical research in most Western industrialized countries. The reason for this development, by and large, is the common experience of rapid social change during the period of high economic growth which included accelerated urbanization, changes in employment patterns and in lifestyle and major social upheavals during the 1960s like the Civil Rights Movement, the Movement against the Vietnam War, Women's Liberation in the United States, the movements against the *Notstandsgesetze* (emergency powers act), nuclear weapons, and the Vietnam War in West Germany. Similar movements emerged in most other Western societies and they eventually merged into the big student movements of 1967/68 which not only brought a resurgence of left wing politics, but challenged the very foundation of order, stability, and planned social development which was the basic notion of what Wagner (1993) has labeled 'organized modernity'³. Together with the economic recession caused by the oil shocks of the early 1970s, a sense of crisis emerged which led to the search for new interpretations of the ongoing changes. In the early 1970s, social scientists began to regard value change as a major factor accompanying, causing, and reinforcing these new developments, and especially Inglehart's (1971, 1977) interpretation of the change of values in Western industrial societies as a 'silent revolution' caused a lasting debate on what values and value change are and how they can be measured, and thus gave a great impetus to the research on social values and value change⁴.

In most Western countries, therefore, research on values became a prominent part of social science research, and this is especially true of Europe. Germany is no exception. Research on value change has become increasingly prominent since the mid 1970s and a compendium which documents German research and publications on values and value change during the 1980s (Böckler 1991) cites 526 publications and research projects published or executed during this period.

The situation is quite different in Japan. As Futaki (1980) has described, it is possible to identify two major waves of value research in Japan. 'Values' as a topic for research first gained prominence among Japanese social scientists in the early 1960s following the publications of a partial translation into Japanese of Parsons and Shils' *To-*

wards a general Theory of Action (Parsons and Shields 1962)⁵ and of the first report on the Institute of Statistical Mathematics' 1953 and 1958 surveys on the Japanese national character (Tôkei Sûri Kenkyujo Kokuminsei Chôsa Iinkai 1961). During this period the only monographs on values by Japanese sociologists and social psychologists were published: three exhaustive theoretical and methodological studies on the development and meaning of the value concept in social science combined with methodological considerations on the inquiry and measurement of values (Mita 1966; Sakuta 1972; Yoshida 1967)⁶.

The Japanese discussion of values of the early 1960s focused on the question of whether the changes of the prewar Japanese value system which occurred during the early post-war era could be interpreted as a sign of progressing modernization i. e. the continuing substitution of 'feudal' social practices for 'modern' ones typical of a bourgeois industrial society. Once the validity of this interpretation model seemed secure, Japanese sociologists more or less lost interest in the question of values.

The second phase of Japanese value research, which began in the late 1960s/early 1970s and which is still going on today, is characterized by a number of large surveys on Japanese social mentality, many of them designed for international comparison. Most of these surveys are executed by ministries and other government agencies or by the big institutes for opinion surveys of newspaper companies like the Asahi and Mainichi Shinbun or of broadcasting companies like the NHK Institute for Broadcasting Culture. Although item batteries on values are included in all of these surveys, they generally are not especially designed for the study of values but they target social mentality in the broad sense of social or life consciousness (*shakai-ishiki*, *seikatsu-ishiki*) and also include questions on actual political or social issues. In addition, values have been the topic of the 'Japanese Life Values Surveys' (*Nihonjin no seikatsu kachikan chôsa*) of the Culture Institute of the Life Insurance Companies which were executed in 1976, 1985, and 1991.

But at the same time, this period is characterized by an absence of sociological, theoretical and methodological reasoning which tries to integrate the ongoing empirical research on social mentality with substantial problems of sociological research. One is even tempted to rather notice a de-coupling of sociological research and the big surveys on social mentality: while much effort seems to be put into problems of survey technique like sampling methods and statistical analysis, the substantiality of many questions for sociological research seems rather questionable⁷ and there also seems to exist a tendency for Japanese sociological research to more or less ignore the results of these surveys. Futaki (1980: 6-8) expected for the 1980s a strong increase of interest in values in

Japanese social sciences. But, although a strong increase of the number of articles in Japanese learned journals dealing with values can be seen since the late 1970s, and contributions from social psychology and political science are quite frequent, sociological contributions are rare, and the few that exist show a tendency of ignorance of Japanese as well as of Western empirical research on values⁸.

2. Change of Social Mentality in Germany and Japan

In contrast to the Japanese discussion of value change of the 1960s and many Western interpretations of social change in Japan, the point of reference in this paper will not be the question of whether the changes of Japanese social mentality after World War II reflect Japan's transition to a modern society, or whether they can be used as an indicator of the degree of modernity which she has attained. Rather it is taken for granted that Japan is a modernizing, hence a modern society since industrialization took hold and the modernization project became the common goal of the Japanese elite in the mid-Meiji era⁹. This paper will therefore focus on the question of whether ongoing modernization processes in Germany and Japan which resulted in quite similar elements of social change like accelerated urbanization, shifts in industrial structure and employment patterns from primary and heavy to consumer and to service industries, the change to a society of high education, the advent of mass consumerism and of leisure society and so on have led to similar phenomena of change of the social mentality. The point will be that, at least on a structural level, similar groups of values have been affected by the changes of social mentality in both societies, that similar value patterns have emerged as a result of the processes of change, and that ongoing changes are moving in the same direction of continuing pluralization of value patterns. Nevertheless, this paper does not assume that there are not important differences between German and Japanese society with regard to the content of value patterns as well as to the processes of change. An analysis of these differences will be attempted forward at the end of this paper.

The fact that there are major differences between German and Japanese social mentality will be obvious if one compares the German and Japanese results of the fourth World Youth Survey of 1988 (Sômuchô Seishônen Taisaku Honbu 1989). A number of items concerning family life, work, political participation, and general outlook on life show marked differences (cf. table 1): 75% of German vs. 58% of Japanese youth wish to have a father "who puts his family before his job", a father "who tries to be

friend with his children” is the ideal of 56% of the Japanese and of 88% of the German youth, seniority as reason for promotion and increase in salary is selected by 44% of the Japanese vs. 15% of the Germans, while 72.5% of the German vs. 38% of Japanese youth select achievement for the same purpose, active political protest in the case of dissatisfaction with society is considered by 39% of the Germans but only by 19% of the Japanese, 31% of the Japanese vs. 19.5% of the German youth agree with the statement that “men should go out and work while women stay home and take care of the house” etc. etc. In many cases the proportion of respondents who select a ‘modern’ answer is about 20 percentiles higher, and those who select a ‘traditional’ answer is about 20 percentiles lower among German youth.

Table 1: Values of Japanese and German Youth in Comparison: 4th World Youth Survey 1988

		Japan	Germany
Q7: Ideal father	a father who puts his job before his home and family	18.1	12.1
	a father who puts his family before his job	58.4	74.6
	a father who is strict with his children	31.3	3.3
	a father who tries to be friends with his children	56.4	88.2
Q8: Ideal mother	a mother who puts her outside work or activities before her home and family	2.3	5.8
	a mother who puts her family before her outside work or activities	86.1	84.6
	a mother who is strict with her children	12.9	2.8
	a mother who tries to be friends with her children	76.2	90.9
Q23: Reason for promotion and rise of salary	seniority first	43.8	15.1
	performance first	37.8	72.5
Q25: Reason why man works	to earn money	64.5	60.1
	to do his duty as a member of society	7.0	14.2
	to find self-fulfillment	25.7	22.8
Q37: Attitude in case of dissatisfaction with society	I will use my voting right but nothing more	41.4	39.0
	I will actively resort to measures permitted by law	19.0	39.1
	I will resort to illegal measures if necessary	2.7	4.1
	I will become a dropout from society	16.9	6.6
Q43: Goals in life	to get rich	38.7	7.1
	to acquire social position	5.1	20.8
	to live as I like	46.6	60.3
Q48: Man should work, women should stay at home	agree	30.6	19.5
	disagree	43.7	68.8
Q49: Attitudes towards marriage	one should marry / it is better to marry	73.6	47.2
	it is not necessary to marry / better not to marry	13.7	42.2


Source: Sômuchô Seishônén Taisaku Honbu 1989

Nevertheless, in both societies a clear development from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ values can be observed, and in both societies this trend implies that certain groups of ‘traditional’ values drop substantially in importance while other groups of ‘traditional’ values are not influenced by these changes and retain a high importance. To approach this question it is useful first to look separately at Germany and at Japan for what did change and what did not.

