

LOCKE'S POLITICAL THEORY AND ITS "EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS" II

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This article constitutes PART II of a discourse which attempts to clarify the relationship between Locke's political theory and his epistemology. PART I appeared in the previous issue of this journal. In PART I, I demonstrated the failure of the "foundationalist" project in which some commentators attempted to show that Locke's epistemology is the basis of his political theory. In PART II (PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE META-DISCOURSE), I shall proceed to provide an anti-foundationalist picture of Locke's discourses by describing how his political theory and his epistemology are connected. PART I and PART II form a continuous discussion defending the view that his political theory and his epistemology are united by common ties, though the one is not supported by the other.

PART II. PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE META-DISCOURSE

1. INTRODUCTION

The failure of the foundationalist project which I exposed in PART I may be attributed to the absence of any serious meta-discourse among Locke scholars. Commentators like Milam, Yolton and Tully set out to search for the epistemological foundations of Locke's political theory, after reading what other scholars and commentators had written about his discourses.¹ They might have avoided carrying out the systematically misguided project if the others had been successful in conducting a discourse about Locke's discourses. Given the absence of any serious meta-discourse, it is to be expected that some would respond to this failure in an inappropriate fashion. So I shall begin by discussing two possible responses. I shall reject them, and then proceed to make my own contributions toward the establishment of a successful meta-discourse.

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2. TWO POSSIBLE RESPONSES

2. 1 The first possible response to the failure of the foundationalist project is to abandon any attempt at establishing a link between Locke's political theory and his epistemology, and to fall back on the traditional claim that there is a fundamental inconsistency between the two. The claim of a fundamental inconsistency is at least a century old, and has been repeated more recently by such commentators as C. E. Vaughan, George Sabine and Peter Laslett.² This claim concerns the conflict that is said to exist between "rationalism" and "empiricism". It usually takes the following form: Locke is fundamentally an inconsistent thinker, because the "rationalism" of his political theory conflicts with the "empiricism" of his epistemology. But would it be right to respond to the failure of the project by repeating this claim?

The claim is certainly not a logical consequence of the failure of the project. Granted that Locke's epistemology is not the basis of his political theory, it *does not logically follow* from this that there is a fundamental inconsistency between the two. It is perfectly possible to imagine that the two are fundamentally consistent with each other while one is not the basis of the other. So one cannot defend the claim by relying on logical necessity. To defend it, one must actually point out a specific instance of fundamental inconsistency.

Most defenders of the traditional claim would cite the following instance as an instance of fundamental inconsistency: in the *Two Treatises* Locke holds that our knowledge about natural law and natural rights is "innate", whereas in Book I of the *Essay* he clearly states that no knowledge is "innate".³ It is extremely difficult, however, to defend this particular claim. For there is no good reason to believe that Locke treats the knowledge of natural law and natural rights as "innate" in the *Two Treatises*. To defend this belief, one would have to create an over-refined interpretation by seizing upon a very small segment of what Locke wrote. One might refer to Section 11 of the *Second Treatise*, where he wrote: "[Cain] cries out, *Every one that findeth me, shall slay me*; so plain was it writ in the Hearts of all Mankind" (ST, 11). One might concentrate on the phrase "writ in the Hearts of all Mankind" (as Laslett does in his note to ST, 11), and ascribe to Locke the view that the knowledge of natural law is innate. Yet this ascription cannot be justified. As Hans Aarsleff has correctly pointed out, Locke used the phrase "writ in the hearts" because it was itself biblical and fitting in the context.⁴ The mere appearance of the phrase does not imply his concession to the innatist view of knowledge. In the third essay in the *Essays on the Law of Nature*, Locke denied that the law of nature is

"inscribed in the minds of men".⁵ This view remained unchanged in his mature work, the *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, where he specifically warned us not to identify his denial of "an innate Law" with a denial of "a Law of Nature" (*Essay*, I, iii, 13). We have ample evidence to believe that he had a consistently anti-innatist view about the knowledge of the law of nature (as well as knowledge in general). For him, human beings must exercise their natural faculties in order to acquire the knowledge of the law of nature.⁶

I have criticized a specific version of the claim of a fundamental inconsistency. This is probably the most popular version of the claim though there may be other versions as well. Defenders of the claim (or a similar claim about Locke's rationalism in political theory and his empiricism in epistemology) frequently neglect to specify the aspects in which his political theory conflicts with his epistemology. Without trying to examine other possible versions of the claim, I should like to raise a more general objection at this point. I shall criticize the assumption underlying the claim itself, i. e., the assumption that if a "rationalist" element of Locke's political theory conflicts with an "empiricist" element of his epistemology, then this conflict represents a fundamental inconsistency of his system of thought. If this assumption is shown to be unsound, then we can radically undermine the claim.

Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that we have successfully shown that there is a specific conflict between Locke's "rationalist" political theory and his "empiricist" epistemology. But even if we have shown this, it does not automatically prove that the conflict in question is *fundamental* to his system of thought. The conflict could be said to be fundamental or central to his system, *if* the distinction between rationalism and empiricism is of central importance to the system as a whole (which comprehends political theory and epistemology). I have already criticized the claim that Locke's epistemology is the basis of his political theory. Furthermore, I shall show later that the fundamental links between his political theory and his epistemology are *not* epistemological. Given these, the conflict between rationalism and empiricism cannot be regarded as a *fundamental* inconsistency of his system of thought. The strategy of showing a conflict between Locke's "rationalist" political theory and his "empiricist" epistemology, even if it worked successfully, could not reveal any fundamental inconsistency of his thought. The post-Lockean distinction *within* epistemology, i. e., the distinction between rationalism and empiricism, cannot be used to reveal a fundamental interdisciplinary conflict, i. e., a conflict *between* his political theory and epistemology.

It should be added here that those who defend the traditional claim often speak of

Locke's "philosophical" inconsistency (rather than his "fundamental" inconsistency). They often say that he is "philosophically" inconsistent in providing a rationalist political theory and an empiricist epistemology. What they mean by "philosophical" is, roughly speaking, epistemological. So they can defend their claim about his "philosophical" inconsistency (as distinct from a claim about his "fundamental" inconsistency), if they successfully show that a rationalist element of his political theory conflicts with an empiricist element of his epistemology. But it is clear from what I said in the preceding paragraph that a "philosophical" inconsistency (in the sense of an epistemological inconsistency) cannot be regarded as a fundamental inconsistency of his thought.⁷

I have raised two objections to show that we cannot defend the traditional claim of a fundamental inconsistency. The first objection concerns a specific version of the claim, while the second concerns the assumption underlying the claim itself. These objections undermine the claim. It would be wrong, therefore, to rely on this claim in responding to the failure of the foundationalist project.

2.2 The second possible response to the failure of the project is to see it as the failure of the particular commentators I discussed, and to retain the hope that a very skillful commentator will one day be able to discover in the *Essay* the epistemological foundations of Locke's political theory. One might suggest that I only demonstrated (in PART I) the failure of the three particular foundationalists' attempts without demonstrating the necessity of the failure of any future attempt. So it seems plausible to suggest that there might be a successful future attempt of the foundationalist kind. Is this suggestion well-founded?

First of all, it is misleading to describe the foundationalist attempt as an attempt to "discover" the epistemological basis of Locke's political theory in the *Essay*. Given the fact that his *Essay* and *Two Treatises* do not exhibit any immediate epistemological link, the foundationalist would have to undertake a reconstructive (rather than descriptive) task. So the question we must answer is a compound one: Can a future commentator discover in the *Essay* the kind of epistemological doctrine which might be interpreted as the epistemological basis of Locke's political theory? But since he can obviously find *an* epistemological doctrine in the *Essay*, the crucial question to ask is why he should try to *interpret* a particular epistemological doctrine *as* the epistemological basis of his political theory. No evidence suggests that Locke *actually* used a particular doctrine of the *Essay* to underpin his political theory. A future commentator will, therefore, construct a possible or fictitious (rather than actual) basis of his political theory by using the material presented in the *Essay*. Is it likely that he can construct such a basis? Even if he can, is

it desirable to do so? I should like to address these questions below.

Suppose that we look for an epistemological doctrine in the *Essay* which can possibly be interpreted (or re-interpreted) as supporting, or justifying, a portion of Locke's political theory. It is difficult, if not impossible, to discover such a doctrine. Besides the candidates I examined in my critical discussion of the foundationalist project (PART I), what doctrine do we have? Here as well as elsewhere, we mean by an "epistemological" doctrine a doctrine about ideas or knowledge. Locke's account of a man's "liberty" in the *Essay*, II, xxi, for instance, may be said to have a certain connection with his account of a man's "liberty" (to dispose of his person or goods) in the *Second Treatise* (58, 63). The former account, however, is not epistemological. One might suggest, then, that his account of the idea of power, as distinct from his "digression" into a discussion of liberty, necessity and will, can be interpreted as an epistemological basis of his political theory. This suggestion is not utterly implausible, since the concept of power (as we shall see later) is fundamental to his discourses including his discourse on property and government. So let us see what will happen if we take this suggestion seriously.

Locke's account of the idea of power, as distinct from his "digression", is primarily an account of how we come to have the idea of power (*Essay*, II, xxi, 1). Unlike Hume, he does not challenge the view that the idea of power is clear or intelligible. What Locke does in the *Two Treatises* is to use the idea of power or the word "power". What, then, is the nature of the connection between his account of the origin of the idea of power and his political theory? The connection is not causal. No evidence suggests that Locke used the idea of power in his political theory, as a result of his particular account of the origin of the idea of power. On the contrary, he actually used the idea of power long before he worked out the particular account in the *Essay*.⁸ The connection is not logical, either. Anyone can use the idea of power, or the word "power", even if he cannot give a true account of how we acquire the idea of power. Locke's use of the idea of power in the *Two Treatises* is logically independent of the truth, or falsity, of his account of the origin of the idea in the *Essay*. Thus what we can say about the supposed connection is as follows: Locke's account of the origin of the idea of power can be treated *as if* it were a justificatory device for his use of that idea in his political theory. In short, his account of the idea of power is a fictitious, epistemological basis of his political theory.

