

Changing Faction Politics in Japan

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INTRODUCTION

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has appeared to be an ever ruling party in the post-war Japan, is now facing a grave crisis since its foundation in 1955. The influence-peddling scandal caused by the Recruit Company, a rapidly growing information-services conglomerate, has involved any number of politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen and forced the former prime minister Noboru Takeshita and other cabinet members to resign. Although the prosecutors could not find sufficient evidence to charge Mr. Takeshita or ex-prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone with criminal activity, it was widely believed that the two top leaders were to be indicted. Opinion polls showing the popularity of the LDP has dropped to 3.9 percent testify to general suspicion among the people eloquently.

Mr. Takeshita chose for his successor, then foreign minister Sosuke Uno who did not himself receive cash or stock from Recruit but was tainted by his close association with Mr. Nakasone, after searched in vain for a leader who was unsullied by the scandal. It is, however, reported that new prime minister Uno too who has been in office for only a month, is now considering to resign because his womanizing affair with a former geisha has been disclosed and his inferior position with the faction-led LDP makes him enormously difficult to expect sufficient political backup from his party. In the 1986 general election, the LDP won 304 of the 512 seats in the Lower House and appeared so powerful as to rule indefinitely. How has it suddenly become bogged down with endless scandals ?

A fact is that none of the LDP politicians, particularly younger ones, dares to challenge to the premiership, despite the manifest lack of leadership and latent power vacuum, which might provide them with rare opportunities for their quick rise through accelerating a realignment of factions or an alternation of generations. Usually party factions are seen as "forces which compete for the acquisition of influence over the principal institutions of intra-party government, over the formulation of party policy, and over

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the selection of party leaders and of party nominees for public office" (Zariski, 1960).

If so, the intra-party factional competition should facilitate changing power balance between factions to fill up the power vacuum. In the present case of the LDP, however, there has so far been no signs of such a dynamic competition between factions. What has been happening to the faction politics of the recent LDP? Why have LDP factions lost dynamic competition, which in turn was considered to be vital to the flexible adaptation of the party to changes of environment?

This essay attempts to answer these questions, by examining "insitutionalization" of LDP factions. Before analyzing changing structure of the LDP, let us have a brief look at general theories of factionalism in Japan.

GENERAL THEORIES OF JAPANESE FACTIONALISM

Japanese intra-party factions are called "habatsu" which derived from the root word "batsu" which can be translated as "faction" or "clique" in general. "Batsu" means a private, informal group functioning in the field of public affairs, with particularly intimate personal ties and a closed and exclusive unity oriented toward particularistic values. The group often involves quasi-familistic relationship — paternalistic protection or patronage on the part of the leader, and dependence on the leader by the followers (Ishida, 1971).

Generally speaking, in this definition of "batsu" we can find similar characteristics of clientelism. Clientelism can be defined as social grouping of markedly unequal individuals (called patron and client) in personalized reciprocal relationships. This patron-client ties are based on personal loyalty, obligation, and the exchange of unequal goods and services (Zuckerman, 1979). In terms of personalized and reciprocal relationship between the leader and the followers, Japanese "batsu" can obviously be classified as a type of clientelism. But we should not disregard important differences between "batsu" and clientelism. While a dyadic relationship as a basic unit and an exchange of goods and services between individuals as a behavioral criterion are stressed in the concept of clientelism, Japanese "batsu" is prevalently conceived as a collective unit or a corporate group in which a factor of exchange based on individualistic rational choices in clientelism (Graziano, 1975) is not so much stressed as a factor of collective belonging to or emotional participation in a specific group. In other words, "batsu" has an inherent tendency to organize and transform itself into a sort of corporate group with a rather clear collective representation. Therefore "batsu" and clientelism have common function-

al characteristics, but there is a crucial differences between these two concepts in terms of structural dynamics and emotional orientation.

In the classic model of the Japanese social structure, social anthropologist Chie Nakane argues that "batsu" only manifests a general and ubiquitous pattern of the entire social structure of Japan which is characterized by the vertically organized groups (Nakane, 1970). In this vertical group, both conformity and competition can coexist simultaneously. The personalized emotional relationship with the leader imposes conformity with his values and goals on the followers and the lack of ties linking a member with others of equal status imposes intense competition between peer members for the leader's favors and over their own loyalties. Thus the structural dynamics in the vertically organized groups of Japan is explained by the coexistence of conformity and competition. "Batsu" is considered to exhibit the same pattern.