2.1. Changes of Social Mentality in Germany: From Duty and Discipline to Self-Realization

According to Kmiecik's (1976: 461-465) summary of empirical research up to the mid-1970s, in most highly industrialized Western societies a common trend of mentality change could be observed, which led to a relative decline of the importance of rather traditional' orientations towards status, career, achievement, work, security, order and responsibility, while on the other hand the importance of rather 'modern' orientations towards hedonism, leisure, self-realization, spontaneity, humanitarianism, social welfare, gender equality has risen. At the same time a complementary shift of educational values can also be observed.

Departing from this summary, German time series data on educational values provide some clues to the question of the timing of mentality change in Germany (cf. fig. 1)¹⁰.



Source: Emnid

What seems to be clear from these data is that in Germany a period of accelerated change in the direction summarized by Kmiecik began in the early 1960s and continued until the mid 1970s. This was followed by a period of relative stability which continued until the mid-1980s when a new acceleration of value change began. This interpretation is largely in accordance with the results of German research on value

change, which set the timing of the first period of accelerated value change in Germany either between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s or between the early 1960s and the mid-1970s with a period of stagnation following (cf. Klages 1984: 17-22).

According to Klages (1988: 43-51) the development of social mentality in Germany from the period right after the war until this first acceleration of value change can be described in the following way: The end of the war with the experience of German capitulation, occupation by the Allied Powers, war captivity, material calamity, torn families, flight and expulsion from Germany's eastern territories, the partitioning of Germany and annexation of parts of her territory resulted in a complete breakdown of the German value system which during the reign of nazism had been overheated up to the point of a collective psychosis. All values which had been directed towards the national community and its representatives appeared to have been wrong. As allied reeducation made crystal clear, the German people had subjected themselves to a great deception and had become victims of a totalitarian propaganda machinery whilst believing to have committed themselves to a sincere and mutual relationship of loyalty and trust. The defeat by itself had a devastating impact upon all those who until the very end had believed in the propaganda of an inevitable final victory (*Endsieg*). The Nuremberg war crimes trials and the exposure of German crimes led to a deep feeling of shame which mixed with a loss of expectations. The evidence that one had in reality been the agent of a criminal attack against humanity whilst believing to be fighting for a good and just cause, for a long time destroyed the sources of idealism, especially among the younger generations.

The period of national reconstruction which began after the currency reform of 1948 provided a new task to which one could commit oneself without being constantly confronted with reproaches and feelings of guilt, and thus brought relief from this atmosphere of self-hatred. But the result was a negative ethic of turning away from the public and the political, an orientation towards privacy and the advent of a 'without-me'-standpoint which could be interpreted as an alternative to the feeling of deep national humiliation which had reigned after the defeat in World War I.

The privatizational concentration on rebuilding the nation's shattered economy and destroyed living environment, combined with a conservative political restoration, resulted in a massive revalorization of values of orientation towards duty and order. The great importance which was placed on order can be interpreted as a projection of the orientation towards survival which had reigned immediately after the war upon the social reorganization of daily life. The necessity to reconstruct an encompassing econo-

mical-technical order beyond the small-group and familistic orientations of emotional withdrawal was obvious and self-evident, and didn't need any special justification. It was equally obvious that the individual had to participate in the reconstruction of this order by dutiful role-taking. Thus participation in a non-political and ideologically neutral functional order became the predominant way of relating the individual to the community and order and fulfillment of duties together with efficiency, output, economic growth and functionality became the dominant values of the period of reconstruction.


Klages (1988: 48-51) characterized the German value system which emerged in the reconstruction period as a "state of exception". With this characterization Klages wants to emphasize the fact that besides an irreversible destruction of certain values as a result of the German defeat, the emergence of the postwar value system was accompanied by an exclusion from the value system of large segments of value potentials still existing in the population. This exclusion did not consist simply of a contraction of the value universe, but of a deactivation of certain groups of values and thus resulted in a tendency towards inner tensions and mental stress. In this sense, the exclusion of certain groups of values from the dominant value system constituted one prerequisite of the value change which occurred, once, when due to social and economic changes, the legitimacy of the one sided orientation towards self-restraint, self-discipline, and self-control, which had received its *raison d'être* from the situation of material deprivation, had been eroded, and a greater balance between values of self-restraint and self-discipline with values of self-actualization and self-realization became possible¹¹.

Nevertheless, as Klages (1988: 51-56) has pointed out, the causes for the accelerated value change in the 1960s constitute a complex in which various social developments are intertwined. High economic growth and the expansion of the welfare state brought mass affluence which was accompanied by mass consumerism, changes in the lifestyle, and the enlargement of leisure. Television and its general distribution brought a revolution of the media structure, and together with the 'educational revolution' and the emerging society of advanced education led to a general broadening of mental horizons¹². These were developments which especially affected the younger generation. At the same time changes in the industrial structure, i. e. the shift to service industries began to emerge and were accompanied by Germany's first postwar economic recession of 1966/67.

To these social changes one has to add the peculiarities of German's postwar mental structure with its incomplete realization of 'reeducation' and its accompanying

withdrawal into privacy which were interpreted as an expression of the typical German 'authoritarian character' which had made possible the victory of German fascism in the first place. The rebellion of the younger generations and the students since the mid-1960s especially dealt with the question of incomplete 'denazification' and made it the basis for a devalorization of any kind of conservatism, authority and hierarchically-embedded structures¹³. Nevertheless the propensity for value change was by no means restricted to German youth. Due to the peculiarities of the development of German social mentality during the postwar periods of reconstruction and high economic growth, the youth rebellion with its strong moralistic overtones of anti-fascism and request of coming to terms with the nazi past received the tacit understanding, if not open sympathies of larger segments of the population. This might explain why the reaction of German state authorities to the youth rebellion were relatively soft - if compared to other countries like France, Japan, or the United States.

The interpretation of value change in Germany by Klages is largely corroborated by the findings of other authors. Following Durkheim, Meulemann (1983) approaches the change of German social mentality between 1950 and 1980 by analyzing the development of four groups of values: equality, achievement, codetermination (which means participation in politics and in decision making processes), and acceptancy (which means



the acceptance of existing social practices and traditions, and thus secures social integration). For analysis he uses all available time series' of attitude-batteries which span the three decades and have been administered at least three times; this results in twelve to fourteen time series (cf. Meulemann 1983: 779-781). Equality has been highly valued throughout the whole period and shows no change as far as the available indicators are concerned. To illustrate the development of the other three values he uses the following four indicators: 'intrinsic work motivation'¹⁴ for "achievement", "education aim: independence"¹⁵ and "political interest"¹⁶ for "codetermination", and "church attendance"¹⁷ for "acceptance". The results of the development are shown in Fig.2.

