

The Communist Party USA in the 1930s and the Scottsboro Incident

Nobuyuki KAWAUCHI *

Introduction

In 1938, the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration released the *Report on Economic Conditions of the South* through the National Resources Committee. In the introduction to the report, Roosevelt described and positioned the Southern society as a “region” with “the Nation’s No. 1 economic problem.” Moreover, in the report, Roosevelt emphasized the need for radical improvements in southern society, which had a “colonial economy,” and stressed the importance of further integrating the South into the American national economy and promoting capitalism in regional society.¹

However, the 1936 democratic election program did not mention sharecroppers or agricultural workers, and the Roosevelt administration lacked awareness of the effects of the Agricultural Adjustment Act cotton reduction program on these groups. In particular, due to the severe displacement of tenant farmers in the rural South, coupled with the trend among urban migrants—amid the rising panic—to return to the country after losing their jobs, rural society became awash with unemployed workers and wandering tenant farmers. As a result, population outflow from the rural South to the cities rapidly declined, and in 1932, the trend reversed completely as 178,000 flowed into the rural areas. In terms of living standards, in 1929, personal income in the South was about half the national average, and by 1930, the same had fallen by about twice as much as other areas.²

In addition, a glance at the state of Southern society at the time reveals that social life for African Americans was deteriorating rapidly, as the deep-seated racism and prejudice of the White supremacy combined with a creeping fear in the region. Therefore, despite the succession of New Deal programs and the Roosevelt administration’s new awareness of the South, there would be no easy remedy to the regional problems facing America’s Southern states.

The Scottsboro incident, which occurred in March 1931 in a remote valley of the Cumberland Plateau, located in the northeast corner of Alabama, was a shocking case that aptly symbolized the serious problems of the Southern society. Moreover, of particular interest in this case is the fact that, against the backdrop of economic and social chaos spawned by the Great Depression, the Communist Party USA sought to strengthen its mass movements and stir national public opinion, developing vigorous activities aimed at expanding its power base. Therefore, news of the Scottsboro incident caused uproar not only in the United States but also all over the world; additionally, international support movements equal to the furor of the earlier Sacco and Vanzetti case increased.

The present article, while verifying the historical details and judicial process of the Scottsboro incident,³ considers how the Communist Party USA positioned the Negro question within its political lines around 1930, as well as the nature of its involvement in the support

* Department of International Studies, College of International Studies, Chubu University

movement for the “Scottsboro Boys.” Through this discussion, I examine the activities and influence of the Communist Party USA in the early 1930s, and the deep-seated nature of the racial problems that continued to restrain Southern society despite the prosperity of the 1920s and New Deal programs.

Section 1: The Communist Party and the Negro Question

1. *African Americans as a “National Question”: The Comintern Line*

The problem of the African Americans in the United States was repeatedly discussed at Comintern meetings. In the “Thesis on National and Colonial Questions” (1920) at the Second Congress of the Communist International and the “Thesis on the Negro question” (1922) at the Fourth Congress, Black people were formally established as an oppressed race, and policy addressing the Black liberation movement was thrust onto the agenda of the international communist movement. Consequently, at its Sixth Congress, held in July 1928, the Comintern adopted a theoretical position advocating the “right of national self-determination” for African Americans in the “Black Belt.”⁴

During the Sixth Congress, on July 31, African American members called on the Communist Party labor union representatives of each county to prepare a committee for creating an organized African American movement, which led to the Subcommittee on the Negro Question being established. This Subcommittee drafted a resolution on the Negro question, and on October 20, 1928, after obtaining the approval of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI), published the Resolution on the Negro Question in the United States. The resolution stated that Negro workers must be organized as a wing of the trade union movement and called for the development of a mass struggle under the American Negro Labor Congress and the Trade Union Unity League: TUUL.

Moreover, Profintern, an international body of trade unions of the communist party, independently addressed the Negro question, and, in 1929, adopted the “Trade Union Action Programme for Negroes,” prepared by the Committee for Negro Workers. This was an attempt to incorporate the Resolution on the Negro Question in the United States, approved by Comintern the previous year, into the labor movement policy.⁵

In light of this international positioning of the Negro question, on October 26, 1930, the Political Secretariat of the ECCI adopted the next Resolution on the Negro Question in the United States. This resolution stated that the Negro question in the United States “must be viewed from the standpoint of its peculiarity, namely as the question of an oppressed people, which is in a peculiar and extraordinarily distressing situation of national oppression,” thereby confirming with finality that Negro question was to be regarded as a “national question.”⁶

2. *Infighting in the Party and Unreality*

Despite the Comintern’s stance advocating the “right of national self-determination” in the “Black Belt,” the Communist Party USA could not apply this position in practice for some time because of the fierce infighting among its members. A group headed by Jay Lovestone, commonly known as the “Bukharin faction,” argued that Stalin’s treatment of the theory of the general crisis of capitalism did not apply to the United States and saw the potential foundations for a “Negro Republic” as being destroyed by the industrialization of the South and Black migration. At the Party Congress in March 1929, this perspective still formed the majority opinion. In other words, the Bukharin faction stopped short of connecting the “right to national self-determination” line to the notion of a “Negro Republic,” placing greater

importance on the industrialization of the South and the proletarianization of the African Americans.⁷

The Bukharin faction's stance was also clearly expressed in the *Comintern Resolution on the Negro Question in the United States*, adopted by the Politburo of the Communist Party on October 26, 1928. Finally, the prime concerns of the resolution were the industrialization of the South and the proletarianization of the African Americans. Although on the one hand it raised expectations for a social revolution by the Black proletariat, it also admitted that Blacks in the plantation regions lacked the organized experiences comparable to those of industrial workers, making it difficult for them to conduct an autonomous movement.⁸

However, since the dispute over the Negro question was complexly linked to the power struggle between the Bukharin and Stalin factions, the infighting over the party leadership was extremely acrimonious, and the move to define Blacks as an oppressed race even impacted on issues such as the "separation" or "independence" of the Southern states, culminating in repeated debates between Black and White members. This dispute even raised questions pertaining to the relative importance of "social equality" versus "right to self-determination," whether to seek the formation of a "Negro Republic" in response to the separatist trend among African Americans, and whether Southern society was a part of the "national economy" of the United States.⁹