As we have seen above, it is possible to create a fictitious basis of Locke's political theory though it is difficult to find a good candidate for the basis. Granted that it is possible to create such a basis, the crucial question is whether it is desirable to do so. There are reasons why this "as-if" treatment should be regarded as undesirable. First, it

does not help us clarify any part of Locke's political theory. It only satisfies our academic inclination, i. e., the inclination to treat his discourses according to the foundationalist picture of philosophy. Secondly, if we forget that a reconstruction is based on our inclination, it will serve to cherish illusions. We may believe, for instance, that Locke probably gave an account of the origin of the idea of power to justify his use of the idea in his political theory. We saw in PART I the extent to which the three commentators suffer from various illusions. Thirdly, if we do not wish to cherish illusions, we must keep reminding ourselves that the reconstruction has no real basis in his thought. But why should we take this twisted, indirect approach to his discourses? Why should we create a fiction only to destroy it afterwards? A fictitious construct temporarily satisfies our inclination, but it seems useless otherwise.

I have shown above how futile it is to construct an epistemological basis of Locke's political theory out of his epistemology. Although I have examined only one possible future attempt, we may safely infer that *any* future attempt of the foundationalist kind will be futile. As his writings stand, no epistemological doctrine in the *Essay* supports his political theory in any direct or explicit manner. (This point will become even clearer, when I come to offer a description of how his epistemology and his political theory really hang together.) Given the lack of any direct or explicit epistemological support, any future attempt is bound to create a fiction. Once we create a fiction, we may feel that we have solved a "problem" of discovery or reconstruction. Yet this "problem" is a pseudo-problem which arises out of the prior confused belief that Locke's political theory actually rests, or should ideally rest, on his epistemology. As soon as we abandon this belief, our "problem" gets dissolved and we no longer need to struggle to create a superfluous fiction. We might be tempted to use some other doctrine in the *Essay* as a justificatory device for his political theory. But no "as-if" construct would serve to clarify the real relationship between his epistemology and his political theory, unless at least a part of the real relationship is already known. A continued "as-if" treatment, therefore, would serve to solve our pseude-problems without clarifying the real relationship.

To conclude the foregoing critical discussion, it is idle to hope that a skillful foundationalist will one day be able to construct the epistemological basis of Locke's political theory by using the material from the *Essay*. A metaphor may be appropriately used to characterize the status of a stubborn foundationalist who continues to construct a fictitious base. He is "addicted" to a metaphilosophical drug called the foundationalist picture of philosophy. He may feel that he can "construct" something valuable, and solve

his "problems" without actually giving up the drug. But he needs a total conversion. He must give up the drug which creates his problems in the first place. Then he can begin to see how his objects—Locke's discourses—*really* hang together. To engage in a healthy, straightforward meta-discourse rather than a twisted, indirect meta-discourse, we shall give up the old foundationalist picture of philosophy.

3. A DESCRIPTIVE META-DISOURSE

Having rejected the two possible responses, I shall now try to make my own contributions toward the establishment of a successful meta-discourse. Instead of prescribing a particular metaphilosophy for Locke's discourses, I shall try to describe how they are really connected. A new picture of his discourses will emerge from my description. We may treat it as his *de facto* metaphilosophy or his practical metaphilosophy; namely, as the kind of metaphilosophy which he *practiced* in producing his discourses, as distinct from the metaphilosophy which he preached.

In describing the relationship between the discourses, I shall take what might be regarded as a Wittgensteinian policy. The policy is this: DO NOT THINK, BUT LOOK CAREFULLY. On the one hand, I shall try to free myself as much as possible from the various preconceptions which I might impose on Locke; on the other hand, I shall look at his discourses as carefully as possible. Since my meta-discourse is more descriptive than reconstructive, it will rely on a number of quotations from his writings. The reader should be prepared to encounter extensive quotations in the following pages.

Locke's political discourse and his epistemological discourse are largely independent of each other, and sharp boundaries separate the two discourses. But these discourses are horizontally connected by a few non-epistemological links. To discover those links requires a great deal of "looking". We shall see that his discourses are linked by a common method of inquiry, i. e., the method of setting bounds to the power of an agent. We shall also see that they are linked by a common purpose, i. e., the purpose of ending disputes between agents. These are the two basic features common to Locke's discourses. Contrary to the belief of the foundationalists, these common features can be best expressed in the vocabulary of his political discourse: In discussing knowledge as well as politics, he prescribes each agent's proper domain (or "property") and sets bounds to its power. Then he tries to establish peace (or "justice") among contending agents by confining the power of each agent to its proper domain. Let us confirm these common features by looking at his discourses.

3. 1 A Recovery of Parallelism

If we look at the *Essay* and the *Two Treatises*, we are struck by the fact that Locke handles two distinct subject-matters in a similar manner. The subject-matter of the *Essay* is the power of human understanding or knowledge, whereas the subject-matter of the *Two Treatises* is the power of a political agent or government. These distinct subject-matters are handled in a similar fashion. In the *Essay*, Locke states: it is “my Purpose to enquire into the Original, Certainty, and Extent of humane Knowledge; together, with the Grounds and Degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Assent” (I, i, 2; emphasis added). We can express Locke’s central purpose by offering the following descriptive title to the *Essay*: “An Essay concerning the Original, Certainty, and Extent of humane Knowledge”. The title of the *Second Treatise* is very similar to this. Let us first look at the title-page of the 1698 edition of the *Two Treatises* (which Laslett has reproduced in his critical edition). It says: “TWO TREATISES OF Government: In the Former, *The False Principles and Foundation* OF Sir Robert Filmer, And His FOLLOWERS, ARE Detected and Overthrown. The Latter is an ESSAY CONCERNING The True Original, Extent, and End OF Civil-Government.” This clearly indicates that Locke’s own political theory, as distinct from his critique of Filmer’s doctrine of absolute monarchy, concerns the “original, extent, and end” of civil government. There is also a separate title-page inserted before the *Second Treatise*: “AN ESSAY Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End OF Civil Government”.

It is clear, then, that the *Essay* primarily deals with the “original, certainty, and extent” of human knowledge, whereas Locke’s political theory deals with the “original, extent, and end” of civil government. The parallelism is striking. The only difference, apart from the difference between human knowledge and civil government, is the difference between “certainty” and “end”. Locke does not take the view “certainty” is the purpose of human knowledge (*Essay*, I, i, 5 & 6); hence, the exact parallel does not hold. Yet it is fairly clear that in dealing with human knowledge and civil government, he tries to show how X originates, how far X extends, and what the end-point (certainty or purpose) of X is, where X is either human knowledge or civil government.

I should like to emphasize that the descriptive title of the *Second Treatise* is just as important as the descriptive title I have given to the *Essay*. This emphasis is needed because Peter Laslett has dismissed the significance of the title of the *Second Treatise*. He has treated the separate title of the *Second Treatise* as Locke’s insignificant afterthought, on the ground that the “exact and subtle methods of analytical bibliography” have shown that the title-page of the *Second Treatise* was “a later insertion, made in the course of

printing".⁹ Despite Laslett's detective work, the methods of analytical bibliography can only show when the title-page was *printed* and *inserted*. Locke himself *thought* about the "origin", "extent", and "end" of government long before the title-page was printed. I shall present historical evidence for this, and restore the significance of the separate title of the *Second Treatise*. In presenting the relevant evidence, I shall try to show that the "origin", "extent", and "end" of government (or political power) remained an important theme of his political thought for many years.

Nearly thirty years before the title-page of the *Second Treatise* was "printed" and "inserted", Locke began to think about the "origin" and "extent" of political power. In his first political writing, the *First Tract on Government* (1660), he makes use of the idea that "the magistrate's power" is "derived from, or conveyed to him by, the consent of the people" (*F. Tract*, p. 122). He uses it as a hypothesis for the sake of his (illiberal) argument that the "magistrate of every nation" must "have an *absolute* and *arbitrary* power over all the indifferent actions of his people" in their religious worship (p. 123). He already uses the expressions like the "extent" and "limitation" of the legislator's authority, and "its original" (p. 123). In the *Second Tract*, probably written a few years later, Locke gives further considerations on the "sources of civil power", namely, the origin of political power as distinct from ecclesiastical power. He puts down a few possible accounts of the origin of political power, without committing himself to any one of them (*S. Tract*, pp. 229f.). But it is clear that Locke *thought* about the "origin" of political power. In his view, the question regarding the legislative agent's power over "indifferent things" in religious worship can be "examined a little more profoundly" if "the sources of civil power" are "investigated" and "the very foundations of authority uncovered" (*S. Tract*, p. 229).