According to Meulemann, this figure shows that up to the mid-1960s German social mentality remained rather stable, with acceptancy and achievement declining and codetermination increasing thereafter until the mid-1970s followed by a period of stagnation. What is of interest here, is, that which Meuleman calls "intrinsic work motivation" are, according to his own interpretation, values of duty, which regard work as one's duty or life-task, thus correspond to what Klages calls "values of duty orientation", and what Meulemaun calls "codetermination", according to him, can be interpreted as representing values of individualism and self-actualization oriented toward participation in society, thus corresponds to what Klages calls "values of self-actualization". A note should be made of the decline of "intrinsic work motivation". This does not mean that Germans are no longer motivated to fulfil their work duties. It means, that the way work is regarded has changed: work is seen less and less as an end in itself, and other things have become important for finding meaning in life.

The acceleration of value change in the 1960s brought a general devalorization of values of duty, self-restraint, self-control, and discipline, hence what Klages (1993: 205) calls "values of duty orientation and acceptance" (*Pflicht- und Akzeptanzwerte*), accompanied by a general revalorization of values of self-actualization and self-realization (*Selbstentfaltungswerte*). The main groups of values which were involved in the change are presented in table 2.

The degree of change and of the shift of importance cannot be inferred from table 2. As already noted above, value change does not consist of a complete substitution of one set of values for another one, but by a change of the relative weight of various groups of values. What happened in Germany during the first period of accelerated value change was exactly this type of change: In the measurement of the importance of various values with rating scales a shift of the rankings of values of duty orientation and acceptance and of values of self-actualization occurred. Values of duty orientation

Table 2: Main groups of Values Which Are Involved in the Value Change in Germany

	self-restraint and self-control (duty and acceptance)	self-actualization
orientation towards society	discipline obedience fulfillment of duties trust and loyalty subordination diligence modesty frugality	society-directed idealism emancipation(from authorities) equal treatment equality democracy (political) participation autonomy (of the individual)
orientation towards the individual self	self-control self-sacrifice acceptance docility abstemiousness	hedonism sensualism adventure suspense diversion full realization of emotional needs
		Individualism creativity spontaneity self-actualization un-restraint independence

Source: Klages 1984: p.18

and acceptance by no means have disappeared or been relegated to insignificance, they rather moved from a very high importance to a medium rank. At the same time values of self-realization shifted from a very low importance also to a medium rank. As result, when the change came to a standstill in the mid-1970s, on the population average, both groups of values were accorded almost equal importance (Klages 1988: 56-58).

But the development does not merely consist of an equivalent shifting of ranking such that values of self-actualization have gained importance in about the same degree as values of duty orientation and acceptance have lost it. While the rank of some 'old' values has declined considerably, others have been influenced by the change to a much lesser degree. To illustrate this, let us turn back to the development presented in figure 1. The three educational values in this graph were "personal independence and free will" (or 'autonomy'), "orderliness and diligence" (or 'orderliness'), and "obedience and subordination" (or 'obedience'). While one of these values ('autonomy') clearly belongs to the group of values of self-actualization, the other two are core values of the group of values of duty orientation and acceptance. From 1951 until 1974 'autonomy' showed a continuous increase. The development stagnated during the second half of the 1970s and after 1983 it showed a second phase of increase and in 1989 it was selected by 67% of the population as a major virtue to be stressed in the education of children.


Parallel to this rise, 'obedience and subordination' continuously declined from 1951 through 1989. At the same time 'orderliness and diligence', which is clearly considered as a traditional German value (or virtue), although it showed a slight long-term downward trend, at least until the 1980s remained relatively stable and was continuously selected by about 40% of the population¹⁸. But my point here is, that a) 'old' values which imply a hierarchy-orientation seem to have been much more strongly affected by the value change than those 'old' values which do not have such an implication; b) there seems to exist a larger segment of the population to which a combination of 'old' values with 'new' ones poses no problems, i. e. values of duty orientation and acceptance and values of self-actualization seem not at all to be mutually exclusive. I will turn to these points again later, but I first want to explore some of the changes which occurred in Japan.

2.2. Changes in Social Mentality in Japan: From Authoritarianism to Libertarianism

In exploring long-term value change in Germany, a major problem has been that time series data which go back beyond the late 1960s are extremely rare. Of course, in Japan too, survey data have become much more abundant since about the same time as in Germany. But at least, an outstanding time series is provided by the Ministry of Education's Institute for Statistical Mathematics' survey on the Japanese national character which has been conducted every five years since 1953¹⁹. Thus a closer look at the results of this survey seems to be the best way to first approach the question of the change of social mentality in Japan.

Quite similar to the question on German educational values by EMNID, question 2.4 of the survey on the Japanese national character, which was administered for the first time in 1930 and then since 1953 in each survey on the Japanese national character, provides a good overview of long-term changes of Japanese social mentality (cf. fig. 3)²⁰. This graph shows a remarkable change in the direction of 'modern' values. Authoritarian values, which combine two values that had been important elements of the prewar Japanese ideology, showed a decrease from 53% to 39% between 1930 and 1953. They then continued to decrease until 1988 when they were selected by 13% of the respondents. On the other hand, libertarian values, which combine two individualistic and at the same time hedonistic values of the kind that had been heavily criticized as 'decadent Western behavior' by the prewar ideology, increased between 1930 and 1953

from 14% to 32% and they then continued to increase until they reached 64% in 1988. During the same time, acquisitive values oscillated around 20% and didn't change very much²¹.



What is especially interesting, is the picture which evolves if one compares this graph with the development of social mentality in Germany. While in Germany the immediate postwar era had been characterized by a collapse of the old value system followed by a revalorization of values of self-control, duty, and order orientation during the periods of reconstruction and high economic growth, and the change in the direction of 'modern' values coming as late as the 1960s²², in Japan the change from 'traditional' to 'modern' values seems to have begun right after the end of the war and seems to have continued especially strongly until the end of the 1950s with authoritarian values decreasing ten and libertarian values increasing 12 percentiles between 1953 and 1958.

Of course, as qualitative studies indicate, in Japan too, the collapse of the Japanese empire and of the emperor system together with the war crimes tribunals led to ideological disenchantment, anomie and a breakdown of the value system, especially among the younger generation which had been subjected to the heavy indoctrination with the war time fascist ideology during the late 1930s and the early 1940s (cf. Tsurumi 1970: 185-189). Nevertheless, there exist considerable differences in wartime and post-war experiences between Germany and Japan which might explain the differences in the timing of the mentality change. First, although especially during the late 1930s and ear-

ly 1940s a massive indoctrination with the ideology of ultra-nationalism and sacrifice for the emperor and the nation combined with an appeal to idealism of the youth to build the new greater East Asia took place in schools and in the military service, Japan did not experience the mass mobilization for nationalism and idealism that took place in Nazi Germany and led to an 'overheating' of the value system which came close to a collective psychosis. The march into fascism and fascist ideology took place gradually in Japan, was not accompanied by mass mobilization, and allowed for considerable variation of *tenmô* ideology among the different generations, and there seems even to have existed silent rejection of ideological exaggeration (for a description of Japan's march into fascism cf. Kong 1983). Second, to the ordinary Japanese citizen the war had happened like a natural disaster independent of his consent or assent, and relief that it was finally over was the general reaction to the end of the war, guilt or shame concerning Japan's responsibility for the war or war crimes never became an important element of Japan's postwar mentality structure. Third, although Japan experienced destruction of her cities by air-raids, with the exception of Okinawa, she did not become the field of battle, and, although she lost her overseas territories, she was neither divided into zones occupied by different members of the Allied Powers, nor - in principal - did she lose territories which were regarded traditionally as part of the Japanese homelands. The occupation of Japan differed very much from the German one. Legally an occupation by the Allied Powers, practically it was mainly carried out by US Forces alone, and, while in Germany the military breakdown had been accompanied by a breakdown and disappearance of civil government and thus led to direct rule by the occupying powers, in the case of Japan a basic policy of indirect rule and continuity of the Japanese government had been adopted by the United States. Thus for the greater part of the Japanese population, mental adjustment to the postwar realities was perhaps easier than in Germany. Reeducation - with the exception of 'coming to terms with one's past' - was less rejected and perhaps much more effective than in Germany. This is especially true for the education in "democratization" and its stress on individualism and equality which was executed with great zeal even by the Ministry of Education until the late 1950s²³. As a result, the old value system by and large did not collapse after the end of the war, but certain of its segments were rapidly devalORIZED while new values of individualism, equality, and privacy gained importance.