According to this kind of general theory, factions and factionalism are inherent in the Japanese social structure, and therefore they could be found all over Japanese society. Intra-party factions too are considered as a specific case of the general category "batsu", sharing the latter's essential attributes. This view implies that formal, legal institutions certainly provide a kind of framework for politics, but informal groups such as factions represent more dynamic political processes. It is generally agreed that studies on party politics in Japan necessarily deal with factions.

However, the pan-factionalistic view of Japanese society, although it has a certain explanatory power on the formation of party factions in general, is far from perfect one. It can not explain the two important exceptional cases of the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and the Komeito, a new Buddhism-led confessional mass party, which are basically exempt from factionalism. Nor can it distinguish more ideology-oriented factions of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). Besides it disregards changing aspects of the LDP's factions.

FORMATION OF LDP FACTIONS

Japan's defeat in World War II in 1945 and the following American Occupation brought about a series of drastic changes in the framework of Japanese society and government. Above all, under the new American-influenced democratic Constitution of 1947, the Diet became "the highest organ of state power" and the prime minister would not be designated by the imperial edict but by the Diet. Now the majority party in the Diet could control state power, holding the premiership and forming the cabinet. Party politics in Japan had a fairly rich history except for the period between 1940 and 1945,

although it could not fully develop until the postwar constitutional reform was given.

No sooner had the war ended than prewar politicians began to reconstitute political parties. By the end of 1945, the JSP, the JCP, and three conservative parties had been formed. The Occupation-led democratic reforms provided unprecedentedly favorable circumstances with the left-wing parties, while bringing about unexpected difficulties for conservative politicians. Particularly the purge of "undesirable personnel from public office", ordered by the Occupation authorities in January 1946, did serious damage to them. Almost 80 percent of the conservative politicians were purged and the consequent leadership vacuum would be filled by new generation leaders, who were mostly high-ranking bureaucrats and local politicians. As the purge orders had been lifted by August 1951, many of the purged politicians returned to the political arena. This would help create in the conservative camp complicated cleavage lines : between purged and non-purged politicians, between old and new politicians (Barewald, 1959). In these cleavages we can find one of the origins of factional alignments in the LDP.

Another important reform during the Occupation, the dissolution of several huge financial combines called "zaibatsu" accelerated the formation of factions in the conservative camps. Before the war, there were clear financial linkages between the two major "zaibatsu" and the two major conservative parties : the Mitsui with the Seiyukai and the Mitsubishi with the Minseito. The "zaibatsu" secretly contributed political funds to the top party leaders. They could control single sources of funds which they used to insure loyalty and discipline of their party members. With the dissolution of the "zaibatsu," an adequate single source of funds was no longer available to a political party. Consequently, political funds began to come from relatively numerous small contributors and scatter to more individual politicians than before. The diverse channels of funds led the conservative camp to factional division.

Finally, the land reform instituted by the Occupation also contributed to developing LDP factions. The reform changed fundamentally the traditional social structure of the villages and increased the fluidity of the conservative parties. Traditionally prewar conservative politicians enjoyed geographically well defined and exclusive firm political domain in a given constituency where they could rely on their own prestige and familial ties as local elites, failed to develop party organizations. The land reform destroyed the basis of such domains, but newly created conservative parties lacked resources to fill this organizational gap at the local level. Each politician was left to his own resources and had to create his own personal support organization called "koenkai".

"Koenkai" peculiar to the LDP in particular are highly personalized and candi-

date-centered clientelistic organizations, having only loose connection with the party (Curtis, 1971). The electoral system for the Lower House worked to encourage "koenkai." According to the "medium-size constituency system," elections are conducted under a multi-member constituency (one six- and four two-member constituencies in addition to the regular three- to five-member ones) on a single non-transferable vote. It is inevitable for a large party to put up multiple candidates in the same constituency. Since it is unlikely that a substantial number of votes cross party boundaries, the multiple candidacy exacerbates competition for votes between candidates of the same party. This has led to the widespread formation of "koenkai" to defeat the rival of the same party in the same constituency and, at the same time, contributed to factional division within the party.