In 1667, Locke wrote a draft titled "An Essay concerning Toleration". It contains main arguments for toleration which we find in his published work, *A Letter concerning Toleration*. In this draft, he also presents a brief outline of his political theory, and refers to the extent and end of civil government (as distinct from ecclesiastical government). The "end of erecting of government", or the "purpose" which the "power, and authority of the magistrate" ought to serve, is "the good, preservation and peace of men in that [i. e., civil rather than ecclesiastical] society" (Bourne, *Life*, vol. 1, p. 174). The "magistrate ought to do or meddle with nothing but barely in order to securing the civil peace and property of his subjects" (p. 175). The "extent" of "politics and government" is limited to things of this world rather than things of the next world. The legislative agent, or the magistrate, is an "umpire" who is only concerned about "my well-being in this world"

insofar as it relates to the well-being of other men; in short, his power extends only to the “public good”. It “would be injustice if he should, any further than it concerns the good of the public, enjoin men the care of their private civil concerns, or force them to a prosecution of their own private interests”; the legislative agent “only protects them from being invaded and injured in them by others” (p. 176). Thus rudiments of Locke’s mature political theory can be found in the 1667 essay.¹⁰

Locke developed his political theory and his theory of toleration in a parallel fashion. In 1673-4, he offered an analysis of political power and ecclesiastical power by comparing one power with the other. This interesting parallel analysis is presented in his paper, “On the Difference between Civil and Ecclesiastical Power, Indorsed Excommunication, Dated 1673-4”.¹¹ It is the basis of the comparison which Locke makes between the two powers in *A Letter concerning Toleration*. For the purpose of our discussion, we only need to note that in this paper Locke uses a phraseology similar to the “origin, extent, and end” of civil government. As he puts it, his comparative analysis shows “the whole end, latitude, and extent of civil power” on the one hand, and “the whole end, latitude, and extent of ecclesiastical power” on the other (King, *Life*, vol. 2, p. 111).

It is clear from the evidence presented above that Locke thought about the “origin”, “extent”, and “end” of civil government long before the title-page of the *Second Treatise* was “inserted” in the course of printing. Laslett’s dismissal of the title as an “after-thought” is inappropriate, even if we consider the contents of the *Second Treatise* alone. Locke frequently makes use of the words like the “original” (or “beginning”), “end”, and “extent” (or “bounds”) in the text, and we cannot explain the structure of his political theory without using those categories. In Section 4 of the *Second Treatise*, he states: “TO understand Political Power right, and derive it from its *Original*, we must consider what State all Men are naturally in” (ST, 4; emphasis added). The titles of Ch. VIII, Ch. IX, and Ch. XI are the following: “Of the *Beginning* of Political Societies”, “Of the *Ends* of Political Society and Government”, and “Of the *Extent* of the Legislative Power” (emphasis added). The underlined words, of course, appear in the main body of the text as well. (See ST, 99ff. for “beginning”; 124, 131, 134-5 for “end”; and 131, 135, 142 for the “extent” of political power, or the “bounds” within it can be exercised.)

In order to complete the restoration of the significance of the separate title of the *Second Treatise*, let us look at Locke’s other mature works. They show that he regarded “the original, extent, and end” of civil government as the proper characterization of the subject-matter of his own political theory. In *A Letter concerning Toleration*, Locke

frequently speaks of the "original", "bounds", and "end" of legislative power (*Works*, IV, pp. 21, 42 & 44). Elsewhere, he describes his political theory as dealing with the general branch of politics "containing the original of societies, and the rise and extent of political power" (*Works*, III, p. 296).

I have offered ample historical evidence to defend the view that Locke's political theory can be appropriately described as being concerned with the "original, extent, and end" of civil government (or political power). We can also trace the parallel theme of his epistemology — the "original, certainty, and extent" of human knowledge — back to early drafts of the *Essay*. In *Draft A* (1671), Locke briefly states that he considers "the extent of humane understanding & what it is capable of" (Sect. 27, p. 92). Beyond happiness and misery, "we have noe [sic] concernment either of knowing or being" (Sect. 10, p. 56). In *Draft B* (1671), he explicitly states the purpose of his epistemological inquiry by using the same phraseology that we find in the *Essay*: it is "my purpose to enquire into the Originall, Certainty & Extent of humane knowledg [sic]" (Sect 2, p. 37). Thus it is clear that the theme of the "original, certainty, and extent" of human knowledge occupied Locke's thought quite a number of years, just as the theme of the "original, extent, and end" of civil government did. The parallelism is not accidental, given the weight of the historical evidence I have provided above. In the following section, I shall try to unfold the implications of the parallelism and clarify the relationship between Locke's political theory and his epistemology.

3. 2 *Details of Parallelism*

It is not difficult to imagine that Locke expected us to treat his discourses separately. He probably expected us to understand each discourse in its own right. Here we may draw attention to the fact that the *Two Treatises* makes no reference to the *Essay*. This fact may be explained as a natural consequence of the anonymous publication of the *Two Treatises*. Since the *Essay* was published with his name on its title-page, it would have been pointless for him to make any such reference. But what is significant is that he did not mention *any* epistemological principle or doctrine in the *Two Treatises*. The two discourses appear to be separate and distinct if we take seriously what he says in the *Essay*: "great Provinces of the intellectual World" are "wholly separate and distinct one from another" (IV, xxi, 5). Given the apparent separateness and distinctness of each discourse, we can relate the two discourses only by means of the general categories he uses in both discourses. Specific categories he uses in one discourse alone cannot bridge the gulf between the two discourses. Once we focus on his general categories, we may be

able to discover what is common to the two discourses. If we can discover what is common, then we can relate what appears to be unrelated.

The general category which dominates Locke's inquiry is "power": the power of an intelligent agent (or the power of understanding) and the power of a political agent (or the legislative power). His central concern is to set limits, or bounds, to the power of an agent; or more precisely, to the manner by which an agent exercises its power. In epistemology as well as political theory, he is opposed to the view that an agent can legitimately exercise its power without a limit. He tries to set limits to the activities of an agent, an intelligent agent or a political agent. By this method, he tries to achieve a practical (rather than theoretical) purpose. He tries to end the disputes which tend to arise from an agent's transgression of the limits. Human knowledge (properly so called) consists in an intelligent agent's exercise of his power within certain limits. Similarly, civil government (properly so called) consists in a political agent's exercise of its power within certain limits.

It goes without saying that the *Essay* discusses a variety of problems, just as the *Two Treatises* does. But these works exhibit Locke's predominant concern with the limits, or "bounds", of what an agent can and should do. They also reveal his practical purpose of settling disputes, and encouraging the activities of an agent within its proper sphere. These, in my view, are the *central* features which Locke's epistemological inquiry *shares* with his political theory. I shall defend and elaborate this view by showing how these features manifest themselves in the *Essay* and the *Two Treatises*. I shall first turn to the *Essay*, then to the *Second Treatise*, and finally to *A Letter concerning Toleration* to reinforce and supplement my account of the two discourses.¹²

3. 21 Locke's Attempt to Determine "the Extent of Human Knowledge", or the Bounds of the Power of Understanding

Although Locke's discourse on the origin, certainty, and extent of human knowledge (together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent) takes up a wide range of topics, there is no denying that his account of "the Extent of Humane Knowledge" (*Essay*, Bk. IV, Ch. III) is a very important part of his epistemology. If we are allowed to be very crude, we can connect Bk. I, Bk. II and Bk. III with his account of the extent of human knowledge as follows: while Bk. I is Locke's rejection of the innatist account of the origin of ideas (and Bk. III is a digression as he himself says in II, xxxiii, 19), Bk. II is his account of the true origin of ideas and propaedeutic to his attempt to determine the extent of human knowledge. Locke holds that since human knowledge

consists in "the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement, of any of our *Ideas*", it does not extend any "farther than we have *Ideas*" (IV, iii, 1). Given this view, it is understandable why he tries to show the origin and extent of our ideas first. By crudely connecting the three books to one chapter titled "Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge", we can highlight the fact that one of the central purposes of the *Essay* is to determine the extent of human knowledge.

The sheer length of the *Essay* might obscure the importance of Locke's task of limiting the scope of human knowledge. Yet he clearly states that it is the main goal he tries to achieve in his discourse. At the beginning of the *Essay*, he says:

If by this Enquiry into the Nature of the Understanding, I can discover the Powers thereof; *how far* they reach; to what things they are in any Degree proportionate; and where they fail us, I suppose it may be of use, to prevail with the busy Mind of Man, to be more cautious in *meddling with things exceeding its Comprehension*; to stop, when it is at *the utmost Extent* of its Tether; and to sit down in a quiet Ignorance of those Things, which, upon Examination, are found to be *beyond the reach of our Capacities* (*Essay*, I, i, 4; emphasis added).

He also expresses his concern with the limits, or bounds, of human understanding (hence, knowledge), when he explains the origin of the *Essay*:

Till that [a critical examination of our intellectual powers] was done I suspected we began at the wrong end, and in vain sought for Satisfaction in a quiet and secure Possession of Truths, ... whilst we let loose our Thoughts into the vast Ocean of *Being*, as if all that *boundless Extent*, were the natural, and undoubted Possession of our Understandings.... Thus Men, *extending their Enquiries beyond their Capacities*, and letting their Thoughts wander into those depths, where they can find no sure Footing; 'tis no Wonder, that they raise Questions, and multiply Disputes, which never coming to any clear Resolution, are proper only to continue and increase their Doubts, and to confirm them at last in perfect Scepticism. Whereas were the Capacities of our Understandings well considered, *the Extent of our Knowledge* once discovered, and the Horizon found, which sets the *Bounds* between the enlightened and dark Parts of Things; between what is, and what is not comprehensible by us, Men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avow'd Ignorance of the one, and employ their Thoughts and Discourse, with more Advantage and Satisfaction in the other. (I, i, 7; emphasis added.)

Let us note why Locke tries to set limits to human knowledge by examining the power of human understanding. As it is indicated above, he tries to distinguish the proper objects of human understanding from the improper objects in order to free men from endless disputes over "the vast Ocean of Being" (i. e., metaphysical and theological

disputes). He wants men to accept their ignorance in what they cannot know, and encourages them to “imploy their Thoughts and Discourse, with more Advantage and Satisfaction” in what they can know. Elsewhere, Locke explains this purpose as follows. First, if we critically survey the “Powers of our own Minds”, “we shall not be inclined” to “sit still” “in Despair of knowing any thing”, nor to “question every thing, and disclaim all Knowledge”. In other words, a critical examination of intellectual powers provides “a cure of Scepticism and Idleness” (I, i, 6). Secondly, we may hope that the critical examination will direct men’s limited intellectual powers to their “proper” subject-matter, i. e., morality or a regulation of their conducts. Locke maintains that each man’s narrowly limited capacity is sufficient for the acquisition of the knowledge of morality:

How short soever their Knowledge may come of an universal, or perfect Comprehension of whatsoever is, it yet secures their great Concernments, that they have Light enough to lead them to the Knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own Duties (I, i, 5).