Nevertheless, the postwar development of Japanese social mentality was not one sided characterized by a decrease of old and an increase of new values. As it will become clear from the following examination of the survey on the Japanese national charac-

ter and other opinion polls, many old values were preserved and even gained in importance. Good examples for these kinds of values are questions 5.6 and 5.1d of the survey on Japanese national character. Question 5.6 asks for the preference between two types of superiors: “a man who always sticks to the work rules and never demands any unreasonable work, but on the other hand, never does anything for you personally in matters not connected with the work” and “a man who sometimes demands extra work in spite of rules against it, but on the other hand, looks after you personally in matters not connected with the work”. Since 1953 more than 80% select the paternalistic superior. Question 5.1d asks to select the two most important from a list of four virtues: *oya-kôkô* (filial piety, to be dutiful to one's parents), *on-gaeshi* (repaying moral indebtedness), respecting individual rights, and respecting freedom. Since 1963, when this question was first included in the survey, more than 60% of the respondents select *oya-kôkô* and more than 40% *on-gaeshi*, and in both cases a trend towards increase can be observed since 1978. ‘Respecting individual rights’ decreased from 48% to 36% between 1963 and 1988 and ‘respecting freedom’ oscillates around 40% (Tôkei Sûri Kenkyûjo Kokuminsei Chôsa Linkai 1992: 528)²⁴.

But the mentality change in Japanese society is not limited merely to the fact that some new values gain and some old values lose in importance while some core traditional values retain a high importance. A closer look at the surveys on the Japanese national character and at other surveys concerning Japanese social mentality reveals that a change to ‘modern’ values can be observed especially in those cases where ‘traditional’ values are connected with a high valorization of authoritarian-hierarchical social relations and conditions. The following examples may illustrate this point.

Question 4.10 of the surveys on the Japanese national character asks whether the respondents would adopt a child in order to continue the family line or not. This practice is closely related to the traditional family system, the *ie*, and thus can be used as an indicator of what degree *ie*-consciousness still exists. The proportion of respondents in favor of an adoption shrank from 73% in 1953 to 28% in 1988; at the same time the proportion of respondents who reject an adoption increased from 16% to 62%. Question 4.4 which asks whether parents should deny or affirm an actual wrongdoing of a teacher, about which the children have heard a rumor, is related to the problem of reinforcing the authority of teachers. Since 1953 a relative majority of the respondents was of the opinion that it is better to affirm the truth, but the proportion of those who selected “it is better to affirm” increased from 42% in 1953 to 62% in 1988, while the proportion of those who thought “it is better to deny” dropped from 38% to 23%.

Concerning the authority of politicians, question 8.1 asks whether "the best way to improve the country is for the people to leave everything to good political leaders". The proportion of respondents who agree with this opinion decreased from 52% in 1953 to 30% in 1988, and the proportion of those who disagree increased from 41% to 61% (Tôkei Sûri Kenkyûjo Kokuminsei Chôsa linkai 1992: 524, 525, 538). Concerning the *tennô* system, question 3.9 of the survey on the Japanese national character and question 35 from the NHK survey on the social mentality of Japanese (*Nihonjin no seikatsu ishiki chôsa*) show that the relationship of the Japanese people to the emperor has become rather detached: In 1953, 57% of the respondents regarded it as a duty of the prime minister to visit the Ise shrine²⁵, in 1988 the proportion of these people had dropped to 18%. But this does not mean that the proportion of opponents of the visit has increased, their proportion amounts continuously to about 10%, instead, the proportion of people who think that the visit is a private religious affair of the prime-minister and he can do it as it pleases himself increased from 23% to 59% (Tôkei Sûri Kenkyûjo Kokuminsei Chôsa linkai 1992: 523). Quite similarly, in the NHK survey, the proportion of people who feel reverence for the emperor dropped from 33.3% in 1973 to 27.5% in 1988, while the proportion of those who have no special feelings with regard to the emperor increased from 42.7% to 46.5% and the proportion of people who feel animosity towards the emperor continuously ranged about 2.2% (NHK Yoron Chôsa-Bu 1991: furoku 22).

Another problem related to hierarchical and authoritarian orientations is gender equality and male-female role-division. In the surveys on the Japanese national character, all direct questions concerning gender equality were administered only once or twice, but as an indirect question which reflects satisfaction with one's own gender, question 6.2 asks what gender one would prefer if one was to be reborn. Between 1953 and 1988, always about 90% of the men wished to be reborn as a man. But in the case of women, the proportion who wished to be reborn as a man amounted to 64% in 1953, and shrank to 35% in 1988. During the same time the proportion of women who wished to be reborn as a woman increased from 27% to 59% (Tôkei Sûri Kenkyûjo Kokuminsei Chôsa linkai 1992: 529). A direct question concerning male-female role-division is question 48 from the World Youth Surveys which has the following wording: "Here is something that some people say: "Men should go out and work while women stay home and take care of the house". How do you feel about this idea?" The proportion of youth²⁶ who agree with this statement dropped from 50.4% in 1977 to 44.5% in 1983 and to 30.6% in 1988, the proportion of those who disagree rose from 31.7% to 35.5%

to 43.7% (Sômuchô Seishônen Taisaku Honbu 1989: 80). The same tendency of a decrease of support for the traditional middle-class male-female role-division is apparent from similar questions in the prime minister's office's surveys on the situation of women and the survey on values of the Japanese by the German Institute for Japanese studies²⁷. Also inquiring in the same direction are questions 8 and 12 of the NHK survey: Between 1973 and 1993 the proportion of respondents who supported the classical role-division between husband and wife as the ideal family situation dropped from 39% to 20% and the proportion of those who support a family ideal of husband's and wife's cooperation rose from 21% to 41% (q 8). In 1973 35% of the respondents regarded family and household as the primary task of married women and only 20% approved of women continuing to work after marriage and birth of children. In 1993 the situation had reversed: Only 18% wanted to relegate women to the house and 37% regarded marriage and children as no obstacle to women's work (q 12) (NHK Hôsô Bunka Kenkyûjo 1994: 59-60). All these surveys show that especially among women, the younger generations and respondents with advanced education levels, the classical male-female role-division is increasingly rejected.

This kind of mentality change which is almost always apparent when 'traditional' attitudes and values are oriented to hierarchical and authoritarian social conditions cannot be observed in the case of 'traditional' attitudes and values which lack this kind of orientation, but rather are oriented towards smooth interpersonal relationships. This is especially obvious in the case of filial piety (q 5.1d), repaying indebtedness (q 5.1d, q 5.1b), good human relations at the work place (q 5.6) in the surveys on the Japanese national character. But especially the answers to question 5.1d show the continuing strong importance of traditional values does not move in the direction of a dichotomy between advocates of 'traditional' and 'modern' values, but since 1953 constantly more than 50% of the respondents selected a combination of a 'traditional' and a 'modern' answer (Tôkei Sûri Kenkyûjo Kokuminsei Chôsa linkai 1992: 111). A closer look at the change of attitudes concerning human relations and work gives some additional information concerning the overall trend of the change of Japanese social mentality.