James Ford, an African American member participating in the Sixth Congress as a representative of the Communist Party USA, argued that the power struggle within the Communist Party was making organizing Black activity extremely difficult; another representative, Claudia Jones, made a negative remark that some members were indifferent or prejudiced about the Negro question. In addition, at the Tenth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International in July, 1929, Robert Minor stated that as things stood, it could hardly be said the party as a whole was optimistic about the Negro question and argued that organized Black activity was insufficient. Because the conflict within the Communist Party USA over the Negro question was carried up to the Comintern platform in this way, under Stalin's order, the Comintern eventually decided to expel the Bukharin faction from the party, and in June 1929, the Communist Party USA resolved its internal conflict by ousting the 200-strong Bukharin faction.¹⁰

After expelling the Bukharin Faction, on October 26, 1930, the Politburo of the Communist Party published the *Resolution on the Negro Question in the United States, Final Text*, thereby establishing a theoretical base for the organization of the African American masses. This resolution rebuked the fantasy that the industrialization of the South would proletarianize workers; instead, it emphasized the particularity of the problems of the "Black Belt." In doing so the Communist Party positioned the Black populace as a "racially" oppressed group, which could not be understood simply in terms of capital/wage-labor relations, and the task of emancipating the Black masses from an agricultural system in which production was constrained was set forth in theory as a bespoke assignment for the South. In this way, the Communist Party strengthened its efforts to promote a sharecropper movement across the Southern production areas and integrate this into the national social reform movement.¹¹

Furthermore, this resolution served to establish as policy pillars the "right to national self-determination" in the South and "social equality" in the North and explained the problems, including the issue of "separation/independence," in the following terms. The "right to national self-determination" in the "Black Belt" included the right to establish Black-only schools and government organs, and the right to "independence" from the United States in the Black majority region; yet at the same time, it sought to guarantee the freedom of the

African American people to remain federated with the United States if it preferred to do so and emphasized that the idea of establishing an exclusive, separate “Negro State” was an “unreal and reactionary caricature.” Therefore, at the time, the Communist Party was not only considering the separation of Blacks and Whites but had also placed importance on policy for promoting organization of workers aimed at racial unity.

Further, as conditions for realizing the “right to national self-determination” in the “Black Belt,” the Communist Party identified the confiscation of White-owned land, the revision of state borders to connect with Black-majority areas, and the elimination of the White autocratic rule oppressing the Blacks. Since the center of the Communist Party was, after all, New York, and Garvey’s Black nationalist movement had a deep-rooted influence in Manhattan, the New York Communist Party, in competition with petty bourgeois nationalists, had to exert originality by emphasizing proletarian nationalism; however, in the “Black Belt,” which did not have to deal with such a situation, the idea of demanding democratic reform was in itself “revolutionary.”¹²

However, even within the Communist Party, White chauvinism figured prominently, and in Manhattan, the “struggle against White chauvinism” within the party marked the beginning of an increase in the Communist Party’s influence among African Americans. This was clearly demonstrated in the expulsion of August Yokinen, a Finnish-American member of the Communist Party brought to public trial by Communist Party USA leaders in March 1931. This incident began when Yokinen, who was managing the Finnish Workers Club of Harlem, allegedly made racist remarks against several African-American members. This was severely criticized as an act of White chauvinism by Communist Party leaders, who even decided to orchestrate a public trial against Yokinen. The public trial was observed by more than 2,000 media representatives, including correspondents from the *New York Times*, and the atmosphere was akin to a political show—staged to demonstrate the strength of the Communist Party’s line.¹³

Nevertheless, during around that time, the respective communist parties directly adopted the extreme party lines of the Sixth Congress of the Communist International the Tenth Plenum of its Executive Committee, which, in the history of the international communist movement, are considered “far left” and “sectarian” in nature.¹⁴ Despite the unprecedented social crisis of the Great Depression, the unrealistic policy set out by the Communist Party USA was largely ineffective in strengthening mass movements or expanding the party’s power base.¹⁵

For example, although it cannot be denied that the “right to national self-determination” in the “Black Belt” had the emotional effect of mobilizing White party members, *the Resolution on the Negro Question in the United States*, with respect to labor movements, provoked an intransigent struggle with the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and a fierce, exclusivist attack on the organized Black movement of religious practitioners by the American Negro Labor Congress. The Communist Party’s position came to be symbolized by its slogans for the 1932 Presidential Election, which prescribed a “revolutionary way out of the crisis” and the “establishment of a workers’ and farmers’ government.”¹⁶

In the 1930s, about one-tenth of the 7,500-strong membership of the Communist Party USA was African American, yet given the conservative social structure in the South and the harsh situations that Blacks themselves had to face, the Communist Party’s treatment of the Negro question as a national one, based on the Comintern line, did not appear to have been effective in expanding the party’s power base or orchestrating a mass movement. Moreover, for the Black masses, the effects of unemployment and famine made it extremely difficult to accept

the issue of “self-determination” as a realistic problem, nor did this develop into an effective strategy for encouraging the organization of Black party members or promoting trade union movements.

Nevertheless, the Scottsboro incident was a symbolic case, in which the structural inconsistencies of Southern society were brought to the fore along with the issue of racial discrimination, and for the Communist Party, which conducted a dogmatic and mechanical discussion from beginning to end and could only develop limited organized movements of African Americans, Scottsboro also presented a prime opportunity to conduct specific activities while gaining public support.

3. The Communist Party's Organized Movements of Black Americans

After the Fourth Congress of the Communist International adopted the “Thesis on the Negro Question” in 1922, in October 1925, the Communist Party USA organized the American Negro Labor Congress (chaired by Lovett Fort-Whiteman, official organ: *Negro Champion*). Seeking to advance Black employment and trade unions participation, the American Negro Labor Congress aimed to establish movements of Black workers at the local council level while also organizing interracial labor conferences to promote the unification of all workers, regardless of race or color.

Concurrently, in 1925, in Chicago, the Communist Party established the International Labor Defense (ILD), which while working to contain the violence of White supremacist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan also campaigned against the lynching of Blacks and provided support and legal defense in frame-ups. The ILD also included Black and White middle-class members and succeeded in carrying out movements from a broader popular base than the American Negro Labor Congress, whose demands were exclusive and extreme.¹⁷ As discussed below, the ILD was instrumental in the campaign to free the “Scottsboro Boys.”