The above-discussed factors, however, were of lesser importance when compared to the emergence in 1955 of the LDP as the sole conservative party in Japan. Two conservative parties, the Liberals and the Democrats, merged to form the LDP chiefly because of outside pressures.

One of the pressures came from newly unified Socialists who had been split since 1951 into the Left and Right Socialist Parties. In 1955, they joined to form the JSP. Now the Socialists held over a third of the seats in the Lower House, sufficient to block the conservatives' attempts to revise the present democratic Constitution. Another pressure came from top business leaders who considered political stability as an indispensable condition for future economic growth. They wanted the conservatives united in a single party so as to keep the Socialists out of power. The business leaders had also been worried about rampant political corruption scandals over government contracts and subsidies. In order to improve such a situation, they created a single formal channel through which all political funds for the conservatives should flow in January 1951. The single channel necessitated a single conservative party as the receiver of contributions.

Since the formation of the LDP was forced by external factors, the new party not only had insufficient time to resolve persistent internal divisions, but was also unable to decide even the first presidency. The party had to leave the leadership post vacant until a next party congress. Before the merger, the party presidents had been chosen by party elders through consultations, but the custom failed to work in the new LDP and the leader had to be elected. The introduction of presidential election intensified factional conflicts all the more and made factional formations clearer (Thayer, 1969). Franchise for the election was given to only a small number of about five hundred people, composed of Diet members and two representatives from each prefectural federation. In the early

stages the membership to the factions was essentially limited to the members of the Diet, to those of the Lower House in particular. Small number of membership inevitably strengthened leader-follower relationship based on exchange of limited goods and services, namely, campaign supports, funds, appointments and votes. Moreover, since the LDP as a "party in power" (Fukui, 1970) controlled huge resources of the government, none of its factions wanted to risk the party's loss of power by splitting it. That the JSP seemed in ascendancy also helped prevent winning factions from expelling losing ones from the party.

DEVELOPMENT OF FACTIONS

Immediately after the merger of the conservative parties in 1955, factional ties were so loose that each politician could even be an overlapping member of factions. No faction was more than a friendship club which started with a series of banquets and weekend trips to resorts. It had no rigid organization. Such a bond of friendship without formal organizations was soon found too fragile to maintain firmly every member's allegiance. By late 1957, most of the factions had created their own headquarters in the hotels of Tokyo and tried to formalize their organizations.

As the formal structure of the faction began to emerge, the leader-follower relationship became hierarchically systematized. The position of a follower in the hierarchy was ultimately determined by the faction leader, although the latter took into consideration the former's age and times he had been elected. Therefore, the leader's personality played the most significant role in the faction's life. Despite the great discretion of the faction leader, the factions became institutionalized, equipping itself with "a headquarter, regular meeting, a known membership, an established structure, and firm discipline" (Thayer, 1969).

Factional competition centered around the party's presidential election, since stakes were high. The LDP presidency virtually meant the premiership of Japan and the outcome of the elections worked as the decisive factor in allocating important posts of the party and government to different factions.

Moreover, since no faction was large enough to control the party by itself, coalition-making between factions was inevitable before a presidential election. The winning coalition formed the mainstream of the party and controlled the key posts. As a rule, with each presidential election, old coalitions were broken and a new mainstream emerged. Thus the boundary between the mainstream and the anti-mainstream was so

fluid that losing factions always had chances to rejoin the mainstream at the next election.

This made it difficult for the mainstream factions to monopolize all of the key posts and helped forming conventions according to which a spoils system peculiar to the LDP functioned. There were about 200 posts in the Diet, party, and cabinet. Of these most important were 19 (20 from 1974) cabinet ministerial portfolios and 3 top party posts: the secretary-general, the chairman of the executive council, and the chairman of the policy affairs research council. The faction led by the party president or a larger influential faction in the mainstream coalition usually obtained most desirable posts, such as the secretary-general and the cabinet portfolios of finance, foreign affairs, and international trade and industry. The remaining cabinet portfolios were allocated not only to the mainstream factions but also to the anti-mainstream factions. In principle, allocation was based upon the sizes of factions, although their varied relationships with the presidential faction made great difference in allocation process. Basically the same criterion was applied to appointments to other minor posts in the Diet, party, and government. This allocation system, now called "factional equilibrium-oriented allocation system", both mitigated factional conflicts and legitimized factional formation of the LDP.