2.2.1. Attitudes Concerning Work and Human Relations

The changes of Japanese value patterns, which will be treated afterwards, also clearly include a change of values concerning work and human relations. In the results of the 1976/77 survey on Japanese life values²⁸ by the Culture Institute of the Life In-

insurance Companies and the Nomura Research Institute, a value pattern of higher order was identified which was called 'adulthood' and which was comprised of the basic values shared by the overwhelming majority of the Japanese. At that time, this value pattern included a number of values which implied a high valorization of integration into formalized and hierarchically structured groups and local society as well as of diligence, hard work, and work as an end in itself.

The latter is no longer the case. As the examination of the development of individual items concerning work throughout the three surveys on Japanese life values shows, on the one hand, for the majority of the respondents work still is of high importance, but there no longer exists a consensus concerning a moral superelevation of work, diligence and endeavour which regards them as ends in themselves and basic virtues, so that these elements have detached themselves from the higher order value pattern 'adulthood'. On the other hand, an increasing minority regards work mainly as a means to earn money, or does not want to work more than it is common. According to this development, new higher order value patterns competing with 'adulthood', which have developed in 1985 and 1991, include elements of explicit avoidance of responsibility and hard work. Increasingly, leisure is regarded as of equal importance to work and has acquired a central position in the life of the Japanese. In the surveys on the Japanese life values, the proportion of respondents who find most happiness in hobbies and amusement rose from 49% to 61% between 1985 and 1991. Quite a similar tendency is shown by the NHK surveys (cf. table 3)²⁹.

Table 3: The Relative Importance of Leisure and Work

	1973	1978	1983	1988	1993
Leisure has priority	32.1	29.4	31.1	34.0	36.1
Work and leisure are of equal importance	20.9	24.9	27.9	32.4	35.3
Work has priority	42.9	41.4	39.0	31.2	25.8

Source: NHK Yoron Chosa-Bu 1993: furoku 16; NHK Hosokura Kenkyusho 1994: 62

The same kind of interpretation is possible concerning the results of the attitude-batteries of the surveys on Japanese life values and of the value survey of the German Institute of Japanese Studies. Life areas like the family and leisure which compete with work are of primary importance in 1991, work comes second: 59% of the respondents accord priority to the family instead of the firm, 28% accord priority to the firm instead of the family (Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentô 1992: 124), and 44.3%, in case of a job transfer, regard the interests of the family as more important vs. 36.7% who give

priority to the interests of the firm (Deutsches Institut für Japanstudien 1991: 21). The younger the respondents are, the higher is the proportion of those who decide in favor of the family and leisure.

Changes concerning work-related attitudes can be observed especially among young Japanese as are clear from table 4, which is based on the results of the World Youth Surveys³⁰. These results show a marked tendency toward decline of those attitudes towards work, which hitherto have been regarded as 'typically' Japanese. As in Germany, a major aspect of this change of work-related values is the pluralization of work-related value patterns (cf. Rôdôshô Shokugyô Antei Kyoku 1991-91-92). Judging from these results, in my opinion, in the future it will no longer be possible for Japanese companies to conduct their personnel management on the assumption of relative uniform attitudes towards work and leisure among their workforce, but they will have to take into account the necessity of dealing with and balancing a number of diverging desires, motives, and needs. In this sense, the personnel management of Japanese companies will face similar tasks of adjustment to changing work-related values as have been addressed by personnel policies in German industries since the end of the 1970s.

Table 4: Change of Work-Related Attitudes among Japanese Youth

Question	Answers	1977	1983	1988
Would you like to continue on with working where you are right now?	I want to continue	37.4	34.1	26.2
	If opportunity arises, I want to change	25.3	23.8	27.9
	I would like to change, but I will probably stay on with this job	22.9	23.8	25.3
	I am determined to change	3.7	3.6	5.3
How would you like promotions and salary increases to be decided?	Only by seniority	10.2	4.2	4.6
	Mainly by seniority, but performance also considered	36.0	37.7	39.2
	Mainly by performance, but seniority also considered	25.8	32.3	31.7
	Only by performance	6.5	6.4	6.1
Why do you think man works? (please chose one answer)*	To earn money	54.5	59.2	64.5
	To do his duty as member of society	10.9	8.9	7.0
	To find self-fulfillment	34.5	28.8	25.7
Suppose you work under a superior, do you think it is a good idea to have social contact with him after hours? *	Yes	73.4	63.3	58.1
	No	25.5	23.6	28.1
Which gives you more satisfaction- your job or your life outside the job?	Job	30.5	27.9	21.5
	Life outside the job	48.5	52.7	56.7

*)These questions had been administered in the first survey of 1972, but not in the second of 1977
Source: Sômuchô Seishônén Taisaku Honbu 1989: 60 and 64. Percentages of 'no answers' not included.

The surveys on the Japanese national character show that since 1953 no big changes have occurred concerning the importance of social obligations in human relations, once such obligations have been recognized. Constantly, more than 50% of the respondents accord priority to such obligations of personal interests, and the importance of such obligations increases with rising age. But these surveys give almost no information concerning to what degree these kinds of obligations still play an important role in the life of the Japanese. According to colleagues from the Institute of Statistical Mathematics, qualitative research accompanying the surveys on the Japanese National character has shown that the meaning and content of many of the terms for these 'traditional' aspects of Japanese human relations have changed during the forty years that these surveys have been executed. Therefore, in my opinion, the results of these surveys cannot be interpreted such that social relations in Japan still unfracturedly are based on formalized structures of *giri* and *on*³¹. Instead, the results of the surveys on Japanese life values rather shows since 1985 a clear tendency of decreasing importance of traditional formalized hierarchical human and group relationships, while on the other hand, the importance of equal human relations and of self-determined selectivity with regard to the establishment of group relationships increases. Since 1976/77 the willingness to associate with people from one's neighborhood has increased, but this kind of socializing has become more casual and non-committal; to enter into obligations is avoided as well as participation in organized and formalized neighborhood activities and active engagement in cultivation and improvement of one's environment. A similar tendency is shown by the NHK surveys on Japanese social mentality. The willingness to enter into social relationships which imply a large degree of obligation has clearly decreased concerning social contacts with one's colleagues as well as with neighbors. And while in both cases the proportion of respondents who wish to limit contact to the neces-

Table 5: Change of Attitudes Concerning Human Relations: What kind of social contact do you wish to have with colleagues/with people from the neighbourhood?

Answer	1973	1978	1983	1988	1993
with colleagues					
A kind of contact which is limited to work-related matters	11.3	10.4	13.6	15.1	17.8
A kind of contact which includes talking and socializing after hours	26.4	31.4	32.4	37.6	38.8
A kind of contact which includes advice and help concerning all kinds of problems	59.4	55.3	52.3	44.6	40.4
with neighbours					
A kind of contact which is limited to greeting if one meets each other	15.1	15.1	19.6	19.2	19.8
A kind of contact which includes talking and socializing without great obligations	49.8	52.5	47.5	53.4	54.2
A kind of contact which includes advice and help concerning all kinds of problems	34.5	31.9	32.4	26.8	24.9

Source: NHK Yoron Chōsa-Bu 1993: Furoku 13 und 20; NHK Hōsō Bunka Kenkyūjo 1994: 61,64.

sary minimum has slightly increased, a marked increase can be observed concerning casual contact with colleagues and neighbors which is directed towards amusement and relaxation (cf. table 5).