Following the suppression of the textile strikes in Gastonia, North Carolina, in September 1929, the Communist Party's (TUUL) began its effort to unite the South into an organized labor movement. To that end, the following month, the Central Committee of the Communist Party established an Agriculture Department, while also incorporating a National Negro Department and District and Section Negro Committee within its party structure.¹⁸

In addition, in December 1929, the IDL became actively involved in providing legal representation not only for labor disputes but also for lynching incidents involving African Americans; in January 1930, it requested all of its branches to set up special committees to manage the Negro Question. Accordingly, at the Seventh Communist Party Congress in June 1930, the policy of “giving special importance on the demands of Black tenant farmers and sharecroppers in the South” was emphasized.¹⁹

This marked the beginning of the Communist Party's campaign of organized activities in the South. In the fall of 1929, a White Communist Party member and trade union activist was arrested in Norfolk, Virginia after organizing an interracial union meeting. In early 1930, in Salisbury, North Carolina, a Black Communist Party activist was attacked by a White mob while giving a speech at an anti-lynching meeting. Then, in Atlanta, Georgia, in March 1930, activists from the Textile Workers' Union were arrested at an interracial union meeting, and in May that year, four Communist Party members were charged with violating an 1886 state insurrection statute; their imprisonment lasted until 1937. In addition, in June 1930, an incident occurred in which a married couple by the name of Davis, who were university professors, and Communist Party activist Tom Johnson were attacked by a group of reservists opposed to racial equality and were arbitrarily arrested by the police. The frequent occurrence

of these incidents caught the attention of the United States Congress, prompting a survey by the House of Representative Fish Committee, which included public hearings in the main Southern cities, including Atlanta, Chattanooga, Birmingham, Memphis, and New Orleans.²⁰

In November 1930, about one year after the Wall Street Crash, the American Negro Labor Congress changed its name to the League of Struggle for Negro Rights (General Secretary: Harry Haywood, official organ: *Negro Liberator*). While voicing concrete demands for Black rights—including education, welfare, wages, and labor conditions—the new organization argued for a need for complete “rights to national self-determination” across the Southern “Black Belt” and reform of the plantation system. James S. Allen, who was widely known as the editor of *Southern Worker*, was passionately devoted to the reform of Southern society as one of the Communist Party members working on the Negro Question.²¹

4. *Establishment of the Sharecroppers Union (SCU)*

The Communist Party USA established a platform for Black liberation in the South based on the Comintern policy seeking to liberate African Americans and establish the “right to national self-determination” in the “Black Belt.” This included (1) the expropriation of land from large estate holders and its distribution to tenant farmers and sharecroppers, (2) the unification of the “Black Belt” across state borders, and (3) the guaranteeing of the “right to national self-determination” among the majority of the African-American population in the “Black Belt.”

Furthermore, in November 1930, the Communist Party began conducting concrete activities aimed at organizing tenant farmers and sharecroppers, sending party organizers to various states, including Alabama, North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Tennessee. Communist Party members distributed some 10,000 leaflets in these states; in Charlotte, North Carolina, activities were initiated by members who had fled the suppression of the Gastonia strike; and in York County, South Carolina, a tenant farmers’ union was founded. It was against this backdrop that, in June 1931, the Communist Party formed the Sharecroppers’ Union (SCU) in Camp Hill, Tallapoosa County, Alabama and strengthened its organized activities through its involvement in the Scottsboro case, discussed below.²²

At that time, Alabama was divided into three areas, each with different characteristics. The northern half of the State was a hilly upland area with a majority of small- and medium-scale independent farmers, in the center of which stood the South’s largest industrial city, Birmingham. Next, from the center to the south, the “Black Belt” ran from east to west, powering expansive cotton plantations, second only to the Mississippi River Delta, where, naturally enough, the African-American population was concentrated. In addition, the southernmost coastal area was home to a scattering of farmers engaged in the export special cash crops out of Mobile.²³

Tallapoosa County, the cradle of the SCU, was located at the intersection of the northern hilly region and the “Black Belt,” and with less Black inhabitants and lower rates of sharecropping and illiteracy than Lee County and Lowndes County, its race relations were more stable than most rural Southern counties. While it is true that these conditions were favorable for establishing the SCU, we must also consider that Tallapoosa County was located near the Birmingham’s mining and steel industries. In Birmingham, the coal miner movement, which included Black miners, began early, and as panic broke out, the influence of the union movement led to the revival of the Farmers’ Union of Alabama. The Farmers’ Union of Alabama, which mainly consisted of migrant farmers, tenant farmers, and agricultural workers, moved further to the left in league with the trade unions, even gaining a reputation as the most left-wing group in the National Farmers’ Union (NFU). Buoyed by these favorable conditions,

the SCU gradually moved south, before advancing westward into the central “Black Belt” aiming to organize workers.²⁴

However, in Alabama, there had been no organized movements of tenant farmers against planters since the failed Election Riot of 1874, which also made the SCU’s task incredibly difficult: its “revolutionary slogans” advocating the requisition of land and the “right to national self-determination,” rather than helping organize workers would also have negative consequences unless it connected them to concrete problems based on the opinions and demands of poor Black farmers. For this reason, the SCU confronted social problems, such as the abolition of Jim Crow laws, the elimination of wage gaps, the eradication of lynching, and the dismantling of the sharecropper system, and confronted landowners with the pressing demands of tenant farmers, poor farmers, and agricultural laborers, exerting a considerable, albeit temporary, influence.²⁵

Yet, no matter how the SCU engaged with the daily demands of tenant farmers and sharecroppers, as long as the structure of Southern society remained problematic, the vehemently negative reaction of “landed society” instilled in people the fear of a “red” terror spread by “outside leaders,” and the SCU even came under violent attack from farmers. Although the SCU was forced to go underground as a result, it continued conducting activities, steadily and persistently, and, in August 1935, led the cotton pickers strike in the neighboring county of Lowndes, Alabama. In an executive meeting that July, the SCU decided to conduct the cotton pickers strike and Secretary Clyde Johnson began a funding drive through an article in *The Nation*.²⁶

This first cotton pickers strike since the end of the 19th century was followed by a similar strike two weeks later in the delta area of Arkansas, organized by the Southern Tenant Farmers’ Union (STFU). Although the cotton pickers strike ultimately failed, wages on the large plantations of northern Alabama increased and the planter class was criticized in the *Birmingham Post*.²⁷