Our Business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our Conduct. If we can find out those Measures, whereby a rational Creature put in that State, which Man is in, in this World, may, and ought to govern his Opinions, and Actions depending thereon, we need not be troubled, that some other things escape our Knowledge (I, i, 6).

In Book IV of the *Essay*, Locke states that “morality” is “most suited to our natural Capacities”, and it is “*the proper Science, and Business of Mankind in general*” (IV, xii, 11). By contrast, we cannot know (with certainty) whether matter can think, or whether the soul is immaterial (IV, iii, 6). In these matters as well as in the “*experimental Philosophy of physical Things*” we must rely on faith and probability (IV, iii, 6 & 27).

We may sum up Locke’s main task as follows: He examines the power of human understanding and sets limits to it, in order to put an end to endless disputes (hence, extreme scepticism and complete idleness). He additionally recommends men to use their intellectual powers in the proper domain of moral knowledge. This summary is based on what he actually stated in the beginning of the *Essay*, and also on his similar statements in *Draft B* of the *Essay* (sects. 1 & 3). It conforms to his statement about the “History” of the *Essay*: “a Subject very remote from” human understanding made it necessary to “examine our own Abilities, and see, what Objects our Understandings were, or were not fitted to deal with” (The Epistle to the Reader, p. 7). It is also in accord with James Tyrrell’s famous statement that the *Essay* originally grew out of a discussion “about the Principles of morality and reveal’d Religion”.¹³

Notice that Locke does not try to lay down epistemological principles and doctrines in order to justify other branches of human culture such as political theory and

the science of nature. To read the *Essay* as an epistemological groundwork for another study (of morality, or of nature) is to read it with neo-Kantian spectacles. It is neo-Kantians in the 1860's such as E. Zeller who granted the status of academic dignity to the discipline of "*Erkenntnistheorie*" and treated it as the centre of philosophy and the foundation of other sciences or studies. They made explicit what was implicit in Kant, by going "back to Kant". At the same time, they seemed to share the view (expressed by Vaihinger) that Locke was the first philosopher to "have a clear consciousness that all metaphysical and ethical discussion must be preceded by epistemological investigations".¹⁴ But whatever neo-Kantians thought of the *Essay*, it is clear that Locke did not write it as an epistemological groundwork to justify other non-epistemological disciplines. As we know from the Epistle to the Reader, he proposed to his friends that a critical examination of intellectual powers should be their "first Enquiry", or an enquiry "before [they] set [themselves] upon Enquires" of perplexing nature (*Essay*, p. 7). But this inquiry is predominantly negative or critical. Instead of providing justified methods or premises for other disciplines, it tries to disjustify the methods and premises of the 17th-century metaphysical and theological discourse. One might say that there is a positive element in Locke's project. As we have seen, he does hold that his critique of knowledge would direct men to the knowledge of morality. But this is a hope rather than a constructive programme of knowledge. We should relate him to such philosophers as Hume, Kant and the earlier Wittgenstein, rather than the neo-Kantians who hold that *Erkenntnistheorie* is, and ought to be, the foundational discipline for other disciplines. For the first three philosophers are legitimate successors to Locke's project of setting limits to knowledge.¹⁵

Locke spent many years writing the *Essay* "by incoherent parcels" and in a "discontinued way" (The Epistle to the Reader, p. 7). He picked up a number of topics on the way, and this makes it difficult to decide on the main purpose of the book. But I have focused on his original conception of the book, and have tried to show why he was concerned to set limits to knowledge.

3. 22 Locke's Attempt to Determine "the Extent of Civil Government", or the Bounds of Legislative Power

Although the *Second Treatise* addresses a number of problems, and each of its chapters is devoted to a distinct topic, careful reading shows that Locke tries to set limits (or "bounds") to the power of an agent: the natural power of every man, the power of non-appropriators, the power of appropriators, or the power of the supreme political

agent called “the Legislative”. Just as Locke’s account of “the Extent of Humane Knowledge” is a central part of his epistemology, his account of “the Extent of the Legislative Power” (ST, Ch. XI) is a central part of his political theory. Also, just as his account of the origin of ideas is propaedeutic to his attempt to determine the extent of human knowledge, his account of the origin of property (ST, Ch. V) is propaedeutic to his attempt to determine the extent of civil government. In Locke’s view, the legislative power ought to be established in every commonwealth (or a society), because men enter into a commonwealth (or a society) for “the great end” of enjoying “their Properties in Peace and Safety” under “the Laws establish’d in that Society” (ST, 134). Hence, he must show how each man comes to have a property in external possessions before he tries to set bounds to the power, or activities, of the legislative agent.

Let us first see that Locke is preoccupied with the limits of power in his political theory. The powers of various agents are limited in various ways, at different stages of his political theory. In the state of nature prior to appropriation, each man has a liberty (i. e., a power) to do what he thinks fit, provided he stays “within the bounds of the Law of Nature” (ST, 4, 128; cf. 57, 59). The bounds of the law of nature are the obligations which God has imposed on the actions of men. Locke does not sharply distinguish between the obligations so imposed and the disabilities caused by such imposition. The most important obligation of the law of nature is the following: “no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions [required for his self-preservation]” (ST, 6). By stipulating this fundamental precept of the law of nature, Locke specifies the limits which each man’s action cannot and ought not to exceed. Just as the limits of human understanding serve to stop men’s continual disputes over religion and metaphysics, the bounds of the law of nature serve to stop men’s continual disputes over one another’s life, health, liberty or minimal possessions.

Whereas each man has the minimal, legitimate sphere of actions by virtue of his membership of the human species, each man expands this sphere of actions by his labour prior to the establishment of political societies in the world. In his account of appropriation, Locke is primarily concerned to limit the power of non-appropriators. God gave the world to “the use of the Industrious and Rational”, and “He that had as good left for his Improvement ... *ought not to meddle with* what was already improved by another’s Labour” (ST, 34; emphasis added). Locke’s secondary concern is to limit the power of appropriators. In the beginning of the world, he says, each man ought to appropriate external goods “within the *bounds*, set by reason of what might serve for his *use*” (31). In the successive age of commercial economy, the “*bound of his just Property*” are relaxed.

Each man can justly acquire his possessions, no matter how large they may be, as long as those possessions do not perish uselessly in his hand (46). This relaxation of the "bounds" shows that Locke's primary concern is to limit the power of non-appropriators rather than that of appropriators. (This may be criticized.) Once men have acquired unequal possessions and have united into a political society, every man's power is equally limited by positive laws ("one Rule for Rich and Poor" (142)).

Finally, we come to Locke's theory of the state. Its core is an attempt to determine "the Extent of the Legislative Power" (Chap. XI) The legislative power is the supreme power of a commonwealth; and whoever holds this power ought to exercise it within definite "bounds". Unlike Filmer and Hobbes, Locke holds that no political agent ought to exercise its power arbitrarily and without a limit (cf. *ST*, 138; *FT*, 9). The "Bounds" of the "Legislative Power of every Commonwealth" are set by the "trust" of "the Society" on the one hand, and by the law of nature on the other hand (*ST*, 142). The society of men erects the legislative power with the trust that it shall be "govern'd by *declared Laws*" (136); and the law of nature commands the legislative agent to preserve mankind (142). Men, according to Locke, unite themselves into a collective society for the purpose of the mutual preservation of their exclusive rights over their lives, liberties and possessions. Then the society sets up a legislative agent with the above-mentioned "trust". Hence, the first "bound" of the legislative agent is this: "The Legislative ... cannot assume to its self a power to Rule by extemporary Decrees, but *is bound to dispense Justice*, and decide the Rights of the Subject by *promulgated standing Laws, and known Authoris'd Judges*" (136). Secondly, since the legislative agent is bound to obey the law of nature which commands the preservation of mankind, it ought to preserve its society or maintain its good, "*the publick good* of the Society" (135). In other words, positive laws ought to be made and executed for the good of the whole society (which consists of the holders of exclusive rights) rather than the good of a particular section. There are two other "bounds" of the legislative power (138-42).

3. 23 *The Parallels Explored*

Locke's concern with the limits of power, as we have seen above, is pervasive in his political theory. Let us now see the main parallels that exist between his epistemology and his political theory. In his political theory as well as in his epistemology, Locke is dealing with an agent who has a tendency to exercise its power beyond any limit. He tries to cut off endless disputes by confining the activities of each agent to its proper domain. According to his epistemology, no intelligent agent can, or ought to, interfere with

the vast ocean of beings which remains beyond his comprehension. Hence, nobody can, or ought to, claim to know whether matter can think, or whether the soul is immaterial. This method of cutting off endless disputes has its counterpart in Locke's political theory. Two kinds of disputes which are discussed in his political theory ought to be distinguished: disputes among citizens over their rights, and disputes between the ruler and the ruled. First, Locke tries to put an end to interpersonal disputes by limiting the power of every member of a commonwealth. A citizen's power does not extend any further than his private domain, i. e., the domain consisting of his life, liberty and possessions. Anyone who arbitrarily exercises his power over the object of another man's domain is liable to punishment. The laws made by a legislative agent within a commonwealth specify the degrees of punishment, and the state is nothing but an impartial arbiter to settle interpersonal disputes by its laws, judges, and the collective force of the commonwealth. Secondly, Locke tries to cut off endless disputes between the ruler (above all, the legislative agent) and the ruled, by limiting the power of the ruler. The chief limit placed on the power of the ruler is that the ruler is "bound" to uphold the rule of law. (The ruler cannot rule arbitrarily; he ought to rule by an impartial application of equal laws.) By confining the activity of the ruler to that of making, and enforcing, the laws for the preservation of the lives, liberties and possessions of citizens, Locke tries to remove an arbitrary way of settling the conflicts between the ruler and the body of citizens. If a legislative agent violates the limits of its actions, then the body of citizens—"the people"—can exercise a right to remove the legislative agent. Thus Locke's method of cutting off disputes, the disputes between the ruler and the ruled as well as those between citizens, is the method of confining each agent's power to its proper domain.