Besides these posts were allocated on a faction rather than individual basis. As mentioned above, within the faction it was essentially left to its leader to decide how to distribute its share of posts. But in reality distribution of posts, particularly minor ones, came to be done almost automatically in accordance with seniority in terms of both Diet membership and affiliation with the faction. The faction leader needed to make distribution seem fair in order to keep unity and competitiveness of his faction by preventing dissatisfaction and eventual defections of the rank and file (Fukui, 1978).

In sum, the allocation system, developed after the introduction of the presidential election, institutionalized factional competition within the LDP, which in turn structured the party's factionalism.

CHANGING FACTION POLITICS IN THE 1980s

In the 1960s there were as many as ten factions in the LDP. Their number has since been reduced to only four major factions, Takeshita, Nakasone, Miyazawa, Abe, one minor faction led by Komoto, and one small group led by Nikaido (**Table 1**). Needless to say, as the number of factions decreased, each has more members than before (**Table 2**). Every one of the existing factions is inherited, not created, by a new generation leader.

It has become too difficult and constly to build a new faction from scratch (Iseri, 1988).

Table 1
Geneology of factions (1955-1989)

1955	1965	1975	1985	1989
<i>Former Kaishinto groups</i>				
Miki-----			Komoto-----	
Kono-----	Nakasone-----			
	-Sonoda-----	*		
<i>Former Democratic Party groups</i>				
Ishibashi-----	*			
Kishi-----	Fukuda-----		Abe-----	
	-Fujiyama-----	*		
	-Kawashima-----	*		
<i>Former Liberal Party groups</i>				
Sato-----		Tanaka-----		Takeshita-
				-Nikaido---
Ikeda-----	Maeo-----	Ohira-Suzuki-----		Miyazawa-----
Ishii-----		*		
Ono-----	Funada-----	*		
	-Murakami ---	Mizuta---	*	

Source : Hirobumi Iseri, *Habatsu Saihensei*, Tokyo: Chuokoronsha, 1988, p. 11.

Note : Asterisk shows extinction.

In the 1960s, it was widely believed that the most optimal size for a faction ranged from 20 to 50 members. 20 was considered as the minimum number for a faction to obtain at least one ministerial portfolio on the principle of proportionate size, whereas 50 was presumed as the upper limit that a faction could supply political funds and avoid competition between its own members in the same constituency (Watanabe, 1964).

Since the 1970s, however, this empirical law has been broken so radically that the Tanaka faction could boast 140 members in 1986. Now the Takeshita faction has 120 members and three other major factions each has between 84 and 89. What made it possible to create such an oligopolistic situation in the LDP's factional world ?

According to Michisada Hirose, a journalist, in terms of the size, the factional system of the LDP has evolved through three distinct phases. The first phase from 1955 to 1978 was characterized by competition among small and medium-sized factions with

less than 50 members (Until 1972 members of the Upper House did not always join factions). The second phase from 1978 to 1987 was characterized by predominance of one large faction led by Tanaka. The third phase since 1987 to the present is distinct in power-sharing by four large factions (Ishikawa & Hirose, 1989).

Table 2
Numerical strength of the factions

faction	1972	1983	1988
Tanaka	93 (45)	114 (52)	
(Takeshita)			121 (49)
(Nikaido)			14 (3)
Fukuda	88 (33)	67 (25)	
(Abe)			89 (30)
Ohira	45 (20)		
(Suzuki)		77 (28)	
(Miyazawa)			89 (28)
Nakasone	39	56 (7)	88 (25)
Miki	38 (11)		
(Komoto)		36 (8)	30 (6)
Shiina	18		
Mizuta	13		
Funada	9		
Ishii	9		
Ishihara		6	
None	10	38 (16)	14 (3)

Source : Masumi Ishikawa & Michisada Hirose, *Jiminto*, Tokyo : Iwanamishoten, 1989, p. 214.

Note : All Diet members ; Number in parenthesis shows members of the Upper House.

The above-mentioned oligopolistic situation originated from the second phase. The period was closely connected with the personal fate of the indicted ex-prime minister, Kakuei Tanaka, in the Lockheed corruption scandal (Johnson, 1986). Since 1976 when he was arrested, he decided to enlarge his faction so as to be able to protect himself, exercising indirect influence upon the trial under way. But his personal will should not be overestimated as a determining factor of the larger size of factions. For there were structural changes which encouraged factions to expand.