The same tendency is observable not only in the results of quantitative surveys but also is reported in studies based on qualitative research like the research on networking of Japanese women (Imamura 1987; Salamon 1975; Ueno 1988; 1993). These studies stress the fact that Japanese women place high importance on the protection of privacy, but wish to maintain broad human relations and contacts as long as this protection is guaranteed. Nevertheless, in any case, participation in groups and establishment of social contacts is highly selective and self-determined, and always attention is paid to keeping these contacts as casual and non-committal as possible and of avoiding great obligations. At the same time the formalized, traditional forms of human relations in local society are regarded rather negatively by the women who try to limit as much as possible the impact of these types of relations on their life.

The description of the change of Japanese social mentality presented above, in my opinion, shows that quite similarly to the development in Germany, we also can observe in Japan a development leading from 'traditional' values of order (values of duty orientation and acceptance) to individualistic values of self-actualization. Nevertheless, while in Germany values of self-actualization are closely connected with a high valorization of citizens' participation in politics and everyday decision-making processes, in Japan, much less importance is placed on such participation, and since the 1970s this importance is even decreasing. In the NHK surveys, the proportion of respondents who would react to pollution problems with participation in citizens' movements dropped from 36% to 25% between 1973 and 1988 (NHK Yoron Chōsa-Bu 1991: furoku 21). In a similar way it can be seen in question 37 from the World Youth Surveys that in 1988 39% of German Youth, but only 19% of Japanese youth would consider participation in legal protests like demonstrations and strikes in the case of dissatisfaction with society; in Japan this proportion dropped from 26% in 1977, while in Germany it rose from 32% (Sōmuchō Seishōnen Taisaku Honbu 1989: 70).

Nevertheless, in both countries the change of social mentality is characterized by a change of the relative importance of old and new values, the emergence of new combinations of values, and the pluralization of value patterns. Furthermore in both countries a large segment of the population is characterized by a combination of old and new values. These questions will be dealt with in the analysis of value patterns and their pluralization in Germany and Japan.

(To be continued)

Notes

¹ Naturally, there also exist other approaches to the problem of values in the past like content analyses; examples of this kind of content analyses for Germany and Japan are Mohler 1992 and Ortmanns 1994.

² In the sociological research on values the distinction between values and attitudes is regarded as quite important, cf. Fiedrichs 1968: 76-93; Kmicieak 1976: 151-202; Meyer and Rüegg 1979.

³ As Wagner (1994: 134) has pointed out, the dealing of social science with the various protest movements in the beginning was ambivalent at least: Social science of the era of organized modernity, with its strong conviction in the predictability of social change and the manageability of any kind of social problems, could perceive of the protest movements and the accompanying changes of social mentality only as of an upsurge of irrationality and deviant behavior, hence of social pathology.

⁴ This is not the place to reiterate the various critiques and anti-critiques of this debate. The interested reader might use the references given in Klages 1992 and in Inglehart 1990.

⁵ This book was first published in 1951. The partial translation into Japanese by Nagai Michio and others was published in 1960.

⁶ According to Futaki (1980: 1), the three monographs had originally been published between 1961 and 1963 as contributions to journals.

⁷ There are a few item batteries in these surveys which, to put it mildly, are very difficult to interpret, and which should have been constructed differently right from the start.

⁸ An example of this is Bachika (1993) who claims that research concentrating on values is very rare and cites Rokeach's research of the 1970s (Rokeach 1983) as almost the only exception, but who completely ignores Inglehart's contributions and the whole discussion on Inglehart as well as all European research.

⁹ I will not dwell on this question now, but doubts concerning the validity of the interpretation of Japanese society as a case of uncompleted modernization, might they be based on models of either left-wing or conservative modernization theories, have become quite frequent since the critique of popular theories on the Japanese (*nihonjinron*) and their academic counterparts took off in the 1980s. New light might be thrown on this issue by Wagner's (1994) book which attempts to analyze the phases and conflicting models of modernization which various Western societies have experienced since the late 18th century.

¹⁰ This question was administered by the German opinion survey institute EMNID between 1951 and 1989. Its wording was as follows: "Which attributes should be the main goals of children's education? Obedience and subordination, orderliness and diligence, or independence and free will?" On most occasions when the question had been administered, multiple answers had been possible, see Klages (1984: 19) for details.

¹¹ According to Klages (1984: 50-51) to secure a certain weight ratio between these two groups of values is a central cultural decision and task of any society. As Wagner (1994: 3-18) has shown, self-discipline and self-realization together as a pair form the basic values of modernity, while their relative weight has varied over time in the different

phases and models of modernity.

¹² Meulemann 1983: 792-793 especially cites the expansion of secondary and tertiary education and the diffusion of television as main reasons for an enormous broadening in cultural participation in West Germany during the late 1960s.

¹³ Thus the German youth movement of 1960s used to refer to itself as 'anti-authoritarian movement'. For an account of German socio-political movements of the 1960s cf. Otto 1977.

¹⁴ A series by EMNID: 'Do you experience work as a heavy burden, a necessary evil, an opportunity to make money, a rewarding activity or the fulfilment of a mission?' Combined percentages of "rewarding activity" and "fulfilment of a mission".

¹⁵ The same EMNID series which is explained in note 10. Percentages of "independence", computed somewhat differing from those used in fig. 1.

¹⁶ A series by Allensbach, "are you interested in politics?", percentages "yes".

¹⁷ A series by DIVO, the percentage of all people who at least claim irregular church attendance.

¹⁸ The data seem to indicate a stronger downward trend since the late 1980s, but unfortunately EMNID decided to discontinue the series in that year so that more recent data are not available.

¹⁹ Some of the questions included in this survey had even been administered as early as the 1930s.

²⁰ Question 2.4 has the following wording: "There are all sorts of attitudes towards life. Of those listed here, which one would you say come closest to your feeling? (a) Work hard and get rich. (b) Study earnestly and make a name for yourself. (c) Don't think about money or fame; just live a life that suits your own tastes. (d) Live each day as it comes, cheerfully and without worrying. (e) Resist all evils in the world and live a pure and just life. (f) Never think of yourself, give everything in service of society." Following Flanagan (1982: 426), the answers have been regrouped to three orientations: "libertarian" which combines (c) and (d), "acquisitive", which combines (a) and (b), "authoritarian", which combines (e) and (f).

²¹ According to Flanagan (1982), the acquisitive values largely correspond to 'materialistic' values in the sense of Inglehart. Since these values were not influenced by the remarkable value change which occurred in Japan, Flanagan concludes that Inglehart's interpretation of value change in industrialized countries as essentially a change from materialistic to post-materialistic values doesn't make much sense for the analysis of Japanese value change.

²² Content analyses of German newspapers indicate that the value change started somewhat earlier, already in the late 1950s among German elites, cf. Mohler 1993.

²³ The question of coming to terms with Japan's war responsibility and war crimes is still unresolved today, and the Ministry of Education has been a formidable obstacle to any attempt to take up this task in school education, concerning 'democratization' as a goal of postwar education cf. Ortmanns (1994: 286-290); Nishi (1982: 160-186).

²⁴ Nevertheless, it has to be noted that the continuing high importance of *oya-kôkô* cannot be interpreted as a straight persistence of prewar moral concepts which are closely related to the emperor system. According to colleagues from the Institute of Statistical Mathema-

tics, this term has changed its meaning in the course of time, and nowadays, especially younger respondents understand the term simply as “to care for one’s parents”. This is consistent with the author’s own observations among Japanese students: Younger Japanese are unable to understand the term directly and, after some discussion, interpret it in the same way.

²⁵ The Ise shrine is dedicated to the sun-goddess *Amaterasu-ōkami*, which is regarded as the divine ancestress of the Tennō house, thus the question of a prime minister’s visit to the Ise shrine is not merely related to the problem of an infringement of the constitution’s separation of religion and politics, its significance extends to question, whether the legitimacy of the prime-minister’s office is derived from the Tennō and his divine ancestors or from the will of the people, thus to the question of a tacit reinforcement of the ideology of the Tennō system.