Moreover, even the *Montgomery Advertiser*, a paper for the planter class, called for the prompt enactment of the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenancy Act (BJFTA), which was under deliberation in Congress at the time, as a solution to the farm tenancy problem. Furthermore, in Lowndes County, the Resettlement Administration (RA) financial support and agricultural education plan for tenant farmers was initiated with the approval of the planter-led Agriculture Promotion Association.²⁸

Section 2: The Scottsboro Incident and the Communist Party’s Support Campaign

1. Details of the Incident and the Court Case

Around noon on March 25, 1931, a 42-car freight train was traveling south along the Tennessee River between Chattanooga, Tennessee, and Memphis to the West. The Scottsboro incident began when two White female millworkers, Victoria Price and Ruby Bates, who had boarded the train without a ticket, claimed to have been raped by nine African-American teenagers (aged 12 to 19) aboard the same train. The Black youths were arrested immediately and held in the jail of a small town called Scottsboro (agriculture trading center with a population of approximately 2,800 people), in Jackson County, Alabama. This is the first chapter in the long history of the Scottsboro case.²⁹

Price’s cry of rape caused an instant uproar in the small country town, with shouts of, “Let those niggers out!” “Give ‘em to us!” and “Lynch them, or bring disgrace to the south!” some locals even pelted the jail with stones. Fearing a riot, the prosecution transferred the nine Black

teenagers from Scottsboro to Kilby State Prison near Montgomery under guard by the state militia.³⁰

The trial began on April 6 at Jackson County Courthouse (Judge Alfred J. Hawkins). Stephen R. Roddy served as defense attorney for the boys. Roddy came forward in response to strong requests from a support movement organized by pastors and religious leaders upon the plea of the mother of two defendants, the Wright brothers—Roy and Andy Wright. A sham three-day trial returned guilty verdicts for all nine defendants. The youngest defendant, Roy Wright, receiving life imprisonment and the other eight were sentenced to death. However, the ruling aroused much controversy and many people sent protest letters criticizing racism in the South to Governor of Alabama, Benjamin M. Miller, insisting that the incident was in fact a group lynching disguised as a legal case.³¹

As Scottsboro made the headlines, it became apparent from the backgrounds and family relations of the White mill girls who claimed to have been raped that the defendants had been denied a fair trial, and the defense took the case to the Alabama Supreme Court on appeal, claiming that the trial had been invalid and all of the defendants were innocent. Although the Supreme Court of Alabama granted a new trial for Eugene Williams, it decided to uphold the original verdict for the other “defendants.” The defense immediately appealed to the United States Supreme Court. At the Supreme Court, veteran attorney Walter Pollak revealed the contradictions of the trial, focusing on the nature of the attorney appointment and the guarantee of citizenship rights, prompting the Supreme Court to reverse the convictions and order a retrial.³²

After that, a series of new facts emerged that proved the innocence of the defendants, and amid growing public sentiment about the direction of the trials—marked by a large support rally held in Birmingham on March 6, 1933—on March 28, 1933, the retrials began in Decatur, Morgan County (a community of around 25,000). This time, defense attorney Clarence Darrow was replaced in fear of him being influenced by the Communist Party by Jewish attorney Samuel Leibowitz. The defense began by filing a “shock motion” on the ground that all 12 of the jurors were White, arguing that the case breached both the Alabama Criminal Code and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution based on the citizens’ right to a fair trial. However, the objection was denied. Next, in the courtroom, after the jury heard new medical evidence, as well as an admission by Bates that she had been forced to give false testimony, the defense expected to win a not-guilty verdict. Yet, on April 17, the jury returned another guilty verdict.³³

2. Protestations and the Growing Support Movement

When the Scottsboro incident occurred, Charles Derba of the Communist Party Central Committee instructed party members to conduct support activities immediately, gathered information from the party’s Southern strongholds of Chattanooga and Birmingham and made the decision to begin a national support campaign supported by the full force of the Communist Party machinery.

Lowell Wakefield, a representative of the Communist Party in Birmingham, went to watch the trials, and after receiving his report, on April 10, the day after the first verdict was delivered, the Communist Party released an extensive statement about the case, vowing to step up its campaign in the South by fighting the Scottsboro case.

At the Central Committee of the Communist Party Headquarters, a lively tactical debate was unfolding over the liberation of Black Americans and the “right to national self-determination” in the “Black Belt”; however, the Communist Party members who were active

in the Southern States were aware of the degree to which White Southerners despised the “red” outsiders of the Communist Party and knew that the party would be unable to expand its power base among Southern Blacks without tackling more concrete issues stemming from the state of Southern society. In this regard, the Communist Party had to connect its campaign for the Scottsboro boys to its efforts to organize workers in the South.³⁴

Moreover, the Communist Party did not make the decision to support the youths simply for humanitarian reasons: the move also reflected the party’s stance, which it had developed through surveys and investigations into the political characteristics of Southern Society and the economic significance of the “Black Belt” that had previously been conducted by Ford and Allen.³⁵ It can be argued that the Scottsboro incident and the current of national public opinion played a significant background role in the selection of Ford, a Black activist, as the Vice-Presidential candidate in 1932, 1966, and 1940.

The ILD met with the parents of the defendants, obtaining their approval in becoming the main organization behind the support campaign, and established the policy of leading the court battle while advocating equal treatment of Black people. Through these ILD activities, the Communist Party began to exert a considerable influence on the mass movement in the South. On April 9, 1931, the ILD sent a protest telegram to Governor Miller and dispatched civil right lawyer Joseph Brodsky to investigate the case and defend the boys. During a period of about 10 days, the ILD is reported to have distributed over one million leaflets and raised more than 1,000 dollars in contributions.³⁶

Furthermore, the ILD led a global appeal, spreading the details and unfair nature of the case, and conducted an international fund-raising drive. It also built on these activities by organizing a special campaign delegation for communist parties and trade unions in Europe, led by veteran member J. Louis Engdahl, at the request of Ada Wright, mother of the Wright brothers. In Germany and France, demonstrations proposed by the Communist Party and the ILD became so intense that protesters even lost lives during clashes with the police. At the same time, demonstrators in several European countries stormed American embassies, pelting the buildings with stones.³⁷

Within the United States, the League of Struggle for Negro Rights assigned several dozen full-time members to the case and seeing potential in the incident to transform social and political awareness in the South, conducted a steady program of daily activities. First, these full-time members investigated the personal histories and family relations of the teenage “defendants” and used leaflets and pamphlets to demonstrate the misery and discrimination that the boys suffered during their youth. Then, through these processes, it became apparent that on the train where the alleged rape occurred, the boys were exhausted after fighting and many did not even know the names of the other boys, and a series of facts came to light that confirmed the discriminatory nature of their arrest.³⁸

The IDL campaign was significant in that it raised objections, demonstrating, for example that (1) local newspapers (such as *Sentinel* in Jackson Country) had inflamed public opinion while asserting the boys’ guilt and (2) in the early stages, most of the reporters sent from newspapers such as the *New York Times* and the *Chattanooga Daily Times* mainly ran stories with the White mill girls as “victims.”