One important change was the introduction of a primary election proposed in 1976 by prime minister Takeo Miki, a sworn enemy of Tanaka. It was meant to reduce factional power and use of money in choosing the party president. In the first primary

election of 1978, the candidacy required support of twenty or more Diet members. The new rule made it virtually impossible for small factions to survive. The situation has become even worse since 1981 when a candidate had to be recommended by fifty or more Diet members.

Another change was in the pattern of political funding. A 1976 revision of the law regulating political funds, also proposed by prime minister Miki, set ceilings on the amount of contributions to political organizations by interest groups. As Gerald L. Curtis has pointed out (Curtis, 1988), it has broken the monopolization of funding channels by factional leaders. At the same time the revision required individual politicians to raise a large share of their funds for themselves. Moreover, it coincided with a major shift in the source of political funds. While the importance of funds from the business establishment declined, contributions from the local businessmen increased remarkably. The new trend provided individual politicians with opportunities to develop their own sources in local businessmen. Curtis states that these changes in political funding removed one of the major constraints on faction membership. Nowadays the principal role of the faction in fund raising is not distributing political money from the leader, but assisting its members in developing their own channels. Senior members with cabinet experience are expected not only to raise his own funds but also to contribute a certain share of funds to the faction.

The growth in size inevitably necessitated faction to reform its internal structure. For instance, in 1986 the Tanaka faction had 140 members. It was much larger than the second largest party in the Diet, the JSP having 127 Dietmen. Clearly the faction could no longer depend solely on personal ties to maintain its unity.

One of the structural reforms was introduction of faction's general secretaryship. The Tanaka faction created it first time in 1983 for the purpose of taking charge of its factional administration. Other factions soon followed the suit. Now it is so well established that secretaries-general of factions meet regularly to discuss not only interfactional affairs but the party's general policies.

Another reform was that board of executive directors was created and empowered to convene faction's general meeting and to control admission to it. The reform established a collegial decision-making system, while at the same time further tightening factional discipline on the individual members. Now every faction even has its own statute. Besides, as stated earlier, internal structure of faction was hierarchically systematized in accordance with seniority in the election times. Now factions perform some functions of political parties as if they themselves were parties. The functions of factions have

changed drastically.

CONCLUSION

Examining the LDP's political achievements in the postwar era, political scientists Seizaburo Sato and Tetsuhisa Matsuzaki find one of the most important aspects of its development in "institutionalization of the LDP." They argue that the "institutionalization" is demonstrated by the routinization of allocation system based on seniority rule (Sato & Matsuzaki, 1986). Their argument has such an implication that the LDP has transformed itself from a "backward" personalist to a "modern" democratic party in its own way, through the "institutionalization" of itself. As we have seen, however, it was not the party but the factional division and competition within the party that the allocation system had institutionalized.

Furthermore, the process of institutionalizing the factions represented simultaneously that of depriving the LDP of cohesiveness. Using the terms of Richard Rose, each LDP faction has now become a "self-consciously organized body, with a measure of cohesion and discipline thus resulting" (Rose, 1964). Conversely, the party has become more and more fragmented despite the repeated criticism against factionalism and proposals for abolition of factions by the party formal organs (one of the most important proposals was that of Takeo Miki, then secretary-general, for modernization of the party in 1965).

Nevertheless we must concede that the LDP has become more than a mere coalition of factions. The degree of internal differentiation and specialization in the policy-making process within the LDP has been particularly remarkable. In fact the LDP's policy affairs research council now has 32 commissions and 17 divisions. Besides it is said that certain senior Diet members have developed a great deal of expertise and to exercise strong influence on specific policy areas, taking a leadership role in the commissions of the LDP's policy affairs research council (Inoguchi & Iwai, 1987).

This, however, does not mean that the LDP's policy-making ability has been improved, but corresponds to the very fact that the LDP's policy-making process has become fragmented. For it is the lack of comprehensive and coherent policy-making power in the party that enables individual politicians to intervene in a specific policy area. They are usually aligned with specific business lobbies, from which they, in turn, can draw political funds. LDP's politicians have become specialized in specific policy areas, not because they want to take part in designing long-term and systematic policy visions

for the party, but only because they want to exercise influence over policy-making processes of the business interests that they represent. It is not exaggerated to say that only the differentiation in economic interests, which Japan's industrial development entails, leads to specialization of LDP politicians.