We have seen that Locke's epistemology also encourages each man to use his intellectual power in the domain of moral knowledge (rather than natural philosophy or geometry). It might be said that an equivalent of this encouragement in Locke's political theory is the view that each man should use his labour-power within his own estate.

3. 24 *The Confinement of Power and the End of Disputes: A Confirmation*

My account of the *Essay* and the *Second Treatise* has made it clear that Locke's epistemology and his political theory share at least two prominent features. First, Locke tries to set limits to an agent's exercise of power, in his epistemology as well as in his political theory. In his own words, he sets "bounds" to an agent's power, or the actions of an agent. Secondly, Locke seeks to put an end to disputes which arise from an agent's

unlimited exercise of power. These two features can be combined, and expressed as follows: Locke seeks to put an end to disputes by limiting the power of an agent.

Some commentators may doubt whether the two features I have singled out as the common features of Locke's discourses are really central to his thought. This doubt is reasonable, since he himself did not comment on the relationship between his epistemology and his political theory, or between the *Essay* and the *Second Treatise*. As I said before, he probably produced the two discourses in the hope that they could be understood independently. However, from the viewpoint of a meta-discourse which I am conducting at the moment, it is important to understand that Locke's theory of knowledge and his theory of politics are two manifestations of his general inquiry into the limits of the power of an agent. The purpose of this general inquiry, as I said, is to cut off endless disputes. It is a practical purpose. In what follows, we shall see another manifestation of Locke's general inquiry: his theory of toleration. I shall discuss *A Letter concerning Toleration* below, in order to show that my meta-discourse has so far concentrated on what is really central to his thought. We shall see that in his theory of toleration, just as in his epistemology and political theory, he is preoccupied to set limits to the power of an agent for the purpose of putting an end to disputes. *A Letter concerning Toleration* contains a summary of my characterization of the central, common features of Locke's epistemology and his political theory. (In this paragraph as well as in the preceding paragraph, I have spoken of "an agent" in the singular. But to put it more exactly, Locke sets limits to the powers of *different kinds* of agents, where politics and toleration are concerned. In his epistemology, every man is an intelligent agent of the *same kind*; hence, his epistemology concentrates on one kind of agent. In this respect, it differs from his political theory or his theory of toleration.)

Locke opens his discourse on toleration by commenting on religious fanaticism. His comment is a reproduction of the main theme of the *Essay* which we have already noted:

the establishment of opinions [in religious disputes] ... for the most part are about nice and intricate matters, that *exceed the capacity of ordinary understanding* (*Works*, VI, p. 7; emphasis added).

Central to Locke's discourse on toleration is the view that ecclesiastical power and political power ought to be exercised within entirely distinct domains, for entirely distinct purposes. He specifies the end and extent of ecclesiastical government as well as those of civil government, and repeatedly emphasizes that the two ought to be kept

sharply separate. It is on the basis of the sharp separation of ecclesiastical and political (or civil) power that he discusses “how far the duty of toleration extends” (*Works*, VI, p. 16). We shall focus on this basis, rather than his specific claims about the duty of toleration.

Locke says that it is “above all ... necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion, and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other” (*Works*, VI, p. 9). The end of a commonwealth is to preserve and promote the “civil interests” or “civil concernments” of its members, i. e., their lives, liberties, and possessions, by an impartial execution of laws. The “whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only to these civil concernments”; “it neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to the salvation of souls” (*Works*, VI, p. 10). The end of ecclesiastical power, on the other hand, is “the public worshipping of God, in such a manner as they [i. e., free and voluntary members of a church] judge acceptable to him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls” (p. 13). “All discipline ought therefore to tend to that end, and all ecclesiastical laws to be thereunto confined” (p. 16). Nothing relating to civil concernments should, or can, be “transacted” in the “religious society” called a church; “No force is here to be made use of ... for force belongs wholly to the civil magistrate” (p. 16). On the basis of the distinct ends and extents of civil power and ecclesiastical power, Locke goes on to discuss “the duty of toleration”. The details of his discussion do not concern us. He claims, for instance, that no private person has any right “to prejudice another person in his civil enjoyments, because he is of another church or religion”. The reason is that a man’s civil concernments are “not the business of religion” (p. 17).

What concerns us here is the fact that Locke repeatedly emphasizes the distinctness and separateness of civil power and ecclesiastical power. He confines the activities of the magistrate and the church to two separate domains. By this method, he tries to put an end to any dispute between the realm of politics and that of religion. Let us confirm these two points by Locke’s text.

I shall quote one of the many passages where Locke emphasizes that ecclesiastical power is distinct from political power:

[The authority of the clergy] ought to be *confined within the bounds of the church*, nor can it in any manner be *extended to civil affairs*; because the church itself is a thing absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth. *The boundaries on both sides are fixed and immovable. He jumbles heaven and earth together*, the things most remote and opposite, *who mixes these societies, which are, in their original, end, business, and in every thing, perfectly distinct, and infinitely different from each other*. No man therefore, with whatsoever ecclesiastical

office he be dignified, can deprive another man, that is not of his church and faith, either of liberty, or of any part of his worldly goods, upon the account of that difference which is between them in religion (*Works*, VI, p. 21; emphasis added).

Religious intolerance, in Locke's view, is the use of force to convert men to any religion, whereas "toleration" is nothing but an act of "removing that force" (*Works*, VI, *A Second Letter concerning Toleration*, p. 62). Hence, intolerance is a form of conflating the two distinct and separate domains of politics and religion. It is to remove the "fixed and immovable" "boundaries". The bounds of the two powers are the ones which Locke prescribes. Thus he uses the method of inquiry common to the *Essay* and the *Second Treatise*, i. e., the method of setting limits to an agent who tends to use its power without a limit. In his discourse on toleration, he sets limits to the powers of the church, the state, and private members of any particular church.

The bounds Locke prescribes are called the "just" bounds (*Works*, VI, p. 9). To be tolerant is to stay within these just bounds; namely, to abstain from taking or using what properly belongs to the realm of politics for a religious purpose. All men including the highest priest and the civil magistrate ought to stay within the "just bounds". By prescribing the "just bounds", Locke tries to put an end to the ongoing contest and confusion between the church and the state. He comments: "heads and leaders of the church" have been "moved by avarice and insatiable desire of dominion" to preach that "heretics are to be outed of their possessions, and destroyed" (p. 53). They are the men who "mixed together, and confounded two things, ... , the church and the commonwealth" in resorting to the use of force (p. 53). Locke's solution to this "unhappy agreement" between the church and the state is to confine each agent to its proper domain:

if each of them would contain itself within its own bounds, the one attending to the worldly welfare of the commonwealth, the other to the salvation of souls, it is impossible that any discord should ever have happened between them (p. 54).

Thus in his theory of toleration, Locke tries to solve disputes by confining the power of each agent to its proper domain.

Locke's discourse on toleration is, of course, not simply about the relationship between the church and the state. Throughout his discourse, he urges every Christian to render what is religious to its proper sphere, and what is political (or civil) to its proper sphere. The care of a man's soul ought to be left to each man who may freely choose to join a church, and the power to dispense justice in the next world ought to be left to God. The care of a man's life, liberty and possessions ought to be left to each man,

rather than to the church or the civil magistrate. And the public punishment of those who invade another man's civil concerns ought to be left to the civil magistrate who rules by an impartial application of equal laws. Locke's method of containing each agent's power within its proper domain is a method of giving everyone his due, or rendering to every agent what is "his own". He tries to do "justice" to the religious as well as the political; the clergy as well as the civil magistrate; God as well as citizens.

Let me summarize my account of the central features which are common to Locke's theory of knowledge, his theory of politics, and his theory of toleration. The basic category of Locke's inquiry is "power", or an agent who has power. His general method is to set limits to the power of each agent. His general purpose is to end disputes. We are now in a position to see Locke's three discourses as specific manifestations of his general inquiry into the limits of power. The spirit of his general inquiry, as I indicated in the preceding paragraph, is *suum cuique tribuere* ("To render to every one his due (his right, or his own)"). We should interpret the Stoic maxim of justice negatively in this context, just as Locke and other modern theorists after Grotius interpreted it negatively.¹⁶ It means: to abstain from what is everyone's due; or to leave intact what properly belongs to everyone; or to preserve what is everyone's own. Locke tries to state, clearly and distinctly, what are the proper domains of the agents. Once he demarcates each agent's proper domain, or once he determines the "extent" of each agent's power, then he only urges every agent to stay within his own domain. If every agent minds his own business, then justice and peace will be negatively established among all agents — intelligent agents, appropriators, non-appropriators, the supreme political agent, and the church. In Locke's view, disputes and injustice disappear if everyone minds his own business. The spirit of his inquiry which runs through his three discourses, then, is this: Mind your own business, and disputes will cease. To adapt one of Locke's propositions of demonstrable morality for our purpose, we can say: "Where everyone minds his property, there is no injustice".