The vigorous daily activities of ILD had a great effect on the mothers of the Scottsboro boys: the mothers of the Wright brothers, Heywood Patterson, Eugene Williams, and Olen Montgomery supported the Communist Party in the 1932 Presidential Election; one mother, Broadus Mitchell, even announced her candidacy in the Maryland governor Election under the slogan of a establishing a socialist system free from discrimination or oppression while

supporting the “Scottsboro boys.”³⁹

Section 3: Divisions in the Support Campaign

As the activities of the ILD and the League of Struggle for Negro Rights activities progressed, the Communist Party’s influence caused various confusion and conflict among the individuals and organizations involved in the campaign for the “Scottsboro Boys,” bringing the ILD and League of Struggle for Negro Rights up against the following two difficulties.

First, Clarence Darrow, who was known at the time as the greatest criminal lawyer in the United States, withdrew from the defense. Attorney Darrow was 75 years old at the time and had a glowing record in relation to historical court battles, which included the defense of Eugene Debs of the Socialist Part of America in the National Railway Union conspiracy case, the Steunenberg assassination case, and the Scopes Monkey Trial; however, Darrow criticized the Communist Party, stating that the Scottsboro case “is being controlled by the Communist Party. They are more interested in using this case for their own ideological purposes than they are in the safety and welfare of the Black youths.”⁴⁰ The sudden resignation of prominent veteran attorney Clarence Darrow greatly disappointed the members of the support group, who were aiming to win the retrial by elevating the new publicity campaign and organized movement.

At this point, in January 1933, William L. Patterson, the Executive Secretary of the IDL, wrote a letter to Leibowitz, a prominent young attorney based in New York, asking him to defend the boys. Although Leibowitz knew that the ILD was a Communist Party organization and that Communist Party has increased its influence in the support group, Leibowitz accepted the request to defend the boys having himself suffered continuous racial discrimination as a poor Jewish boy. However, when Leibowitz arrived in Alabama, he was greeted by a tempestuous street demonstration to shouts of, “Down with the Jewish lawyer from New York,” and, “To hell with attorney Leibowitz! Chase him out of town!” as a strange atmosphere reminiscent of martial law gripped the town, which was heavily guarded by state militia.⁴¹

The second problem faced by the IDL and the League of Struggle for Negro Rights concerned the intensification of the conflict with the National Association for Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which had been working to advance the well-being of Black Americans and improve social status.

In the early days of the Scottsboro case, the NAACP first wished to focus on uncovering the facts of the case, stating, “If they were guilty and had a fair trial, the case is none of our business.”⁴² However, although as the truth of the matter became clear, the NAACP organized a large-scale publicity campaign and support movement. It argued that due to “the nonsensical activities of the Communists,” the case had involved “too much sectional recrimination; too much racial emphasis; and too much personal feeling,” calling for the ILD and League of Struggle for Negro Rights to withdraw from the support movement.⁴³ Therefore, in Chattanooga, William Pickens—the Kansas representative of the NAACP—strongly criticized the Communist activities surrounding the case as a threat to favorable human relations between the Blacks and Whites.⁴⁴

The Communist Party objected, labelling the NAACP’s criticism “reformist” and “opportunistic” and branding its activities to organize Black Americans as simply an effort to fuse the White and Black bourgeois.⁴⁵ This conflict between the Communist Party and the NAACP also created divisions among the youths and their mothers, with Ozie Powell, Charley Weems, and Clarence Norris taking positions in support of the NAACP rather than the ILD

and League of Struggle for Negro Rights.⁴⁶

Then, the more the Communist Party expanded its campaign, the more it began to arouse not only the support group but also the people of Alabama; from 1931, there was an increase in the number of attacks on African Americans and Communist Party members by White mobs seized by the “red” fear. For example, on July 15, 1931, when the SCU held a meeting in Camp Hill, Tallapoosa County to protest against the Scottsboro case, members were attacked by a mob of several hundred Whites, culminating in the lynching and killing of Ralph Gray, a Black Communist Party member and the Union leader. Moreover, on July 11, 1932, in Atlanta, Georgia, Angelo Herndon, another Black Communist Party member, was arrested for insurrection while conducting publicity activities. To integrate the support movement for Herndon and the Scottsboro case campaign, the ILD formed the National Scottsboro-Herndon Action Committee.⁴⁷

Section 4: The Conclusion of the Retrials

It cannot be denied that, after the United States Supreme Court’s decision to order a retrial, factors such as the change of defense attorneys, the “fear” of communism, and the lynching outbreak created division and conflict among the individuals involved in the support campaign. Yet it is also true that, because of the series of surprising facts that came to light in the retrial courtroom to the advantage of the “defendants,” and the defense’s unbridled offensive during the trial, these divisions and conflicts became swallowed up amid the seething public sentiment. It should be noted that the abrupt turn during the retrial long preceded the division and conflict in the support campaign.