²⁶ Object of these surveys are men and women aged 18 to 24.

²⁷ Naikaku Sōri Daijin Kanbō Kōhōshitsu 1973a: 3, 136, 1973b: 3, 94; 1976: 34-35; 1981: 150-151; 1984: 84; 1985: 138; 1987: 165; 1990: 102. Deutsches Institut für Japanstudien 1991: 24 und 54-55; a detailed treatment of the mentality change concerning gender equality in the family as well as in work life is given in Oelschleger et al. forthcoming.

²⁸ Concerning the surveys on Japanese life values cf. Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentā/Nomura Sōgō Kenkyūjo 1980; Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentā 1987; 1988 1992; 1993.

²⁹ Table 3 is based on question 22 of the NHK survey. The wording of this question is as follows: “There are various opinions concernig how the relation between work and leisure should be. How would you prefer it to be?” Answers “rather than in work, I find fulfillment in leisure” and “I like to finish my work quickly and find as much pleasure as possible in leisure” have been combined into “leisure has priority”, “I put the same strength into work and into leisure” has been rendered as “work and leisure are of equal importance”, and “I sometimes have fun in leisure, but focus my efforts on work” and “I find fulfillment in work and put all my strength into it” have been combined into “work has priority”.

³⁰ The world youth surveys have been eyes, executed in 1972, 1977, 1983, and 1988. The questionnaire was changed considerably from the first to the second survey and since then has largely remained the same. Nevertheless, there exist several questions which were administered in the first, third and forth surveys, but not in the second.

³¹ That traditional formalized relations based on *giri* and *on* were moving in the direction of secularization, individuation, and instrumentalism had already been noted by Befu in 1968 (cf. Befu 1974: 163-169).

Bibliography

- Bachika Reimon (1993): Kachi-shikō to gendai shakai. In: *Shakaigaku hyōron*. (Tōkyō). Vol. 44 (1993/94), No.2. p.147-160.
- Befu, Harumi (1974): Gift-Giving in a Modernizing Japan. In: Lebra, Takie Sugiyama; William P. Lebra (ed.): *Japanese Culture and Behavior: Selected Readings*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. p.158-170.

- Böckler, Michael u. a. (ed.) (1991): *Wertwandel und Werteforschung in den 80er Jahren. Forschungs und Literaturdokumentation 1980-1990*. Bonn: Informationszentrum Sozialwissenschaften.
- Deutsches Institut für Japanstudien (1991): *Individualität und Egalität in Familie und Unternehmen. Erste Ergebnisse einer in Mai 1991 in Japan durchgeführten Repräsentativumfrage*. Tōkyō: Deutsches Institut für Japanstudien. [Philipp-Franz-von-Siebold-Stiftung Deutsches Institut für Japanstudien Miscellanea, 1] .
- Flanagan, Scott C. (1982): Changing Values in Advanced Industrial Societies: Ingleharts Silent Revolution from the Perspective of Japanese Findings. In: *Comparative Political Studies*. Vol. 14, No. 4. S. 403-444.
- Friedrichs, Jürgen (1968): *Werte und soziales Handeln. Ein Beitrag zur soziologischen Theorie*. Tübingen: Mohr.
- Futaki, Kōji (1980): 1980 nendai o dō toraeru ka. Kachikan kenkyū no genjō to kadai. In: *Māketīngukiyō*. 1980, 1: S. 1-9.
- Herbert, Willi und Hippler, Hans-Jürgen (1991): Der Stand der Wertwandelforschung am Ende der achtziger Jahre. "State-of-the-art" und Analyse der dokumentierten Forschungsergebnisse. In: Böckler, Michael u. a. (Bearb.): *Wertwandel und Werteforschung in den 80er Jahren. Forschungs- und Literaturdokumentation 1980-1990*. Bonn: Informationszentrum Sozialwissenschaften. p. VII-XXXIX.
- Imamura, Anne E. (1987): *Urban Japanese Housewives: At Home and in the Community*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald (1971): The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies. In: *The American Political Science Review*. Vol. 65, No. 4. p. 991-1017.
- Inglehart, Ronald (1977): *The Silent Revolution : Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics*. Princeton, N. J. : Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald (1990): *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
- Klages, Helmut (1984): *Wertorientierungen in Wandel Rückblick, Gegenwartsanalysen, Prognosen*. Frankfurt/M; New York: Campus Verlag.
- Klages, Helmut (1988): *Wertedynamik. Über die Wandelbarkeit des Selbstverständlichen*. Zürich: Edition Interform. [=Thesen+ Texte 212] .
- Klages, Helmut (1992): Die gegenwärtige Situation der Wert- und Wertwandelforschung - Probleme und Perspektiven. In: Klages, Helmut; Hans-Jürgen und Herbert, Willi (ed.): *Werte und Wandel Ergebnisse und Methoden einer Forschungstradition*. Frankfurt und New York: Campus. p. 5-39.
- Klages, Helmut (1993): Value Change in Japan and (West-) Germany. In: *Japanstudien Jahrbuch des Deutschen Instituts für Japanstudien der Philipp Franz von Siebold Stiftung*. Vol. 4, 1992. München: Iudicium. p. 199-208.
- Klages, Helmut und Kmiecik, Peter (1979): Einführung. In: Klages, Helmut und Kmiecik, Peter (ed.): *Wertewandel und gesellschaftlicher Wandel*. Frankfurt und New York: Campus. p. 11-19.
- Kluckhohn, Clyde (1962): Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action: An Ex-

- ploration in Definition and Classification. In: Parsons, Talcott and Shils, Edward A. (ed.): *Toward a General Theory of Action: Theoretical Foundations for the Social Sciences*. New York: Harper & Row. p.388-433. [=Harper Torchbooks. The Academic Library] [First publ. 1951] .
- Kmiecik, Peter (1976): *Wertstrukturen und Wertwandel in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Grundlagen einer interdisziplinären empirischen Wertforschung mit einer Sekundäranalyse von Umfragedaten*. Göttingen: Schwartz.
- Kong, Kwang-Duk (1983): *Tennô-Faschismus. Zur Entstehung, Struktur, Ideologie und Funktion des Herrschaftssystems in Japan, 1868-1945*. Marburg/L: Doctoral Dissertation, Philipps-Universität Marburg.
- Linton, Ralph (1945): *The Cultural Background of Personality*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- Meulemann, Heiner (1983): Value Change in West Germany, 1950-1980: Integrating the Empirical Evidence. In: *Social Science Information*. Vol.22, No.4/5. p.777-800.
- Meyer, Ruth und Rüegg, Walter (1979): Wertforschung im systematischen internationalen Vergleich. In: Klages, Helmut und Kmiecik, Peter (ed.): *Wertewandel und gesellschaftlicher Wandel*. Frankfurt und New York: Campus. p.41-60.
- Mita, Munesuke (1966): *Kachi ishiki no riron. Yokubô to dôtoku no shakaigaku*. Tôkyô: Kôbundô.
- Mita Munesuke (1979): *Gendai shakai no shakai ishiki*. Tôkyô: Kôbundô.
- Mita Munesuke (1988): Shakai ishiki. In: Mita Munesuke; Kurihara Akira; Tanaka Yoshihisa (ed.): *Shakaigaku jiten*. Tôkyô: Kôbundô. p.388-389.
- Mohler, Peter Ph. (1992): Wertewandel in der Bundesrepublik in den 60er Jahren. Ein "Top Down" - oder ein "Boottom Up" -Prozeß? In: Klages, Helmut; Hippler, Hans-Jürgen und Herbert, Willi (ed.): *Werte und Wandel. Ergebnisse und Methoden einer Forschungstradition*. Frankfurt und New York: Campus. p.40-68.
- Naikaku Sôridaijin Kanbô Kôhôshitsu (ed.) (1973a): *Fujin ni kansuru ishiki chôsa*. Vol. 3. Tôkyô: Naikaku Sôridaijin Kanbô Kôhôshitsu. [=Yoron chôsa hokokusho shôwa 47 nen 10 getsu chôsa] .
- Naikaku Sôridaijin Kanbô Kôhôshitsu (ed.) (1973b): *Fujin ni kansuru ishiki chôsa*. Vol. 2. Tôkyô Naikaku Sôridaijin Kanbô Kôhôshitsu. [=Yoron chôsa hokokusho shôwa 47 nen 10 getsu chôsa] .
- Naikaku Sôridaijin Kanbô Kôhôshitsu (ed.) (1976): *Fujin ni kansuru yoron chôsa*. Tôkyô: Naikaku Sôridaijin Kanbô Kôhôshitsu. [=Yoron chôsa hokoku-sho shôwa 51- nen 8- gatsu chôsa] .
- Naikaku Sôridaijin Kanbô Kôhôshitsu (ed.) (1981): *Fujin ni kansuru yoron chôsa*. Tôkyô: Naikaku Sôridaijin Kanbô Kôhôshitsu. [=Yoron chôsa hokoku-sho shôwa 54- nen 5- getsu chôsa, shôwa 54- nen 10- getsu chôsa] .
- Naikaku Sôridaijin Kanbô Kôhôshitsu (ed.) (1984): *Fujin ni kansuru yoron chôsa*. Tôkyô: Naikaku Sôridaijin Kanbô Kôhôshitsu. [=Yoron chôsa hokoku-sho shôwa 59-nen 5-getsu chôsa] .
- Naikaku Sôridaijin Kanbô Kôhôshitsu (ed.) (1985): *Fujin ni kansuru yoron chôsa (II)* . Tôkyô: Naikaku Sôridaijin Kanbô Kôhôshitsu. [=Yoron chôsa hokoku-sho shôwa 59-nen