3.3 The Bounds of Locke's Discourses

If we are to think about the possibility of a successful future meta-discourse, it is not sufficient to detect Locke's predominant concern with the limits of power, or his hope for the end of disputes. We must recognize another peculiarity of his discourses. He sets limits to his discourses, and various segments of his discourses. He treats one discourse as distinct and separate from another discourse; one segment of a discourse from another segment of the same discourse. He draws sharp boundaries between the

topics he discusses, and develops his views within a narrowly demarcated territory. In short, Locke limits his discourses and parts of his discourses, just as much as he limits the powers of the agents he discusses.

This peculiarity makes it difficult to relate a part of the *Essay* to another part, or a part of the *Second Treatise* to another part. It makes it extremely difficult to relate a part of the *Essay* to a part of the *Second Treatise*. Often, though not always, a connection is absent because of Locke's preoccupation with the bounds of a discourse. Every attentive reader would notice how frequently he makes qualifying remarks of the following type: "it is not my present purpose to discuss ..."; "I shall not meddle with this question at the moment ..."; or "I shall have occasion hereafter to consider this". Any writer may make this type of qualifying remarks, if he wishes to indicate that one question (discussed in one place) is distinct from another question (discussed in another place, or not discussed at all). But Locke makes qualifying remarks *too* often. Why? The reason seems to be the following: *he is preoccupied with the idea of setting limits to the questions he deals with; and he wishes to respect the "just bounds" of his discourse* within which he is supposed to stay. I shall substantiate this point below.

Examples of Locke's typical qualifying remarks can be easily found in his writings. In the Preface to his first writing, he states the following:

I have chose [sic] to draw a great part of my discourse from the *supposition* of the magistrate's power, derived from, or conveyed to him by, the consent of the people.... Not that I intend to meddle with that question whether the magistrate's crown drops down on his head immediately from *heaven* or be placed there by the *hands of his subjects*, it being sufficient to my purpose that the supreme magistrate of every nation what way soever created, must necessarily have an *absolute* and *arbitrary power* over all the indifferent actions of his people. (*F. Tract*, pp. 122f.)

The key expression we must note is this: "I" do "not" "intend" to "meddle with" another question. It might appear that like so many academic writers, Locke is simply distinguishing what he intends to discuss from what he does not intend to discuss. If this is the case, then there is nothing peculiar about his mode of writing or thinking. Yet there is more in Locke than the academic convention. Let us look at more of his qualifying statements:

"I shall not at present meddle with the Physical Consideration of the Mind" (*Essay*, I, i, 2).

"The Reason of this, I shall shew, in another Place" (II, iv, 6).

"... of how vast an extent it is, I shall have occasion to consider hereafter" (II, ix, 4).

"This might carry our thoughts farther, were it seasonable in this place" (II, xx, 6).

"I shall not now enlarge any farther on the wrong judgments, and neglect of what is in their power.... This would make a Volume, and is not my business" (II, xxi, 70).

"But of this, more in its due place" (FT, 11).

"What this Duty is, we shall in its due place examine" (FT, 66).

"But if any one had began [sic], and made himself a Property in any particular thing, (which how he, or any one else, could do, shall be shewn in another place) ..." (FT, 87).

"Every Transgression may be *punished* to that *degree*.... Every Offence that can be committed in the State of Nature, may in the State of Nature be also punished ... it would be besides my present purpose, to enter here into the particulars of the Law of Nature, or its *measures of punishment* ..." (ST, 12).

"But this bye the bye. To return to the argument in hand" (ST, 42).

"It is not my business to inquire here into the original of the power or dignity of the clergy" (*Works*, VI, *A Letter concerning Toleration*, p. 21).

Again and again, Locke reminds himself and the reader of his "present purpose" or his "business", by indicating what his present purpose or business is *not*.

The sentences which I have quoted above are not, properly speaking, cross-references. He does not specify *where* he will discuss the question he says he will. All he is suggesting is that he is discussing one question now, and he will discuss another distinct question in "another place". Rosalie Colie, who has examined Locke's skill as an essayist, has consequently found his qualifying remarks "distracting".¹⁷ Distracting as they may be, we need to explain why Locke made those remarks so frequently. It is a perverse interpretation to say that he was trying to avoid discussing some difficult problems, or to conceal his ambiguities and inconsistencies. No sufficient evidence exists for this interpretation. It is more plausible to suggest that Locke was in the habit of distinguishing one question sharply from another question, and he hesitated to transgress the sharp boundaries he himself had drawn. He became apologetic, and tried to justify himself, when he realized that he had transgressed the self-imposed limit. His apologetic and justifying stance is apparent in quite a few passages.¹⁸

To Locke, it is important to stay within a sharply delimited domain of problems. He seems to think that an intellectually responsible man can, and should, solve one problem at a time by sharply separating it from a seemingly similar problem. In fact, he became indignant when his critics ignored the sharp boundaries he had drawn between different segments of his discourse. Locke harshly condemned James Tyrrell on this ground. In the letters which Tyrrell wrote to Locke in 1690 (June and July), he complained that his account of "the divine law" in the first edition of the *Essay* was not very clear (*Essay*, 1st. ed., II, xxvii, 8; in later eds., II, xxviii, 8). Tyrrell misunderstood what

Locke meant by "the divine law", partly because he did not read the *Essay* very carefully and partly because he was vulnerable to the unfounded opinion of his friends in Oxford. Whereas Locke meant by "the divine law" the law of nature as well as the revealed law of God, Tyrrell thought that it would mean the revealed law alone. What made the matter worse is that Tyrrell made the following comment in his letter to Locke:

you doe not expressly tell us, where to find, this Law, unlesse in the SS. [i. e., the Scriptures] and ... it is likewise much doubted by some whether the Rewards and punishments you mention can be demonstrated as established by your divine Law ... (*Correspondence*, IV, pp. 107f.).

This comment infuriated Locke, because it entirely ignored the bounds of his discourse, i. e., the "present business" he was engaged in at a particular part of his discourse. His indignant reply is the clearest expression of his concern with the bounds of a discourse, or the bounds of a part of his discourse. For this reason, I shall quote Locke's reply at length:

in the present case demonstration of future rewards and punishments was *no more my business* then whether the Squaring of the circle could be demonstrated or no. But I know not how you would still have me *besides my purpose and against all rules of method* run out into a discourse of the divine law shew how and when it was promulgated to mankind demonstrate its inforcement by rewards and punishments in another life *in a place where I had nothing to do with all this* and in a case where some mens bare supposition of such a law whether true or false servd my turne. 'Twas *my businesse* there to shew how men came by moral Ideas or Notions and that I thought they did by comparing their actions to a rule. The next thing I endeavour to shew is what rules men take to be the standards to which they compare their actions to frame moral Ideas and those I take to be the divine law, the Municipal law and the law of reputation or fashion.... If I am out in either of these propositions I must confesse I am in an error ... 'tis *not of concernment to my purpose* in that chapter they [i. e., the rules] be as much as true or noe but only that they be considered in the mindes of men as rules to which they compare their actions and judg of their morality.... I did not designe here to treat of the grounds of true morality which is necessary to true and perfect happinesse and 'thad been impertinent if I had so designed: *my business* was only to shew whence men had moral Ideas and what they were and that I suppose is sufficiently don in that chapter. (*Correspondence*, IV, 4 August 1690, pp. 112f.; emphasis added.)

Locke's message to Tyrrell is, in short, this: I have properly done my business, and you are unjustly complaining about things which I have nothing to do with.

From all these considerations, it is clear that Locke was preoccupied to solve each problem within a narrowly confined territory by his own intellectual labour. From his

viewpoint, Tyrrell merely “meddled with” his proper business in a particular part of his discourse without launching a just criticism. “Meddling” is the word which Locke frequently used to criticize those procedures and actions which do not respect prescribed limits. As we have seen, he did not wish to “meddle” with another question which is to be dealt with in another place. Two years before he wrote the angry letter to Tyrrell, he complained about Tyrrell’s personality to Edward Clarke: “Mr. Oakley [i. e., James Tyrrell] meddles in business wherein he has neither commission nor knowledge, and loves to be talking he knows not what” (*Correspondence*, III, p. 472; also, pp. 405 & 455 for Tyrrell’s “impudent meddling” and his “medleing, without order, in a businesse, he was wholly a stranger to”). Meddling with another domain of a discourse seems to be as wrong as meddling with another man’s personal affairs. Locke also condemned Filmer’s acts of meddling with, or conflating, distinct senses of words. Filmer “hudl[es] several Suppositions together ... and in doubtful and general terms makes such a medly and confusion” (*FT*, 20). This meddling is different from meddling with another domain of a discourse, or another man’s personal affairs. Yet any act which does not respect its proper limits, in Locke’s view, ought to be condemned.

Without exaggeration, we can say that Locke’s preoccupation with the bounds of his discourses is as deep as his preoccupation with the bounds of the power of an agent. In one case, he is concerned about the proper domain or business of a discourse, or a segment of a discourse; and he tries to avoid meddling with another separate domain or business. In the other case, he is concerned about the proper domain or business of an agent; and he tries to prevent one agent from meddling with another’s business. In both cases, the same ideas control Locke’s thought—those of “property” and “justice”.

3. 4 *The Limited Possibility of a Future Meta-Discourse*

I have presented a new picture of Locke’s discourses in place of the old “foundationalist” picture. His discourses, or at least his main discourses, are linked by his general method of setting limits to the powers of agents, and his general practical aim of ending disputes. Those discourses are distinct from one another in that they deal with distinct problems. Within the distinct sub-domains of each discourse, Locke also discusses distinct problems without relying on the conclusions he obtains elsewhere.