On the second day of the retrial, Dr. Richard Bridges, who appeared as a witness at the request of the defense, while presenting the medical records for the two women, testified that he had found no vaginal tearing when he examined them. This testimony was supported by that of Lester Carter, who was aboard the same freight train until just before the incident occurred. Although these new facts and testimonies seemed like strong evidence for the boys’ innocence, the trial took a further twist, which shocked the prosecution and was significant enough to influence considerably the direction of the retrial. The second “victim,” Ruby Bates, who had not been questioned in detail by the prosecution due to her disappearance, appeared in the courtroom as a witness for the defense. While showering abuse on Victoria Price, Bates clearly testified that everything she had told the police in Scottsboro was untrue. Urged by Harry E. Fosdick of the Riverside Church in New York, where she had visited during her disappearance, Bates repented of her previous way of life on the verge of prostitution and found herself unable to stand by and watch as the boys lost their youth due to a false accusation.⁴⁸

Bates’ defection to the defense came as a surprise not only to the prosecution but also to the locals, who believed in the guilty verdict. That night, rumors circulated of a 200-strong White mob, outraged by the sudden turn of fortune in the trial, advancing from nearby Huntsville to attack Bates and attorney Leibowitz, and Decatur was thrown into a state of uproar. However, the following day, amid this atmosphere, the jury returned another “guilty” verdict.

About a month later, in May 1933, the support group, including the ILD, the League of Struggle for Negro Rights, and the NAACP, gathered approximately 4,000 people from across the country and orchestrated a heated mass march on Washington and protest demonstration aimed at the President of the United States. At the head of the parade were Bates and some of the Scottsboro boys’ mothers. Similar demonstrations were held throughout the country under slogans such as, “The Scottsboro Boys Must Not Die!” “The Scottsboro Boys Must Be Freed!”

and “Save the Scottsboro Boys!” and the outpouring of public sentiment reached beyond America to the wider world.⁴⁹

In 1934, the Communist Party established the American Scottsboro Committee, and the following year saw the formation of the Scottsboro Defense Committee, a greatly united front, in response to the lessons learned from the march on Washington. This Scottsboro Defense Committee was composed of organizations such as the ILD, NAACP, American Civil Liberties' Union, Church League for Industrial Democracy, League for Industrial Democracy, and Methodist Federation for Social Service. From that point, this committee assumed the central role in the campaign surrounding the legal battle.⁵⁰

Conclusion

As described above, the American Communist Party of the early 1930s followed a policy of assisting the Black liberation struggle while mechanically applying the Comintern's *Thesis on National and Colonial Questions*. However, given the conditions faced by African Americans at the time and the distorted nature of Southern society, this policy was hardly effective in expanding the party's power base, and it is no exaggeration to say that it caused confusion and dispute in the party.

Nevertheless, the Scottsboro incident, which happened to coincide with these developments, highlighted the racism and prejudice of the American South and provided the Communist Party USA, whose discussions had focused entirely on social reform along party lines, with a platform from which to pursue concrete organized activities and develop a mass movement. In other words, because the Scottsboro incident actualized certain contradictions rooted in the American “land” and tradition, the Communist Party USA was able to orchestrate a support movement that surpassed its tactical discussions. This also had much in common with the Communist Party's role in the San Francisco general strike and in the “grassroots” movement of unemployed laborers.

In the late 1930s, with the rise of Fascism in Europe and a second world war on the horizon, the world turned its attention away from the Scottsboro case. Yet despite such circumstances, in 1937, the Communist Party USA argued that the Scottsboro case gave testament to the experience of a united front and the development of a people's front,⁵¹ clarifying its intention to continue supporting the boys and campaigning for the court battle. This position was shaped by the development in which, as the New Deal policies were rolled out in quick succession, the Communist Party USA greatly changed its party line, stressing unity among separate democratic movements and trade union movements, when the Popular Front was proposed at the Seventh Congress of the Communist International. We may also say, then, that as a consequence of this change of direction, the Communist Party could continue working on the Scottsboro case despite difficulties such as the unrealistic nature of its policy and the influence of the “red” fear.

In the Scottsboro trial, after many years and numerous retrials, charges were dropped against five boys and the remaining four were later exonerated. None of the boys was executed.⁵² However, the final defendant, Andy Wright, spent 20 years of his life in prison before his release in June 1950, shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War.

Notes

1. National Emergency Council, ed., *Report on Economic Conditions of the South* (1938) (New York: Da Capo Press, 1972). The *Report on Economic Conditions of the South* embodied the concept of Southern “regionalism,” developed primarily by Howard W. Odum, then a sociologist at Chapel Hill. Howard W. Odum, *Southern Regions of the United States* (1936) (New York: Agathon, 1969); Howard W. Odum and Harry E. Moore, *American Regionalism: A Cultural-Historical Approach to National Integration* (1938) (New York: Peter Smith, 1966). See Eiichi Akimoto, “Amerika ni okeru Chiiki Shugi (Regionalism) no Shiteki Tenkai” [Historical Development of Regionalism in the United States], *Economic Journal of Chiba University*, 18 (July 1985).
2. R. Burford, “Effects of the Federal Cotton Acreage Programs on Outcoming from Southern Farmers, 1930-1940,” Ph.D. dissertation (Indiana University, 1961), pp. 49-50. Eiichi Akimoto, *New Deal and American Capitalism* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1989), pp. 209-210, 312-329. George B. Tindall, *The Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), pp. 359-361.
3. Haywood Patterson & Earl Conrad, *Scottsboro Boy* (Toronto, Ontario: Collier-Macmillan Canada Ltd., 1969); Dan T. Carter, *Scottsboro: A Tragedy of the American South* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971). Although no empirical research on the Scottsboro incident has been conducted in Japan, the following are useful references: Goro Nakano, *Amerika no Ankoku—Beikoku o Shōdō Shita Daijiken* [The Darkness of America: Major Incidents that Shocked the United States] (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 1953), pp. 160-186. Masamichi Morikawa, “Amerika ni okeru Ankoku Saiban: Sono 2—Sukottsuboro jiken” [Closed Trials in the United States: (2) The Scottsboro Case], *Buraku Kaiho Kenkyu*, IIIC (1977).
4. Vladimir I. Lenin, *Draft Thesis on National and Colonial Questions*, translated by Tadahiko Kawauchi (Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1954), pp. 190-191; William Z. Foster, *The Negro People in the American History* (New York: International Publishers, 1970), pp. 455-456; Tetsuro Kato, *Kominterun no Sekaizō* [World Image of the Comintern] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1994).
5. This can be clarified from the Communist Party USA in the following publications. Editorial, “C.I. Resolution on the Negro Question in U.S.,” *The Communist*, XII-1 (January 1930), p. 48; Harry Haywood, “The Struggle for the Leninist Position on the Negro Question in the U.S.A.,” *The Communist*, XII-9 (September 1933), pp. 895-897; Editorial, “Resolution on the Negro Question in the United States: Final Text, Conformed by the Political Commission by the E.C.C.I.,” *The Communist*, X-2 (February 1931), pp. 153-164. Cf. Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, *The American Communist Party: A Critical History* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1961), p. 206.
6. Editorial, “C.I. Resolution on the Negro Question in U. S.,” *ibid.*, pp. 48-49; Editorial, “Resolution on the Negro Question in the United States: Final Text, Conformed by the Political Commission by the E.C.C.I.,” *ibid.*, pp. 153-154.
7. Charles H. Martin, “The International Labor Defense and Black America,” *Labor History*, No. 26-2 (Spring 1985), pp. 169-170; Wilson Record, *The Negro and the Communist Party* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1951), p. 62.
8. Editorial, “C.I. Resolution on Negro Question in U. S.,” *The Communist*, XI-1 (January 1929), pp. 48-55.
9. Theodore Draper, *American Communism and Soviet Russia* (New York: International Publishers, 1963), pp. 352-353; Earl Browder, “The Bolshevization of the Communist Party,” *The Communist*, IX-9 (August 1930), pp. 689-690.
10. William Z. Foster, *History of the Communist Party in the United States* (New York: International Publishers, 1952), p. 254; Jane Degras, ed., *The Communist International Document 1919-1943* (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), Vol. II, pp. 398-401. Note that this collection of materials by Degras reveals some interesting facts about the conflict within the Comintern and the Communist Party—though a detailed critique of the text is necessary.
11. Editorial, “Resolution on the Negro Question in the United States: Final Text,” *The Communist*, X-2 (February 1931), pp. 153-167.
12. Mark Naison, *Communists in Harlem during the Depression* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), pp. 37-45. Cf. Earl Browder, “To the Masses! – To the Shops! Organize the Masses!: Extracts from the Report of the Political Bureau to the Central Committee, 13th Plenum, C.P.U.S.A., August 21,” *The Communist*, X-10 (October 1931), p. 816.