9-getsu chōsa] .

Naikaku Sōridaijin Kanbō Kōhōshitsu (ed.) (1987) : *Josei ni kansuru yoron chōsa*. Tōkyō: Naikaku Sōridaijin Kanbō Kōhōshitsu. [=Yoron chōsa hōkoku-sho shōwa 62-nen 3-getsu chōsa] .

Naikaku Sōridaijin Kanbō Kōhōshitsu (ed.) (1990) : *Josei ni kansuru yoron chōsa*. Tōkyō: Naikaku Sōridaijin Kanbō Kōhōshitsu. [=Yoron chōsa hōkoku-sho heisei 2-nen 9-getsu chōsa] .

NHK Hōsō Bunka Kenkyūjo (1994) : 'Nihonjin no ishiki 1993' chōsa tanjun shūkei kekka. In: *Hōsō kenkyū to chōsa*. (Tōkyō) . Vol.44. No.5. p.56-70.

NHK Yoron Chōsa Bu (1991) : *Gendai Nihon no ishiki kōzō (Dai san ban)*. Tōkyō: Nihon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai. [=NHK Books 614] .

Nishi, Toshio (1982) : *Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945-1952*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.

Ölschleger, Dieter et al. (forthcoming) : *Individualität und Egalität im gegenwärtigen Japan Untersuchungen zu Wertmustern in bezug auf Familie und Arbeitswelt*. München: Iudicium. [=Monographien aus dem Deutschen Institut für Japanstudien, 7] . [Will appear in autumn 1994] .

Ortmanns, Annelie (1994) : Rollenbilder im Wandel. Mann und Frau in japanischen Sozialkundebüchern von 1945 bis 1993. In: *Japanstudien Jahrbuch des Deutschen Instituts für Japanstudien der Philipp-Franz-von-Siebold-Stiftung*. Vol. 5, 1993. München: Iudicium. p.281-309.

Otto, Karl A. (1977) : *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO. Geschichte der ausserparlamentarischen Opposition in der Bundesrepublik 1960-70*. Frankfurt/M; New York: Campus.

Parsons, Talcott und Shils, Edward A. (ed.) : *Toward a General Theory of Action: Theoretical Foundations for the Social Sciences*. New York: Harper & Row. p.45-243. [=Harper Torchbooks. The Academic Library] [First publ. 1951] .

Parsons, Talcott, Shils, Edward A. and Olds, James (1962) : Values, Motives and Systems of Action. In: Parsons, Talcott and Shils, Edward A. (ed.) (1962) : *Toward a General Theory of Action: Theoretical Foundations for the Social Sciences*. New York: Harper & Row. S. 45-243. [=Harper Torchbooks. The Academic Library] [First publ. 1951] p. 47-243.

Rōdōshō Shokugyō Antei Kyoku (ed.) (1991) : *Gendai wakamono no shokugyō ishiki. Shokugyō ishiki no henka ni taiō suru tame ni*. Tōkyō: Kōyō Mondai Kenkyūkai

Rokeach, Milton (1973) : *The Nature of Human Values*. New York: The Free Press.

Salamon, Sonya (1975) : The Varied Groups of Japanese and German Housewives. In: *The Japan Interpreter: A Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan*. (Tōkyō) . Vol.10. No.2. p.151-170.

Sakuta, Keiichi (1972) : *Kachi no shakaigaku*. Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten.

Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentā (ed.) (1987) : *Dai 2-kai nihonjin no seikatsu kachikan chōsa*. Tōkyō: Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentā.

Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentā (ed.) (1988) : *Jibunshugi no jidai. Nihonjin no atarashii seikatsu kachikan*. Tōkyō: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha.

Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentā (ed.) (1992) : *Nihonjin no seikatsu kachikan chōsa-1991*. Tōkyō:

Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentā.

Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentā (ed.) (1993): *Samazoeru nihonjin. Dêta de yomu seikatsu kachikan no henyô*. Tōkyō: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha.

Seimei Hoken Bunka Sentā/Nomura Sōgō Kenkyūjo (ed.) (1980): *Nihonjin no seikatsu kachikan. Shōrai shakai tenbō tame ni*. Tōkyō: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha.

Sōmuchō Seishōnen Taisaku Honbu (1989): *A Summary Report of the World Youth Survey*. Tōkyō: Ōkurashō Insatsu Kyoku.

Tōkei Sūri Kenkyūjo Kokuminsei Chōsa Iinkai (ed.) (1961): *Nihonjin no kokuminsei*. Tōkyō: Shiseidō.

Tōkei Sūri Kenkyūjo Kokuminsei Chōsa Iinkai (1992): *Dai 5 Nihonjin no kokuminsei*. Tōkyō: Idemitsu Shoten.

Tsurumi, Kazuko (1970): *Social Change and the Individual: Japan before and after Defeat in World War II*. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.

Ueno Chizuko (1988): *Onnaen ga yo no naka o kaeru*. Tōkyō: Nihon Keizai Shinbun Sha.

Ueno, Chizuko (1992): Women's Networking. In: Japanisch-Deutsches Zentrum Berlin/-Vereinigung für sozialwissenschaftliche Japanforschung (ed.): *Wissenschaftliche Jahrestagung "Individualisierung in der japanischen Gesellschaft" 04.-06.12.1991*. Berlin: JDZB. [= Veröffentlichungen des Japanisch-Deutschen Zentrums Berlin; 14] . p.132-146.

Wagner, Peter (1994): *A Sociology of Modernity: Liberty and Discipline*. London; New York: Rutledge.

Yoshida, Masaaki (1967): *Kachi no shinrigakuteki kenkyū*. Tōkyō: Nihon Shinrigaku Kai . [= Shinrigaku monogurafu, 4] .