Given this picture of Locke’s discourses, what sort of meta-discourse will we be able to conduct in future? We should not be so optimistic as to believe in the unlimited possibility of our future meta-discourse. On the contrary, we should expect only a limited amount of enlightenment from our future meta-discourse. This is due to the sharp

boundaries which separate one of Locke's discourses from another, and one part of his discourse from another part. Nevertheless, we can enrich the new picture by trying to find *what is common* to his separate discourses, and their various segments.

We can establish more links between Locke's discourses by taking up his general idea (e. g., his concept of human nature, or man's relationship to God, or liberty), and tracing various modifications of this general idea across his discourses. This method has in fact been adopted by such commentators as Hans Aarsleff and Raymond Polin.¹⁹ We can also extract common themes and common concepts from Locke's frequent use of analogy, or his parallel analysis of distinct subject-matters. We should try to detect various parallels in his treatment of distinct subject-matters, because this is almost the only way to invigorate our meta-discourse. The parallels which we frequently come across in his discourses may appear to be superficial at first sight. Yet they are often indicative of his deeply held beliefs or his deeply entrenched modes of thought. For this reason, too, we must be very attentive to any existing parallel. I shall indicate below that there are more parallels than I have already noted.

The acquisition of the knowledge of the law of nature is analogous to the acquisition of external goods such as gold and silver. Locke draws the following analogy in the second essay on the law of nature: Neither the knowledge of the law of nature nor natural resources are given to "idle and listless people". They can only be acquired "with great labour". In order to acquire the gold and silver hidden in darkness, we need to use our "arms and hands" diligently. Similarly, in order to acquire the knowledge of the law of nature, we need to exercise our "mental faculties" diligently (*ELN*, II, p. 135). Locke's analogy here is designed to illustrate the point that though our mental faculties "can" lead us to the knowledge of the law of nature, not everyone makes "proper use" of his mental faculties (*ibid.*, p. 133). The "proper use", according to Locke, involves a diligent study. Most people, he says, are lazy. They are "little concerned about their duty", and guided mostly by "the example of others", "traditional customs", "the fashion of the country", and "the authority of those whom they consider good and wise" (*ibid.*, p. 135).

What Locke is claiming, therefore, is that every man can, and ought to, acquire the knowledge of the law of nature by diligently exercising his own powers, and independently of the authority and tradition of other men. In the *Essay*, Bk. I, he restates this view in a more general manner: God "*fitted Men with faculties and means*" to acquire ideas and truths, and men ought not to "misimploy their power" "by lazily enslaving their Minds, to the Dictates and Dominion of others, in Doctrines, which it is their duty carefully to examine" (*Essay*, I, iv, 22). This political or juridical metaphor is signifi-

cant. It indicates that Locke's discourse on ideas and knowledge, and his discourse on property and government, are united by the common belief that every man can, and ought to, exercise his powers independently of the dominion of other men. According to the *Second Treatise*, all men are naturally "furnished with like Faculties", without any subordination among them (ST, 6). Every one can, and ought to, acquire a property in external goods by his hard work, and independently of the labour of others, prescriptive rights, and the authority of a monarch.

We can further develop the parallels involved in the two discourses. For instance, we can draw attention to Locke's egalitarianism about men's abilities (i. e., powers or faculties), and his libertarianism about their actual achievements. God has fitted men with equal mental faculties, and the "great difference that is to be found in the Notions of Mankind, is, from the different use they put their Faculties to" (*Essay*, I, iv, 22). In Locke's view, men's abilities are equal, but since they exercise their abilities in different degrees, some acquire more knowledge and ideas than others. This is one of the main themes of *The Conduct of Understanding* (sects., 4ff.). But we find the same combination of egalitarianism and libertarianism in Locke's discourse on property and government. He holds that in the beginning of the world, every man was able to acquire a property in external goods by exercising an equal labour-power. But "different degrees of Industry were apt to give Men Possessions in different Proportions" (ST, 48).

It is not my task to carry on a meta-discourse by discussing more parallels, and bringing out more themes and concepts common to Locke's discourses. That is the task of future commentators. I have merely indicated that my picture of sharply-bounded, horizontally-linked discourses can be enriched by further discovery of common themes and concepts. As I said before, however, we can not expect to derive unlimited enlightenment from our future meta-discourse. Locke's discourses are sharply bounded, and specific doctrines developed within one territory have frequently nothing to do with those within another territory. Horizontal links between his discourses, if they exist at all, are not epistemological links. Rather, they express Locke's basic modes of thinking (e. g., the limits of power), his practical concerns (e. g., the end of disputes), or his beliefs (e. g., men's equal abilities). If we can show more horizontal links in future, it will help us see the basic coherence of his discourses. But it should be remembered that those horizontal links are difficult to find. There are not many such links.²⁰

Finally, we may ask whether Locke can be called a "systematic" philosopher. He is not a "systematic" philosopher in the foundationalist sense. Nor is he "systematic" in the way Leibniz is. He is an "analytic" philosopher in the sense that he is preoccupied

with distinguishing and separating one thing from another, rather than uniting one thing with another. If we like to call him a "systematic" philosopher, it should mean that he is *systematically analytic*. We can usefully compare his "system" (in the special sense) with the systematic philosophy of Leibniz. Leibniz criticized Locke's tripartite division of the sciences in *New Essays on Human Understanding*. The "chief problem" of his division of the sciences, says Leibniz, is that "each of the branches appears to engulf the others". Locke's "three great provinces" are "perpetually at war with one another because each of them keeps encroaching on the rights of the others". Leibniz believes that such encroachment is bound to take place in any systematic and constructive treatment of a subject-matter. He concludes that the divided sciences should *not* be conceived "as distinct sciences but rather as different ways in which one can organize the same truths, if one sees fit to express them more than once".²¹ Had Locke lived longer to see Leibniz' *New Essays*, he might have sent him his metaphilosophical reply across the English Channel. He might have replied: "My chief business, or concernment, is critical rather than constructive. Unlike Continental metaphysicians who meddle with a number of things, I prefer to work on properly and narrowly divided subject-matters, and render to each subject-matter its due".

NOTES

1. As a reminder for the reader, I should like to repeat here two of the terminological points that I made in PART I. First, the project I criticized in PART I is called "foundationalist", because it tries to discover in the *Essay* the epistemological basis of (a portion of) Locke's political theory, or to reconstruct the basis out of the *Essay*. Secondly, those who try to carry out the foundationalist project rely on a particular metaphilosophy called "the foundationalist picture of philosophy". According to this picture of philosophy, philosophy is predominantly an epistemological discipline which furnishes foundations for other branches of knowledge (e. g., political theory). This is a metaphilosophy shared by quite a few academic philosophers in the English-speaking world today. These terminological points remain relevant to the discussion in this article, especially to the discussion in section 2. 2.
2. In *Horae Sabbaticae* (2nd Series, 1892), Sir James Fitzjames Stephen made a claim about a "striking incongruity" between Locke's political theory and his epistemology. See Paschal Larkin's reference in *Property in the Eighteenth Century with Special Reference to England and Locke* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1930), p. 55, n. 3. Stephen confusedly speaks of a striking incongruity between Locke's political theory and his "metaphysics". But we should read "epistemology" for "metaphysics", because he claims that Locke's attack on the doctrine of innate ideas is incongruous with his concepts of the state of nature and the law of nature. For a revival of the claim of a fundamental inconsistency, see C. E. Vaughan, *Studies in the*

History of Political Philosophy before and after Rousseau, 2 vols. (Manchester: Manchester University Press), vol. 1, pp. 163f.; George Sabine, *A History of Political Theory*, 4th ed. (Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1973), pp. 488ff.; and Peter Laslett's Introduction to *Two Treatises of Government*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 80ff.

3. See Vaughan, *op. cit.*, p. 163; Sabine, *op. cit.*, p. 489; and Laslett's Introduction to *Two Treatises of Government*, pp. 81f. (Sabine stresses a different kind of inconsistency on the whole. Yet what he says implies that Locke's concept of "innate individual rights" conflicts with his attack on the doctrine of innate ideas.)
4. Hans Aarsleff, "The State of Nature and the Nature of Man", *John Locke: Problems and Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 130.
5. *Essays on the Law of Nature*, ed. W. von Leyden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 136ff. The third essay is entitled "An Lex Naturae Hominum Animis Inscribatur? Negatur" ("Is the Law of Nature Inscribed in the Minds of Men? No").
6. To see Locke's consistency on this matter, we must pay close attention to the new meanings he attaches to traditional terms and the new distinctions he introduces. In the second essay in the *Essays on the Law of Nature*, for instance, he affirms that the law of nature can be known by "the light of nature". But as he explicitly states, he uses the phrase without implying innateness or infallibility. He simply means that each man can acquire the knowledge of the law of nature "by himself and without the help of another, if he makes proper use of the faculties he is endowed with by nature" (*ibid.*, p. 123). In Locke's mature works, we can also find this view together with the distinction between faculty (or power) and the use (or exercise) of it. Consider the following statement from the *Essay*: "There is a great deal of difference between an innate Law, and a Law of Nature; between something imprinted on our Minds in their very original, and something that we being ignorant of may attain to the knowledge of, by the use and due application of our natural Faculties" (I, iii, 13). The phrase "the light of nature" also survives into the *Essay* (I, iii, 13; II, xxviii, 8).