Thus we must not mistake an ongoing process of internal differentiation for an organizational development of the LDP. In fact it is not the party organ but each major faction that attempts to adapt itself to such an environmental change, both training its members for specialists in a particular policy area and disposing these specialized members for every policy area.

But doing so, needless to say, each faction aims at increasing its own power in a competition with others, not improving a policy-making power of the party. Therefore we can not imagine that those specialized politicians might form policy-oriented new "tendencies," crossing the boundaries between the factions, as Sato and Matsuzaki asserted.

On the contrary, they can not be free from factions, since they are too much tied with particular fragmented business lobbies to cross the factional boundaries. If they ignore factional consensus and act independently of their factions, they can not attain, even if minute, their specific goals. For they need factional support to persuade the whole party. Therefore, the more specialized LDP politicians become, the more acutely they need factions. As factions are institutionalized, it is only natural that the party's decision-making process is subordinate to that of factions.

To the problem of the "institutionalization of factions," we may apply the model of organizational evolution that Angelo Panebianco has developed from Michels' theory in order not to analyze factions but political parties with a little alteration (Panebianco, 1988). Just like every political party, we may presume that every political faction evolves through three phases : genesis, institutionalization, and maturity.

A genetic phase is characterized by the prevalence of a personal "cause" or ambition of the faction's leader and of personalist ties with him. In this phase the faction is entirely dedicated to realization of its "cause," the followers' loyalty toward the leader becomes intense and the group often involves quasi-familistic relationship.

In other words, the participants in the faction share certain common ends, even though competition among them for favors of the leader and over their own loyalty toward the leader is enormously severe. Therefore the faction can provide itself with a very strong sense of solidarity and a persistent mobilizing power. Within the faction, a sort of collective and ideological incentives can function, even though it stems only from

the personal "cause" of the leader, partly because of its small size.

In the phase of maturity, the faction grows in size and its structure becomes bureaucratized. The faction is transformed into an organization in which its real end is converted into organizational survival. Factional ties change from fluid and personalist relationship to "a system of interest," in which the participants lose common ends and their interests diverge. The initial "cause" that the leader provided becomes vague and implicit and loses centripetal force. Besides, as the sense of solidarity disappears, selective incentives prevail over collective and ideological ones. As stated earlier, this phenomenon keeps pace with the specialization of the members and the differentiation of their interests. Using the Panebianco's term, the members of "professional type" prevails over those of activist type.

Moreover, in this phase, the leader's freedom of choice becomes remarkably conditioned by organizational constraints, and initial aggressive and adventurous strategy of the faction is replaced by that of adaptation. That is why nowadays mutual accommodation of factions tends to prevail over once intense rivalry between them.

Finally we can define the transitional phase from the genetic phase to that of maturity as the phase of "institutionalization." It is the process of articulating the members' interests while stabilizing organization. It is also the process of legitimizing the existence of factions in the party structure while structurizing the intra-factional competition. If institutionalization of LDP factions started with the routinization of allocation system, this phase has its origins earlier than we tend to assume. As already seen, the allocation system was closely connected with the introduction of the party presidential elections in 1955 when the two major conservative parties merged. That is where institutionalization of factions began. The most decisive moment, therefore, for LDP's factionalism was the formation of the LDP as a single conservative party.

Now LDP's factionalism has reached full maturity. It has become extremely difficult for individual LDP politicians to transform such a well-established factional structure. In 1976 one Upper and five Lower LDP younger Dietmen left the party to form the New Liberal Club (NLC), because they were severely critical of the LDP's endemic corruption scandals. The leader of the group, Yohei Kono, then 39 years old, seemed to many people to represent a new, modern political wave in the conservative camp. But after an ephemeral boom, the new party came to a standstill. In 1986, after ten years' struggle for survival, the sprinter group dissolved and all but one of its member went back to the LDP, because it failed to develop the model of a new conservative party based on urban middle class voters. This history discourages anyone from contemplating

to start a new conservative party all over again. It is unlikely that the LDP will split into two parties or drastically transform its structure in the foreseeable future.

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