13. Mark Naison, *ibid.*, pp. 47-49; Harry Heywood, *Black Bolshevik: Autobiography of an Afro-American Communist* (New York: Liberator Press, 1978), pp. 353-358; Fraser M. Ottanelli, *The Communist Party and the United States: From the Depression to World War* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1991), p. 38. Shinobu Uesugi, *Kōminken Undō e no Michi—Amerika Nanbu Nōson ni okeru Kokujin no Tatakai—* [The Road to the Civil Rights Movement: The Fight of the African Americans in the American Rural South] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1998), p. 181.
14. For that reason, the evaluation of Comintern documents is beset with difficulties. Editorial, "Letter from the E.C.C.I. to the Sixth Convention of the C.P. of U.S.A.," *International Press Correspondence* (1929), p. 208; Das Politsekretariat des E.K.K.I., "Das E.K.K.I.-Plenum," *International Press-Korrespondenz*, LXIXVI (1931), S. 2633. Also note that the extensive Comintern library was examined in detail based on the documents held in Senshu University Library.
15. This confusion and dispute can be observed in the following sources. A. B. Magil, "Toward Social-Fascism: The 'Rejuvenation' of the Socialist Party," *The Communist*, XI-5 (May 1930), pp. 467-468; Editorial, "The Present Situation and the Tasks of the Communist Party of the U.S.A.: Resolution of the Eighth National Convention, Cleveland, Ohio, April 2-8, 1934," *The Communist*, XIII-5 (May 1934), p. 439; Sl Gerson, "The New 'Left' Social-Fascism," *The Communist*, IX-7 (July 1930), p. 627; Carl Reeve, "Lovestoneism-Twin of Fascist-Trotskyism," *The Communist*, XVII-8 (Aug. 1938), pp. 733-734; Editorial, "The Significance of the Comintern Address," *The Communist*, VIII-6 (June 1929), p. 274.
16. Editorial, "C.I. Resolution on the Negro Question in U.S.," *ibid.*, p. 48; Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-208.
17. William Z. Foster, *op. cit.*, pp. 456-460; James W. Ford, "Build the National Negro Congress Movement," *The Communist*, XV-6 (June 1936), pp. 557-559.
18. Cyril Briggs, "Our Negro Work," *The Communist*, VIII-9 (September 1929), p. 495; Editorial, "U.S. Agriculture and Tasks of the Communist Party of U.S.A.: A Draft Program submitted for general discussion-conclusion," *The Communist*, IX-4 (April 1930), pp. 373-374. However, the state of the National Negro Department and the District and Section Negro Committee is largely unknown.
19. Shinobu Uesugi, *op. cit.*, p. 181.
20. In June 1930, in Atlanta, the "Black Shirts" (the American Order of Fascist) was formed by about 400 White people to "combat the Communist Party...and foster white supremacy." Mark Solomon, "Red and Black: African Americans and Communism," Ph. D. dissertation (Harvard University 1972), pp. 418-422; John H. Moore, "Communist and Fascist in a Southern City: Atlanta, 1930," *Southern Atlantic Quarterly*, LXVII (Summer 1968), pp. 440-444. Shinobu Uesugi, *ibid.*, pp. 181-182.
21. James W. Ford, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-161; Jime Allen, "Some Rural Aspects of the Struggle for the Right of Self-Determination," *The Communist*, X-3 (March 1931), pp. 249-251.
22. Shinobu Uesugi, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-186. *Chattanooga Daily Times* (May 6, 1931). In December 1932, there was another incident, in which a shootout broke out between SCU members and a group of sheriffs (the "Battle of Reeltown"). Eiichi Akimoto, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-213. Robinson D. G. Kelley, *Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists during the Great Depression* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990). Also note that Southern Blacks regarded organizers from the outside as successors to the "carpetbaggers," (Republican Party members) who moved from the North during the Reconstruction Era following the Civil War.
23. Shinobu Uesugi, "Amerika Nanbu Mensaku Purantēshon Chiiki ni okeru Nōmin / Nōgyō Rōdōsha no Tatakai" [The Battles of Farmers and Agricultural Workers in the Cotton Plantations of the American South], *Journal of Historical Studies*, 426 (1975), p. 4. T. J. Woofter, Junior's 1934 plantation survey is also important. T. J. Woofter, Jr., et al, *Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation* (Washington, D.C.: GOP, 1936), p. 3.
24. Shinobu Uesugi, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5. Renwick C. Kennedy, "Black Belt Aristocrats: The Old South Lives on in Alabama's Black Belt," *Social Forces*, 13-1 (Oct. 1934), pp. 84-85; F. R. Marshall, *Labor in the South* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), Ch. 5.
25. W. W. Rogers, "The Negro Alliance in Alabama," *The Journal of Negro History* (January 1960), pp. 34-38; John Beecher, "The Share Croppers' Union in Alabama," *Social Forces*, 13-1 (Oct. 1934), pp. 124-132. Since Alabama included the steel industry heartland of Birmingham, the Communist Party was also considering the possibility of collaboration with urban workers. Shinobu Uesugi, *ibid.*, pp. 185-196.