To understand Locke's attack on innatism, we need to note two further points. First, he holds that we must use natural faculties *properly* to acquire the knowledge of the law of nature. (For this, see *ELN*, pp. 132-5.) Secondly, he does *not* deny that our faculties or abilities are innate. What he denies is the innateness of knowledge, ideas and principles. (For this, see Locke's comment: "I never deny'd such a power to be innate, but that which I deny'd was that any ideas or connection of ideas was innate." This comment appears in his marginal notes to Burnet's third set of *Remarks*, printed in John Yolton's *Locke and the Way of Ideas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 56.) Hans Aarsleff has drawn attention to these points, and successfully established Locke's consistency regarding the acquisition of the knowledge of the law of nature (Aarsleff, *op. cit.*). We should add, however, that there is a *minor* inconsistency between the *Second Treatise* and the *Essays on the Law of Nature*. In the former work, Locke holds that the law of nature is "plain and intelligible to all rational Creatures" though it may require some "study" (*ST*, 124). But in the latter work, he suggests (in

ELN, pp. 134f., for instance) that it requires a great deal of study and diligence to acquire the knowledge of the law of nature. This is a minor inconsistency, and he remains consistent as far as his anti-innatism is concerned.

7. One might object to what I said in this paragraph and the preceding one. One might argue that I failed to appreciate the possible significance of the claim of a fundamental inconsistency. The argument might be presented as follows: Any conflict between rationalism and empiricism could lead to the "fundamental" inconsistency of a different kind. If his "empiricist" epistemology conflicts with his "rationalist" political theory, this conflict is "fundamental" in the sense that it is "fundamental" *to us* (rather than to Locke). It is "fundamental" to us, because we treat political theory as a branch of knowledge; and like any other branch of knowledge, it should rest on a particular epistemological position.

Let us consider this objection. It clearly presupposes our commitment to the foundationalist metaphilosophy. "Fundamental to us" really means "fundamental to metaphilosophical foundationalists". Once we abandon our commitment to this particular metaphilosophy, it is by no means obvious why we should treat a conflict between rationalism and empiricism as "fundamental". For we can then begin to see the conflict as a local one within epistemology. Even if political theory is a branch of knowledge, our abandonment of the foundationalist metaphilosophy will enable us to see its legitimacy as independent of any particular epistemological position.

It goes beyond the scope of this article to develop a closely reasoned argument for the *general* abandonment of the foundationalist metaphilosophy. In this article and the previous one, I argue against a *particular* use of this metaphilosophy, namely, the use of it in interpreting Locke's discourses. Nevertheless, I can make some critical comments here. First, metaphilosophical foundationalists can treat the rationalist/empiricist distinction as "fundamental", only at the expense of failing to grasp what is really fundamental to Locke's system of thought. They are likely to perpetuate illusions about it. (For their illusions, see my comments in section 2.2 of this article.) Secondly, they need to justify the *prima facie* implausible view that political theory should stand or fall with epistemology. This view appears plausible to them, because they believe that political theory is a branch of knowledge, and that all branches of knowledge (except epistemology) need epistemological foundations. In my view, however, political theory and epistemology should not stand or fall at the same time. If all branches of knowledge (except epistemology) have one and the same basis, a defect in the basis may ruin all the branches. To avoid this danger, it is better to have sufficiently independent branches of knowledge. Furthermore, political theory (and other disciplines) may never get off the ground if we are to perfect our epistemology first. In this way, the foundationalist metaphilosophy can suppress creative activities in many areas of culture. These considerations, together with a review of the actual development of (what is ordinarily called) knowledge, would lead us to doubt the value of the foundationalist metaphilosophy.

8. For instance, Locke used the idea of power in the *Two Tracts on Government*. This means that he used it long before he worked out his own account of the origin of the idea of power.

9. Laslett's Introduction to *Two Treatises of Government*, p. 50. He also believes that the title-page of the whole book was "printed even later" than that of the *Second Treatise*, and was "brought into line with it" (p. 50). His dismissal of the separate title-page of the *Second Treatise* reinforces his own view of the *Two Treatises*, i. e., the view that it is a continuous discourse directed against Robert Filmer.
10. Locke's tripartite formula of "property" (or "civil concernments")—"lives, liberties and estates"—also appears in the 1667 essay. See Bourne, *Life*, vol. 1, p. 180.
11. The paper was published by King, in his *Life of John Locke*, vol. 2, "Miscellaneous Papers", pp. 108ff.
12. I maintain that Locke presents his own political theory in the *Second Treatise*, and for this reason I shall not pay much attention to the *First Treatise* in the following discussion. But Laslett has argued that we should treat the *Two Treatises* as one book, or as a continuous discourse against Filmer. For a criticism of his view, see my article "A Critique of Laslett's Treatment of the *Two Treatises*", *The Locke Newsletter*, ed. Roland Hall, No. 16 (1985).
13. Quite a few commentators report that James Tyrrell wrote the following comment in the margin of his copy of the *Essay* (which survives today in the British Museum): "the discourse began about the Principles of morality and reveal'd Religion".
14. Hans Vaihinger's view is found in his "Über den Ursprung des Wortes Erkenntnistheorie", *Philosophische Monatshefte*, vol. 12 (Leipzig, 1876). I am indebted to Richard Rorty for this reference, and I have quoted his translation. See Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 135, n. 5. Unlike Vaihinger and Rorty, however, I do not treat Locke as the founder of the foundationalist picture of philosophy.
15. Hume is the first successor who faithfully recaptured the original conception of Locke's epistemological inquiry. See his statement about "the only method of freeing learning ... from these abstruse questions", in *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 12. Also, see Kant's statement about the "true purpose" of philosophy in *Critique of Pure Reason* (A 735, B 763): the "true purpose" of philosophy is "to expose the illusions of a reason that forgets its limits". And see Wittgenstein's statement about the aim of his book in the Preface to *Tractatus*: "the aim of the book is to set a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts".
16. Grotius is the first modern theorist who provided an unequivocally negative interpretation of *suum cuique tribuere*. For this, see my article "The Narrowness of Modern Justice (I)", *International Studies*, No. 4 (June 1987).
17. Colie states: "Locke's constant use of phrases indicating neglect of a subject or its enlargement

in another place is distracting, because also he does not always tell us why he neglects or where the enlargement can be found". See Rosalie Colie, "The essayist in his Essay", *John Locke: Problems and Perspectives*, ed. Yolton (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1969), p. 256.

18. Consider the following statements:

"I hoped this transgression, against the method I have proposed to my self, will be forgiven me, if I have quitted it a little, to explain some *Ideas* of great importance; such as are those of the *Will*, *Liberty*, and *Necessity*, in this place, where they, as it were, offered themselves, and sprang up from their proper roots" (*Essay*, 1st ed., chapter on "Power", sect. 46).

"Though I shall have occasion to consider this more at large, when I come to treat of Words, and their Use: Yet I could not avoid to take this much notice here ..." (*Essay*, II, xx ii, 8).

"the method I at first proposed to my self, would now require, that I should immediately proceed to shew, what use the Understanding makes of them [i. e., our ideas], and what knowledge we have by them. This was that which, in the first general view I had of this Subject, was all that I thought I should have to do: but upon a nearer approach, I find, that there is so close a connexion between *Ideas* and Words ... that it is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our Knowledge ... without considering, first, the Nature, Use, and Signification of Language; which therefore, must be the business of the next Book" (II, xx iii, 19).

In the first passage quoted above, Locke speaks of the "transgression, against the method I have proposed to my self". The "method" here seems to refer to the "present Business" which he stated in sect. 2 of the chapter on power: "my present business" is "not to search into the original of Power, but how we come by the *Idea* of it". In that chapter, Locke certainly does not confine himself to the task of explaining how we come to have the idea of power. In the third passage quoted above, he again speaks of the "method" he proposed to himself. This method refers to the plan he laid down at the very beginning of the *Essay*, the plan or "my Purpose" (I, i, 2; also 3), and it does not include a discussion of language and words. Thus Locke is apologizing for, and justifying, his violation of the limits he imposed on his discourse. He is saying that he is not strictly minding his own business.

19. Hans Aarsleff, "The State of Nature and the Nature of Man"; and Raymond Polin, "John Locke's Conception of Freedom". These two articles are found in *John Locke: Problems and Perspectives* (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1969).
20. An additional difficulty should be noted here. Even the existing parallels between Locke's discourses are *not as exact as we expect*. Compare, for instance, the concept of "power" in his epistemology with that of "power" in his political theory. Though the former signifies a man's natural *ability*, the latter seems to signify more than an ability. We may even be able to

explore various differences between the two concepts of power.

21. G. W. Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, trans & ed. P. Remnant & J. Bennett (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1982), pp. 522 – 5. The page numbers indicated here correspond to those in the Akademie-Verlag edition of the French text.

ABBREVIATIONS

1. Locke's Works

Correspondence: *The Correspondence of John Locke*, 8 vols., ed. E. S. de Beer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976)

Draft A: *Draft A of Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding, the Earliest Extant Autograph Version*. Transcribed with critical apparatus by Peter H. Nidditch. Sheffield: University of Sheffield, 1980.

Draft B: *Draft B of Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding, the Fullest Extant Autograph Version*. Transcribed with critical apparatus by Peter H. Nidditch. Sheffield: University of Sheffield, 1982.

Essay: *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).

ELN: *Essays on the Law of Nature*, ed. & trans. W. von. Leyden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954).

FT: *The First Treatise*; or the first part of *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. P. Laslett (2nd ed. 1967: rpt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

ST: *The Second Treatise*; or the second part of the *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. P. Laslett (2nd ed. 1967; rpt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

F. Tract: *The First Tract*; or the first part of *Two Tracts on Government*, ed. P. Abrams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967).

S. Tract: *The Second Tract*; or the second part of the *Two Tracts on Government*.

Works: *The Works of John Locke*, 10 vols. (London: Printed by Thomas Davison, Whitefriars; Printed for Thomas Tegg et al, 1823).

2. Biographical Works

Bourne, *Life*: H. R. F. Bourne, *The Life of John Locke*, 2 vols. (London: Henry S. King & Co., 1876).

King, *Life*: Lord Peter King, *The Life of John Locke, with Extracts from his Correspondence, Journals, and Common-place Books*, 2 vols. (London: Henry Colburn and Richard Bentley, 1830).