26. *New Masses* (Oct. 22, 1935); *The Nation* (Sept. 18, 1935).
27. This description of the cotton pickers relies heavily on an article by Shinobu Uesugi: Shinobu Uesugi, "1935-nen Arabama-shū Raunzu Gun ni okeru Wata-tsumi Sutoraiiki ni tsuite" [The 1935 Cotton Pickers Strike in Lowndes County, Alabama], *The Studies in Western History*, 143 (1986).
28. *Birmingham Post* (Aug. 27, 1935); *Montgomery Advertiser* (Aug. 31, 1935). Shinobu Uesugi, *ibid.*, p. 17.
29. Dan T. Carter, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-11.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-50.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 51-103.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 104-136.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 137-191.
34. Cyril Briggs, "Our Negro Work," *The Communist*, VIII-9 (Sept. 1929), pp. 495-496.
35. James W. Ford, "The Negro and the Struggle against Imperialism," *The Communist*, IX-1 (January 1930), pp. 23-24; Jime Allen, *op. cit.*, pp. 249-251; James W. Ford, *The Negro and the Democratic Front* (New York: International Publishers, 1938). Note that Ford and Allen were two of the best informed on the Negro Question in the Communist Party.
36. James W. Ford and Anna Damon, "Scottsboro in the Light of Building the Negro People's Front," *The Communist*, XVI-9 (Sept. 1937), pp. 839-843; Harry Haywood, "The Scottsboro Decision," *The Communist*, XI-12 (Dec. 1932), pp. 1065-1069; Dan T. Carter, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-58.
37. William L. Patterson, "The I.L.D. Faces the Future," *The Communist*, XIII-7 (July 1934), pp. 718-727; James W. Ford and Anna Damon, *ibid.*, p. 843; Dan T. Carter, *op. cit.*, pp. 148, 172. Engdahl died of pneumonia in a Moscow hospital in the midst of this international support campaign.
38. Dan T. Carter, *ibid.*, pp. 13-17; *New York Times* (June 21, 1931), p. 5; *The Nation*, CXXXVII (1933), pp. 734-735.
39. William Z. Foster, "Fascist Tendencies in the United States," *The Communist*, XIV-10 (Oct. 1935), p. 889; Dan T. Carter, *op. cit.*, p. 143; Walter White, "The Negro and the Communist," *Harper's Magazine*, CLXIV (1931), p. 68; James W. Ford, "The United Front in the Field of Negro Work," *The Communist*, XIV-2 (February 1935), p. 166.
40. Clarence Darrow, "Scottsboro," *The Crisis*, (March 1932), p. 81; Michael Hannon, "Clarence Darrow: State & Federal Cases," (University of Minnesota, Law Library) <moses.law.umn.edu/darrow/trialpdfs/STATE_FED_CASES.pdf>
41. Dan T. Carter, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-182.
42. Harry Haywood, "The Scottsboro Decision: Victory of Revolutionary Struggle over Reformist Betrayal," *The Communist*, XI-12 (Dec. 1932), p. 1069.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 1069-1070; Wilson Record, *Race and Radicalism: The NAACP and the Communist Party in Conflict* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964), pp. 47-48.
44. Harry Haywood, *ibid.*, p. 1070; Wilson Record, *ibid.*, p. 48; Dan T. Carter, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-183; Hugh Murray, "The NAACP versus the Communist Party: The Scottsboro Rape Cases, 1931-1932," <www.anthonyflood.com/murraynaacpvscp.htm>
45. Jime Allen, "The Scottsboro Struggle," *The Communist*, XII-5 (May 1933), pp. 440-441; Editorial, "The Scottsboro Struggle and the Next Steps: Resolution of the Political Bureau," *The Communist*, XII-6 (June 1933), p. 573; Harry Haywood, *ibid.*, p. 1070.
46. Editorial, "The Development of Struggle for Negro Rights," *The Communist*, XIV-6 (June 1935), pp. 573-575.
47. The Camp Hill and Herndon incidents were emblematic of the anti-Communist hysteria in the American South. Henry Fuller, "Sunday at Camp Hill," *New Republic*, XCIX (1941), pp. 132-134; H. Hudson, *Black Worker in the Deep South* (New York: International Publishers, 1972), pp. 34-36.
48. Mary H. Vorse, "The Scottsboro Trial," *New Republic*, LXXIV (1933), pp. 276-277; Mary H. Vorse, "How Scottsboro Happened," *New Republic*, LXXIV (1933), p. 256.
49. Jime Allen, "The Scottsboro Struggle," *ibid.*, pp. 437-438; Editorial, "The Scottsboro Struggle and the Next Steps: Resolution of the Political Bureau," *ibid.*, 570-573; James W. Ford and Anna Damon, *op. cit.*, p. 838.
50. Eral Browder, "New Steps in the United Front," *The Communist*, XIV-6 (June 1935), p. 1105; James W. Ford and Anna Damon, *op. cit.*, pp. 843-844; James W. Ford, "The United Front in the Field of Negro Work," *ibid.*, p. 173.
51. Eral Browder, "The United Front – The Key to Our New Tactical Orientation," *The Communist*, XIV-2

(December 1935), pp. 1119-1120.

52. Carleton Beals, "Scottsboro Puppet Show," *The Nation*, CXLII (1936), p. 149; Morris Shapiro, "Behind the Scenes at Scottsboro," *The Nation*, CXLV (1937), p. 171; Clarence Norris, *The Last of the Scottsboro Boys* (New York: Basic, 1979).

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